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Individualism in the Novels of Nuruddin Farah 




The subject conceived as “individual” is a sustained focus across the novels of Somali 
writer, Nuruddin Farah. This thesis locates a reading of individualism in Farah’s novels 
in the context of the historical and philosophical development of modern identity in the 
societies of the North-Atlantic. It relies primarily on the analysis of philosopher, Charles 
Taylor, who proposes that individualism makes modern identity an historically 
unprecedented mode of conceiving the person. By individualism, Taylor refers to the 
inward location of moral sources in orientation around which the self is constituted. Non-
individualist conceptions of the self locate moral horizons external to the subject thereby 
defined. 
The novel appears to be the most significant cultural form which mutually 
constitutes modern subjectivity. This is suggested by the centrality of the Bildungsroman 
sub-genre which fundamentally determines the form of the novel. Farah’s work spans the 
historical development of the novel from the proto-realism of his first publication, 
through modernism and postmodernism, returning to the “neo-realism” of his most recent 
novel. The representation of the subject in the novel suggests transformations in identity 
which belie the uniformity of the disengaged, autonomous self which is articulated in the 
novel as a genre. Tension thus is generated between the social commitment Farah 
expresses as a writer and the limitations of the form which deny representation to the 
heteronomous subjectivities who are the objects of Farah’s concern. 
 
The introduction identifies the centrality of individualism to Farah’s project. 
Chapter 1 explores the historical development of individualism and genealogies of 
alternative conceptions of self. 
Chapter 2 addresses the articulation of individualism in the classic Bildungsroman, the 










Chapter 3 interrogates Farah’s use of the “dissensual” Bildungsroman to escape the 
contradiction of the classic Bildungsroman. 
Chapter 4  focuses on how modernism in the novels allows aesthetic resolution of 
individualist contradiction through fragmentation. 
Chapter 5 explores the resistance encountered when the novel attempts to represent 
heteronomy rather than autonomy. 
Chapter 6 suggests the indispensability of coherent subjectivity to Farah’s socially 
committed stance. Within the philosophical matrix of individualism, the “performative” 














Somali writer, Nuruddin Farah Hassan (b. 1945), is known in literary circles as a dramatist,  
novelist and short story writer. He is also known as an essayist and as a writer of non-fiction. 
It is, however, as a novelist that he receives most attention. Farah’s development as a writer 
is interesting since his oeuvre seems to compress a history of the novel into the life work of a 
single author. Farah’s novels trace a trajectory from a kind of proto-realism to modernism 
and postmodernism. Through a broad overview of the criticism of Farah’s novels, this 
section attempts to show the various ways in which the individual is key to an understanding 
of Farah’s work. 
For reasons to be explained in a later chapter, Farah’s first published novel is also 
one of his most fascinating. From a Crooked Rib, which was written while Farah was a 
student of philosophy at the University of Chandigarh in the Punjab, was published in 1970. 
Despite criticism of the book’s lack of aesthetic accomplishment (Wright Novels of 
Nuruddin Farah 27), it was acclaimed for its representation of female consciousness so 
convincing that the author subsequently received mail addressed to “Dear Ms Farah” (Jaggi).  
This first novel with a central female character was followed in 1976 by A Naked Needle 
with its  peripatetic male protagonist. Farah’s literary inspiration is varied and includes 
Dostoevsky, Hugo, Woolf, Joyce and Hemingway among others. (Farah “Why I Write”).  
Influenced by Samuel Beckett (Sugnet “Maps” 741), Farah, after publication of A Naked 
Needle, began to compose his novels as trilogies with characters recognizable from earlier 
books populating later novels. The convention of the trilogy, Farah has explained, 











the theme of an African Dictatorship”, includes the novels Sweet and Sour Milk, Sardines, 
and Close Sesame. The second sequence is titled the “Blood in the Sun” trilogy. This 
includes Maps, Farah’s novel which has received the most scholarly attention, Gifts and 
Secrets. These books have been followed up by two other novels, Links and Knots, which 
presumably form part of a third trilogy, as yet to be named. 
This thesis argues that the novel is a genre which in fundamental ways ideally 
embodies Farah’s worldview. Farah’s novels represent a dense collage of themes, issues and 
concerns, reflected in a kaleidoscopic body of criticism. It will be suggested that beneath 
these shifting  hermeneutic patterns an underlying foundation in philosophical individualism 
is discernible which motivates the content, the form and the interplay of both in the novels.  
 Since Farah’s novels are situated at the nexus of so wide and varied a range of issues, 
critical approaches have been legion. One thematic concern in the literature has been a focus 
on the representation of feminist concerns in the novels (Alden and Tremaine, Stratton and 
Okonkwo, among others). Attention has also been paid to Farah as an explicitly political 
writer, dissecting colonization, postcolonial dictatorship and civil war (Gugler, Mnthali, 
Ntalindwa, Pajalich, Turfan and Wright among others). The representation of Somali culture, 
religion and orality in the novels has also been a focus of attention (Hawley, Mazrui, 
Phillips, Samatar, S.S. and Sparrow among others). A very important thematic concern has 
been the novels’ critique of nationalism (Cobham, Garuba, Ngaboh-Smart, Ntalindwa among 
others). The re-imagining of extended and nuclear family structures has also been considered 
(Bardolph and Alidou, among others). Questions of form have been addressed by various 
critics, in particular, the use of the techniques of modernism and postmodernism (Gikandi, 











perspective of genre study. Ian Adam, for example, considers the affinity of the novels with 
the detective story. 
 Despite the plethora of approaches supported by the novels, a broad survey of the 
literature suggests several ideas in common. One of these is that in various formal ways the 
novels resist hermeneutic closure. Critics observe that Farah’s fiction is marked by 
“dialogics”, “polyphony”, “openness” and “multiplicity” (Pajalich). Hawley finds in the 
novels a hybridized reality in which no ultimate meaning can be found. At best the artist 
offers only an “inscrutability, a holding in abeyance of finality.” (86) Wright encapsulates 
this effect as the “democratic pluralism” of Farah’s political vision (Nuruddin Farah  xix). 
Adam observes of Sweet and Sour Milk, which shares in the generic conventions of both 
detective novel and thriller, that closure is motivated by a repudiation of the idea of a final, 
monologic, dictatorial answer (“Murder of Soyaan Keynaan”). Phillips’s reading of the 
symbolism of shadow in Sardines finds that the novel provides no definitive insights, only 
alternatives, variations and doubt. While Ruggiero provocatively proposes that the map 
presented at the end of Maps is a blank map, Garuba, suggests that what is finally tentatively 
revealed is only an “outline map” (“Postcolonial Geographies” 111). Similarly, Cobham 
states that Maps “challenges us to resist the reflexive urge to pin down a single version of the 
African reality as ‘true’” (“Boundaries of the Nation” 96).  
 Associated with the radical hermeneutic indeterminacy outlined above, is a focus in 
the literature on the individualism displayed in the novels. Gikandi, for example, suggests 
that “Art … prefigure[s] the author’s major concern with the state of the individual in 
modern culture” (“Postcolonial Textuality” 756). The specific type of subjectivity which 











symbolized by the fatherless character, Kalaman, in Secrets in whose genealogical and 
semantic “cul-de-sac of a name” this autonomy is realized. The focus on the individual often 
involves “an intense and passionate search for and assertion of identity” (Mnthali). The 
unremitting focus on the individual paradoxically splits the subject. In the context of an 
analysis of Maps, Gikandi refers to the textual construction of a hybridized or “split 
personality” (458), while Kazan suggests of the same novel that “the fissures rent in national 
and personal identity” (470) produce a schizophrenic self.  
 Placed in the historical and political context of the postcolony, the novels display a 
concern with  the subject as individual operated on by the power of both the postcolonial 
state and tradition. Hand suggests that Farah’s books are about “individual men and women 
who have been denied their rights” (117). A primary individual right explored is the right to 
freedom (Wright, Bardolph, Dietche, Hand, among others). The fictions are also concerned 
with individual resistance to traditional and postcolonial state power (Mnthali, Turfan, 
among others). Individual resistance often takes the form of a development of the “capacity 
for self-regulation” (Stratton “The Novels” 154). The transformation of society, the novels 
propose, is an effect of the transformation of individuals (Pajalich 321). What finally is at 
issue in the novels, it appears, is a cosmopolitan, performative subjectivity. Ngaboh-Smart 
observes that the new individual constructed in the novels “underscores a new civic 
consciousness that connects the self and the local directly to the international” (“Secrets” 
135). 
 The most expansive exploration of individualism in Farah’s novels occurs in the 
criticism of Juliet Okonkwo, Patricia Alden and Louis Tremaine. Okonkwo highlights the 











political freedom …” (“Novelist as Artist” 48), or in alternative formulation, Farah is 
preoccupied with the lack of rights of his characters. It is in Farah’s female characters in 
particular that this “extreme individualistic spirit”(Okonkwo “Novelist as Artist” 49) and 
“consciousness of  […] individual rights” (Okonkwo “Novelist as Artist” 49-50) are 
manifested.  This leads Okonkwo to suggest that while African male writers (and many 
African women writers) represent their female characters stereotypically, Farah’s depiction 
of his heroines displays an egregious attention to their individuality. The individualism of 
Farah’s female characters is defined in terms of their rationality, potential for self-
development and their quest for freedom. Freedom of expression, in particular, is 
foregrounded. For Okonkwo, in addition, Farah is unique in the African literary landscape in 
his successful reconciliation of aesthetic and political concerns. The political novel, 
Okonkwo suggests, can “be faithful to artistic aesthetics.” Quoting Farah himself, Okonkwo 
explains that art is served by “selectively taking the facts of existence and imposing order 
and form upon them in an aesthetic pattern, thereby making them meaningful and relevant.” 
(Okonkwo “Literature and Politics” 57) Aesthetic form imposes order upon the “facts of 
existence” of the subject as individual. Okonkwo stresses that Farah “champions the cause” 
of the freedom of the individual. Okonkwo reveals a connection here only implicit in the 
texts themselves between the individualism of the subjectivity presented in the novels and 
the formal resolution of the aesthetics-politics dichotomy. Exploring the link between the 
individual and this artistic resolution is a substantial concern of this thesis. 
 Alden and Tremaine, drawing on and extending Okonkwo’s argument observe that 
Farah’s fiction represents an extended meditation on the individual: 
Our thesis is that the various strands in Farah’s writing are elements of a single 











deepening meditation on the complex relationship between individual autonomy 
and social responsibility. In Farah’s artistic vision no value is more precious or 
essential than the individual’s freedom to define and shape the life of the self. To 
claim this principle requires, however, that such freedom be extended to all, 
actively promoted within every relationship at every level of human affairs, and 
defended through collective action when necessary. This vision generates and 
incorporates Farah’s political philosophy, his treatment of gender, and his use of 
language (Nuruddin Farah vii-viii). 
The assumptions and implications of Alden and Tremaine’s thesis may be summarized as 
follows: Individual autonomy enjoys ontological status in Farah’s novels. Proceeding out of 
this autonomy is the radical freedom to define the self with a consequent valorization of 
freedom above other values. The principle of equality is enshrined in the extension of the 
freedom of the autonomous self to others. The obverse of this principle is also true. (Equality 
can only be extended to selves who are likewise freely autonomous. They can only achieve 
equality when once they are autonomous.) The corollary is that the collective  is an 
association of free and equal individuals. 
 If this is an accurate reflection of Farah’s political philosophy, then social formations 
are secondary. They are not, “the inevitabilities, the givens, by which lives and identities are 
defined; rather they are instruments to be critically used, rejected or transformed for political 
purposes in which each individual, as an individual bears responsibility” (Alden and 
Tremaine 41). The critical literature fully supports Alden and Tremaine’s observation of the 
novels’ skepticism of the primacy of the social. Bardolph notes that the novels  challenge the 
vertical relationships of fathers and sons, central to patriarchal, patrilinear, virilocal Somali 
kinship systems. Instead, across almost all the novels, the bonds between brothers and sisters 











constructed which itself then comes under literary scrutiny. The horizontal bonds do not 
create a utopian space. Maps is the novel most widely considered to deconstruct both 
national and gender identity (Cobham, Garuba, Wright, among others), powerfully embodied 
by the “menstruating” central male character, Askar. Through the symbol of the foundling, 
Gifts interrogates biological parenthood (Alden and Tremaine). Secrets, through 
provocatively exploding the notion of fatherhood, fundamentally destabilizes both “blood 
and bones” theories of Somali clanship and the nuclear family.   
 What is passed over without illumination in the literature since it is obfuscated in the 
novels, is the paradoxical ontology of the individual in a philosophy which appears to reject 
ontology. The individual is constituted through procedural rationality which, in its self-
validating universality, seems to exclude socially or transcendentally constructed codes. As 
the discussion of the critical literature above suggests, the novels challenge the 
transcendence of national, clan and gender identity from the sublimely absolute, 
unquestioned certainty of the self-reflexive individual. The literature uncritically reflects 
what constitutes the “unthought” of the novels. What is effaced in the novels and in the 
criticism is the existence of a disengaged, essential prior self possessed of the tautological 
capacity to construct itself from the range of options open to it. While this self acquires the 
liberatory overtones encompassed by notions of “hybridity”, “creoleness”, “metissage”, and 
so on, it is predicated on the existence of a prior “disengaged” self which in Farah’s writing 
and in the criticism is completely naturalized. This thesis will attempt to show that 
individualism in the novels operates to occlude those codes external to the autonomous self. 
Some sense of the process by which this occurs is encountered in the observations of 











Farah represents. Language is crucial to the liberatory acts of self-narration of these 
individuals. These self-narrations, one needs to stress, as Alden and Tremaine do not, occur 
in the context of and are constituted in novels. These acts of self-narration are also acts of 
self-definition. But it is only a secondary self which is constituted through these acts of self-
narration. The primary self, this thesis argues, is the subject in part constituted by the novel 
form itself, which in the most extraordinary sleight of hand remains completely invisible but 
completely in control. In order to come into existence, this primary self, “the individual”, 
orients itself within a moral horizon which also remains imperceptible. 
 The moral horizon which does come into view is the subsequent ethics of inter-
subjective relations, what Alden and Tremaine refer to as the “ethical role of the 
imagination.” Individual autonomy expresses itself through imaginative acts of self-
narration. When this self-narration is “fully performed, it is a profoundly social act, one that 
takes place not in a vacuum but in a world” (157).  The self-narration of the autonomous 
individual is ethical “since it must be brought under the control of the inventor and projected 
outward into a social reality to engage other accounts of the world” (168). In this schema, the 
only ethics are the ethics which emerge secondarily in the mutual negotiation of the acts of 
self-narration of autonomous individuals.  
 The connection between a particular conception of the subject and what is variously 
termed ethics, morality, politics, commitment or the social, on the one hand, and the art of 
the novel, on the other, occurs explicitly, as we have seen, in the analysis of Alden and 
Tremaine. It also occurs explicitly in Okonkwo’s assertion of Farah’s “unideological” 
reconciliation through the category of the individual of the otherwise irreconcilable 











various discourses and conceptual frameworks, the assertion is made that Farah’s 
achievement in the novels is an aesthetically triumphant literature of commitment articulated 
through the individual.           
 This thesis argues that the triangulation of the individual, ethics and aesthetic form 
discernible in the critical literature on the novels of Farah, is not fortuitous. It is the 
necessary consequence of a culturally and historically limited conception of the person as 
disengaged individual in part entrenched by the genre of the novel. The philosophical milieu 
within which the novel defined itself was one in which social and/or transcendental ethics no 
longer appeared convincing. A complex interplay existed between decisive philosophical 
shifts in the understanding of the self and science, economy, society and culture in European 
society of the seventeenth century. No longer could the idea of an ontologically grounded or 
logocentric ethics be philosophically supported. Henceforward, morality, as a consequence 
of the manner in which the self was conceived, appeared to emanate from within this newly 
conceptualized subject, or “the individual”. The decisive break in the new European 
understanding of the self occurs with the formulation of Cartesian rationality and is fully 
articulated in Lockean empiricism. The birth of this new understanding of the self as 
individual coincides with the birth of the novel, the new genre which culturally embodies, 
explores and reconciles the contradictions of the transformed subjectivity.  
Like the new individual, capable of self-definition, form in the novel is not given as 
in the epic. Instead, form must be self-reflexively generated out of the life of the individual 
around which the novel acquires shape. It is in the complexities of this exchange that ethics 
is constituted. This thesis proposes that Farah’s novels represent particularly clearly the 











representation of the person through the form of the novel. Against this background, 
individual chapters explore the following areas: 
  Chapter 1 details the theoretical scaffolding which supports the ensuing analysis. It 
draws centrally on the work of philosopher, Charles Taylor, who suggests that individualism 
is the effect of the relocation of moral sources within the autonomous self. While drawing 
primarily on moral philosophy, the field expands into various other disciplines. The effects 
of individualism are encountered in the histories of sociology, anthropology, religious 
studies, political science, law, art and literature. 
 Chapter 2 explores the contemporaneous rise of the novel genre and the 
Bildungsroman sub-genre. It argues that the Bildungsroman, the novel type in which free and 
full personality is developed, articulates with sharpest clarity the individualist foundational 
premise of the novel genre. In various ways the Bildungsroman structure of From a Crooked 
Rib, Farah’s first novel, replicates the eighteenth century rise of the novel in a postcolonial 
context. The chapter considers the implications for the postcolonial female of the use of the 
genre of incorporation of the white, middle class male into the modern nation state. 
Paradoxically, From a Crooked Rib both masks and boldly underscores the contradictions 
inherent in novelistic individualism. The autonomous, free subject ultimately is obliged to 
submit to a social role. The realist novel resolves this contradiction through irony. 
 Chapter 3 considers the ways in which the classical Bildungsroman has been 
appropriated by marginalized groups to negotiate inclusion. The chapter attempts to show 
some of the complexities and paradoxes of the dissensual Bildungsroman as they emerge in 











constitutive of the Bildungsroman, female novels of self-realization nevertheless proceed 
upon the naturalized and normalized a priori of disengaged subjectivity. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the ways in which modernism in A Naked Needle and Sweet 
and Sour Milk , while rejecting some aspects of formal realism, entrenches the norm of a 
self-sufficient, alienated individualism. Modernist technique achieves this effect through 
allowing the irony, generated by individualist reconciliation with sociality in realism, to 
reflect upon itself. The effect of this move upon the subject is to produce fragmentation of 
identity which comes to be celebrated by postmodernism. 
 Chapter 5 considers the challenge faced by Farah when he attempts to represent a 
heteronomous subject in the novel, the genre constitutive of individual autonomy. Close 
Sesame is the exception in Farah’s oeuvre since this novel, unlike the other novels, attempts 
to represent non-individualist Somali culture and religion through an elderly protagonist. In 
order to achieve representation in the novel, the heteronomous subject needs to be in various 
ways disengaged from the external sources which form his ethical horizon.   
 Chapter 6 picks up the thread from Chapter 4. This chapter argues that Farah’s 
overtly postmodern novels, Maps and Secrets, celebrate the schizoid, fragmented identity 
constituted by modernism. Farah’s political commitment, however, requires some form of 
coherent subjectivity. The  later novels, which probably will form the third trilogy, suggest a 
model of  cosmopolitan performative identity. This model of subjectivity effaces the prior 
disengaged, autonomous self out of which it is constituted. In so doing, the narrative marks a 
return to the origins of realism in the genre of romance.  
 What the trajectory traced by Farah’s novels thus ultimately achieves, is resolution of 











autonomous subjectivity out of which the model of performative identity proceeds, 
performative identity, unlike schizophrenic identity, reconstitutes an apparently 
unideological coherent subject, while completely denying the totality out of which that 
subject emerges. On this basis the complex within which the performative subject is formed, 
and the subject itself, is entirely naturalized and normalized, while other patently social 



























Individualism: A Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis takes as its point of theoretical departure the argument presented by Charles 
Taylor in Sources of the Self about individualism, modernity and morality. “Individualism” 
is a term frequently invoked, but rarely defined or used with consistency. In what represents 
the most cogent elucidation of the topic, Taylor suggests that individualism is the historically 
limited form of identity constituted by modernity in the societies of the North-Atlantic. 
Individualism is the form taken by modern identity. Philosophically, he shows that any 
enquiry into the subject, requires that the self be situated within a moral horizon. For Taylor, 
“selfhood and the good, … selfhood and morality, [are] inextricably intertwined themes” 
(Sources 3). According to Taylor, the final rupture with earlier forms of subjectivity occurs 
around the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries when an historically unprecedented break 
occurs. While the moral horizon hitherto had always existed externally in a social and 
transcendental ideal, in the period of modernity the ethical horizon against which the self is 
oriented is perceived to be internal to the subject it self-reflexively defines. For the first time, 
the higher order is not external to the person; instead, the moral sources of the self are seen 
to be located within the autonomous individual.  
This is the core of Taylor’s argument. But the impact of individualism thus defined is 
at the heart of virtually every aspect of the modern worldview, from the economy to the 
public sphere to religion to art, and so on. These ideas are extrapolated in Taylor’s other 
works, among them The Ethics of Authenticity, Modern Social Imaginaries and A Secular 











Sources of the Self  is supported in various ways by the work of other scholars, as will be 
shown, but without Taylor’s clarity of vision regarding the changes wrought in perceptions 
of the self.  
While Taylor’s frame of reference includes the impact of individualism on art, he 
does not consider the novel in much detail. However, the novel appears to be the 
representational mode which, in a complex mutual relationship, is both informed by and 
forms modern identity. As Raymond Williams observes in The Long Revolution, the novel is 
“not so much a literary form as a whole literature in itself” (Williams 304). The significance 
of the novel to the culture of individualism is a key concern of this thesis.  
 As the previous chapter makes apparent, the individual is the major preoccupation of 
the novels of Nuruddin Farah. All the novels, without exception, are set in Somalia, what 
Farah, as a consequence of his extended exile, refers to as the country of his “imagination.” 
Somali-Muslim culture, which Farah attempts to portray in the novels, resists unproblematic 
representation precisely since it appears not to share the assumptions of the novel about the 
nature of the person. This chapter thus seeks to trace the genealogies of various conceptions 
of the self. 
 
I Historical Development of the Individual        
Charles Taylor traces the origin of the modern understanding of the self to Plato. For Plato 
the self is oriented to the good when reason rather than desire rules. Self-mastery is gained 
through reason. Taylor associates Plato with the “rise towards dominance of the ethic of 
reason” (Sources 117) which culminates in the eighteenth century Enlightenment. The ethic 











action, bravery and courage. It may also be contrasted with Aristotle for whom reason exists 
not in the idealized realm of the Forms, but is realized only in social embodiment in the 
polis. For Taylor, “Plato’s view, just because it privileges a condition of self-collected 
awareness and designates this as the state of maximum unity with oneself, requires some 
conception of the mind as a unitary space”(Sources 119)  This represents the crucial centring 
of the self in the mind which forms part of the prehistory of the development of modern 
individuality. The step beyond centring  is embodied by interiority. But to speak about 
interiority in relation to Plato, Taylor maintains, is misleading since, for Plato, the higher 
order is found in the order of the Forms, it is not made. The self thus orients itself in relation 
to a framework outside of itself. Reason presents itself in a cosmic order which simply has to 
be recognized and acknowledged in order to gain access to the higher life. For Plato the 
source of the self remains outside of the self in an external rational order.  
 The Platonic duality of bodily and non-bodily is taken up by Augustine of Hippo in 
the Christian understanding of  flesh and spirit. In St Augustine’s Christian engagement with 
Plato, the realm of the Ideas or Forms comes to be represented by the thoughts of God. The 
rational order of the universe embodies the external “signs” of God’s thoughts. Unlike Plato, 
however, the ability to perceive this order calls the subject not outward, but inward. 
Associated with this move is the change of focus from identifying self-realization in the 
external rational order to an attention to the activity itself of knowing. This change of focus 
inward, for Taylor, not only is a reflexive but a “radically” reflexive move for which the 
adoption of a first person standpoint is prerequisite. Taylor distinguishes the radically 
reflexive attitude from the reflexive by contrasting Augustine’s call with the advice of the 











for one’s soul rather than for one’s property. This “stance” becomes radical through the 
adoption of the first person standpoint: “In our normal dealings with things, we disregard the 
[the] dimension of experience [concerned with a subjective perception of the object domain] 
and focus on the things experienced. But we can turn and make this the object of our 
attention, become aware of our awareness, try to experience our experiencing …” (Sources 
130).  
The consequence of the radical reflexivity Taylor describes is the related 
phenomenon that my experience is uniquely different from your experience. The Augustinian 
“proto-cogito” is the sine qua non of  the sense of inwardness of modern individuality. It is 
only from this standpoint outside of the world of experience that a view of an “inner domain 
of objects” can be produced. This move also makes the first person standpoint inescapable in 
the quest for truth. The good can only be accessed through ontological individualism. But 
with St Augustine, the break with an order external to the self is not quite complete. Taylor 
quotes Gilson who summarizes the Augustinian position as one which leads “from the 
exterior to the interior and from the interior to the superior” (Sources 136). Also, 
significantly, with St Augustine “the idea can grow that moral perfection requires a personal 
adhesion to the good, a full commitment of the will” – an important idea which is developed 
in the early modern period. Taylor suggests that, for Plato, the eye has the ability to see the 
external rational order. It merely has to be appropriately focused. For St Augustine, the eye 
has lost this ability which is restored only by God’s grace through an internal search into the 
“I”. 
 For Taylor, the Cartesian move is to locate the moral sources of the self wholly 











Galileo, understands the universe mechanistically. A representational view of the world 
applies. In other words, “To know reality is to have a correct representation of things” 
(Sources 144). Truth consists only in describing the universe as a machine without imputing 
any teleological purpose. This idea seems infallible and unchallengeable in this scientistic 
outlook. Reality now has to be constructed through description in the mind. However, this 
“order of representations must … meet the standards which derive from the thinking activity 
of the knower”(Sources 145). This epistemic “standard”, applied both to the world and to the 
being that knows the world, leads to an objectification of both the world, on the one hand, 
and  mind and body, on the other. One begins to view mind, body and world functionally, 
mechanistically, instrumentally.  Self mastery in this context does not involve the 
subordination of desire to reason, where reason consists in the right alignment to the higher 
order. Instead, “self mastery consists in our lives being shaped by the orders that our 
reasoning capacity constructs according to the appropriate standards” (Sources, 147).  The 
world thus is “disenchanted” in the Weberian sense that it no longer is seen to reflect the 
“magic” of a meaningful order. Instead, the order is internally generated. In this way the 
subject is split from the world of objects, which exists to be described, categorized and 
ultimately controlled. If this is the case, then aspiration to the good no longer involves an 
orientation to an external ideal order. Moral perfection derives from “the agent’s sense of his 
own dignity as a rational being”(Sources 152). What this implies is that one no longer 
derives one’s sense of worth in the public arena. One strives for perfection within one’s own 
eyes. Platonic hegemony of reason translated into rational control means that life comes to 
be shaped “by the order of demands of reason’s dominance” rather than through orientation 











reason consists in recognizing an external ideal or divine order. Instead rationality is defined 
“procedurally”, truth is determined by how one constructs order. For Descartes, self-
sufficient certainty is generated “for myself following the right method”(Sources 156). Thus, 
although Descartes is not an atheist, God no longer is the moral source of the individual. 
With this “clarity and fullness of self-presence” which makes a divinely inspired order no 
longer requisite, “The road to Deism is already opened”(Sources 157). 
 The final step for Taylor in the development of the modern sense of self is taken by 
Locke. But Locke’s intervention needs to be seen in the context of the Neo-Stoicism of the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in Europe, a philosophical trend in which 
Descartes’ disengaged self is indispensable. Neo-Stoicism was associated “with a broad 
movement among political and military elites towards a wider and more rigorous application 
of new forms of discipline in a host of fields …”(Sources 159). This discipline, applied to 
Descartes’ disengaged self, produces Locke’s “punctual” self. Locke, according to Taylor, 
goes beyond Descartes in rejecting any notion of innate or instinctual ideas. Ideas are 
composites made up of the indivisible building blocks of direct experience. Accessing this 
unmediated experience requires a “clearing of the ground” of all ideas derived from habit or 
custom. The aim of this “disassembly” is the ultimate “reassembly” of a picture of the world 
through the agency of the reified mind. What this process ignores is the origin of the 
capacity of the mind to construct truth. For Taylor, “Locke’s theory generates and also 
reflects an ideal of independence and self-responsibility, a notion of reason as free from 
established custom and locally dominant authority”(Sources 167). What this view excludes 
are theories which see humans as tending through instinct, custom and religion to the good. 











and what is painful is evil. Locke in this way foreshadows the utilitarianism Taylor 
subsequently considers. For both Descartes and Locke, rationality is procedural, dependent 
on how it is derived, rather than based on its content. And knowledge is true only if you have 
determined it for yourself.  
Combined with the notions of discipline popular at the time, this radical 
disengagement permits “self-remaking”.  The “extensionless” self which exists nowhere but 
in its ability to “fix things as objects”, directs its procedural discipline onto itself, to re-make 
itself in the image of the ideal of internally generated rationality: “The subject who can take 
this kind of radical stance of disengagement to himself or herself with a view to remaking 
…” is what Taylor calls the “punctual” self (emphasis added) (Sources 171).  What is 
created, is a picture of a  disembodied, “perfectly detachable consciousness.” Taylor adds 
that what holds the “package together is an ideal of freedom or independence”(Sources 174). 
What is interesting in Taylor’s discussion of disengagement and the punctual self is the 
unarticulated suggestion that this process itself comes to be desired. Self-remaking becomes 
the moral ideal rather than a morality beyond itself. The idea that one fashions oneself is 
increasingly significant in the development of Farah’s novels, as the subsequent chapters 
show. Freedom of the subject to re-create the self, on this analysis, becomes the highest 
virtue.    
 In the French philosopher, Montaigne, Taylor inaugurates another line in the 
development of modern identity. If Descartes disengages Augustinian inwardness from its 
moral source in God, and replaces God with universal rationalism, Montaigne develops 
Augustinian inwardness in a more subjective way. For Montaigne, reason is not the 











purposes. Animals live more happily than human beings, a boon of the absence of 
rationality. This emerges most strongly in the ways in which Montaigne prefigures debates 
around the idea of the “noble savage” through his defense of “primitive” cultures like that of 
the American first peoples. For Taylor, Montaigne’s quest is not one for universal, verifiable 
truth, but for the particular, unrepeatable truth within every one of us. Montaigne’s 
endeavour is thus as radically reflexive as Descartes’, but the nature of the disengaged 
subject thus constituted is different:  
Each of us has to discover his or her own form. We are not looking for the 
universal nature; we each look for our own being. Montaigne therefore inaugurates 
a new kind of reflection which is intensely individual, a self-explanation, the aim 
of which is to reach self-knowledge by coming to see through the screens of self-
delusion which passion or spiritual pride have erected. It is entirely a first-person 
study, receiving little help from the deliverances of third person observation, and 
none from “science”(Sources 181).      
So for Taylor, by the turn of the eighteenth century, all the essential components of  
modern identity have already been forged: These include the sense of “self-responsible 
independence” traced back to Descartes, the “recognized particularity” of the individual, 
originating in Montaigne and a sense of personal commitment. Personal commitment is the 
modern form of the Stoic conception of the will which is taken up by St Augustine for whom 
sin consists precisely in the “inability to will fully”(Sources 185). Through the centrality of 
the will in the Augustinian heritage, personal commitment comes to play a vital part in the 
modern conception of the individual. What Taylor refers to as the “three sided 
individualism” is so fundamental to European culture and its offshoot in North-America that 











In various ways to be outlined in this thesis, Farah’s oeuvre unproblematically 
assumes this model of the person as individual which the novel form itself colludes to 
construct. While almost every other concept is radically destabilized in the novels, the 
individual, whose historical development Taylor outlines, is unquestioned.  
A number of consequences flow from this conception of the individual. Thought and 
valuation appear to be products of the mind, products of an inner process rather than in 
various ways embodied. An effect of  this “new localization”, is the constitution of the 
absolute difference between subject and object. The material world appears at a distance 
from the subject. Older beliefs in magic, where objects or speech acts hold power, require an 
“open boundary” between subject and object. The self thus defined is “porous.” The open 
boundary no longer exists with the new conceptualization of the individual. Possession gives 
way to self-possession. The self is now in various ways “buffered” (Taylor A Secular Age 
37-41).  
In Farah’s novels, the boundary between the natural and supernatural worlds appears 
fluid and permeable. But the source of this dimension of the novels is not the constitutive 
effect of a heteronomous notion of the subject, reflected in the representational mode of the 
genre. The supernatural elements in the novels are either aspects of the beliefs of characters 
or seem instead calculated to give the narrative an authentically Somali-Muslim aura – what 
Eileen Julien refers to as the “ornamentalism” of African, but also, by extension, of much 
postcolonial fiction (Julien 679). The contrast between the “porous” heteronomous self and 
the “buffered” autonomous self is explored in more detail in the context of the analysis of 











Taylor proposes that a number of other consequences also flow from modern identity. 
While in the former dispensation community was a given, with the new formulation of the 
individual, community needs to be explained. This is the need filled by various versions of 
contractarian theory beginning with Locke. Flowing from the community forged by contract 
between individual members is the contractual cession of authority to the state – the 
“sovereign individual” is “ ‘by nature’ not bound  to any authority” therefore, “authority is 
something which has to be created” (emphasis in original) (Sources 194).  In the sphere of 
personal relations, a consequence of modern identity is that marriage is seen to be a 
contractual relation between free, independent subjects. The relationship between 
individualism, the nation-state and transformed personal relationships is symbolically 
represented in the sub-genre of the novel which paradoxically defines the genre, namely, the 
Bildungsroman. Virtually every one of Farah’s novels, as will be shown, shares in the 
normalized and naturalized assumptions about subject formation presumed by the 
Bildungsroman.   
A crucially important qualification of Taylor’s conceptualization of modern identity 
is provided by Carole Pateman. Pateman’s feminist critique of contract theory proceeds from 
the observation that the model of the individual who enters into the mythical primal contract 
is male. The authority of fathers (patriarchy) gives way to the authority of “free” and 
“independent” brothers joined by contract (fraternity). Expressed in the terms used by 
Edward Said, Pateman’s argument is that submission to the authority of filiation gives way 
to submission to the authority of affiliation (Introduction World, Text, Critic). What this 
version of contract theory occludes, Pateman argues, is the prior sexual contract between 











can be conceived: “Only masculine beings are endowed with the attributes and capacities 
necessary to enter into contracts, the most important of which is ownership of property in the 
person; only men, that is to say, are ‘individuals’”(5-6).  In other words, men’s freedom in 
the public sphere occurs at the expense of women’s subjection in the private sphere. And, for 
Pateman, the battle is not won if women through the “universality” of the notion of the 
“individual” ultimately in historical time are included as “individuals” since “the ‘individual’ 
is a patriarchal category” (168). Pateman suggests a similar paradox exists in relation to race 
and the “individual” but does not explore this avenue further.  
Another consequence of modern individuality noted by Taylor is that “immunities 
accorded people by law” are “framed”  “… in terms of subjective rights”(Sources 195). 
These rights belong to people in a manner analogous to the ownership of private property, 
what C.A.B. Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism refers to as 
“possessive individualism”. In other words, immunities which may have been articulated in 
the discourse of religious or civic obligation, now are articulated in terms of the individual’s 
ownership of a right. MacPherson suggests further that this fiction of ownership applied to 
the human being’s skills and capacities is indispensable in the transition from slavery to 
wage slavery. MacPherson’s analysis alerts one to the culturally and historically specific 
discourse which Farah’s characters employ in their self-descriptions, a factor which will be 
expanded upon later in the thesis.   
To describe a further consequence of modern individuality, Taylor suggests the 
neologism “poeisis”. By the individual’s “poeitic” powers, Taylor refers to the “centrality of 
constructed orders in mental and moral life” (Sources 197), in particular, the constructive 











quickly runs up against the power of language in constituting complexes from simples. The 
constitutive power of language considered in relation to the individual yields the idea of 
“Language … as our way of manifesting through expression what we are” (Sources 198).  
What ensues is a “fascination”, if not “obsession” with the poeitic powers of the creative 
imagination. In Farah’s novels this translates into the unique capacity of art to construct the 
world anew, a concern central to the project of the most recent novel, Knots, to be considered 
in the final chapter. 
In the course of the eighteenth century, Taylor suggests that modern identity’s 
instrumental stance both to itself and to the surrounding world is given spiritual definition 
and meaning. This occurs through what is termed the “affirmation of ordinary life”. By 
“ordinary life” Taylor refers to the world of “production and reproduction”, the world of 
work and family, the world which not only is ignored in the aristocratic warrior ethic, but 
which is denigrated. By the eighteenth-century, commerce rather than military conquest 
comes to be valued. Commerce is deemed a “constructive and civilizing force” and as a 
consequence “sober and disciplined production was given the central place” (Sources 214).  
This transformed outlook in the material sphere is paralleled by a transformation in the 
Christian spiritual sphere. Crucial to the Protestant revolution is a rejection of the idea that 
the corporate body of the church is the vehicle of the sacred. Henceforward, the conviction 
gains ground that each believer stands in an individual relationship with God and that his 
salvation depends upon his belief and conduct alone. The individual is thus in a direct 
unmediated relationship with God. In this conception, particularly in Puritan discourse, 
work, labour itself is “spiritualized” and becomes a form of worship. Similarly, a 











with the potential to produce scientific knowledge itself to become a form of worship. The 
subject as individual may serve God through controlling himself and the world. 
The Reformation influences the private sphere also. The “ordinary life” of marriage  
is transformed and elevated. Where marriage in the past was seen as an almost invariable and 
inevitable social institution, it is now reconceptualized as the contractual bond of two free 
and equal individuals. In this scheme, companionate marriage itself becomes a kind of 
“temple” in the worship of the Protestant God. Puritan conceptions of marriage in part 
contribute to the development of what has been termed “companionate marriage.” Brought to 
the fore in companionate marriage is not the idea of the family as cornerstone of social order, 
but rather the idea of a voluntary union of two individuals requiring a visibly heightened 
degree of personal and emotional commitment. A consequence of the rising significance of 
individual choice of life partner is the ensuing challenge to patriarchal authority. A further 
consequence of companionate marriage is the separation  of the family from broader society. 
Concomitant also is the developing requirement both of privacy for the family from wider 
society and privacy for individual members within the family. In various ways, Farah’s 
novels chart many of these trends. The focus on privacy within which the individual 
constitutes him- or herself is symbolized by the recurrent motif in the novels, alluding to 
Virginia Woolf’s essay, of “a room of one’s own.”   
Associated with the development of the subject as individual, is the increasing 
valorization of sentiment. Feeling occupies a hitherto unprecedented role in shaping the 
relationship both of husband and wife, and parents and children. In fact, Taylor observes that 
increasingly childhood and youth are regarded as separate phases of development rather than 











For Taylor, sentiment becomes the “touchstone of the good” and feeling yields us 
access “to the design of things”. This idea may be traced through the Romantics towards the 
end of the eighteenth century (especially the German Romantics following Goethe) where 
nature itself becomes the source of sentiment. Nature as source cannot be disentangled from 
sentiment as discussed above which inspires transformed family relations. In a sense, Taylor 
contends that this move reifies nature. Nature no longer is part of a vision of order, instead it 
becomes the source of sentiment which informs virtue, the good of the already disengaged 
subject.  
For Taylor, Rousseau is the philosopher at the fountainhead of those streams in 
contemporary culture which celebrate self-exploration and “which make self-determining 
freedom the key to virtue”(Sources 362-3). Rousseau is the progenitor of the modern 
conviction of inwardness, that the self has hidden depths. Romanticism at the end of the 
eighteenth century foregrounds the access of the autonomous subject to the voice within 
which in turn is in tune with what Taylor refers to as the “élan” of nature. Locating the moral 
source in nature leads to an unprecedented appreciation of sensuality through which nature is 
accessed. In this way, sensuality and spirituality are fused. Furthermore, through the focus on 
sensual experience, the mode of appreciation of the world is emphasized. In this way at the 
close of the eighteenth century the concept of the aesthetic which in various ways merges 
with ethics comes into being. The realization of the truth in nature constitutes a form of 
expression. Interestingly, this expression is more than simply a making manifest of a prior 
truth. The process of adducing the inner truth itself brings something new into existence. 
Through this expressivism, something in addition to the truth of nature comes into being. 











individual is under obligation to fulfill his originality. In this way, “a new and fuller 
individuation”(Sources 375) comes into being. 
As already hinted at, Taylor suggests that these developments produce a new 
understanding both of art and artists. For Taylor, Herder states it too “bluntly” when he 
suggests that “The artist is become a creator God.” For Taylor, the artist may more 
appropriately be compared with a “soothsayer” or “seer” (Sources 378)  and the work of art 
has a deep moral or spiritual significance. This attitude towards art which constitutes the 
artist as a prophet necessarily casts the artist also as martyr – the suffering artist. It also 
creates the myth of the avant-garde which deems the artist, in contact with the morals 
sources, a few steps ahead of society and with whom, in time, society catches up. Rather 
more ominously, Taylor suggests that the opposition between artist and society is simply the 
precursor of a connection embodied in the need of the capitalist endorsers of disengaged, 
instrumentalist reason for a kind of spirituality which artists supply: “Moreover, once this 
image [of the artist as trailblazer] becomes generally accepted; once it becomes not just the 
self-image of the misunderstood artist, but the socially accredited stereotype, the collusion 
between bourgeois and artist finds a language”(Sources 424).   
               If the product of disengaged individuality among the Romantics is self-expression, 
then the product of autonomous individuality among what may be termed post-or anti-
Romanticism for Taylor is “subject-centredness”. Nature in various ways is demoted among 
the post-Romantics: In Zola’s naturalism, one encounters a “despiritualized nature”; 
Baudelairean epiphanic art is also “anti-nature” and it is an amoral nature which is 
uncovered in DH Lawrence, Fauvism and Surrealism. Early twentieth-century modernist art, 











within, modernism encounters a fragmented, splintered subject. Paradoxically, subject-
centredness operates to decentre the subject which is deemed to represent the more authentic 
experience of life. But crucially for the question of the individual, decentring is not in 
opposition to the unitary self, rather it colludes with it. As has been suggested in an earlier 
chapter, Farah’s oeuvre represents a kind of “potted history” of the novel. The fragmentation 
of the disengaged self is dramatized in Farah’s more overtly modernist and postmodern 
novels. Farah’s novels reflect a wider trend where fragmentation leads to the celebration of 
schizophrenic identity. But as subsequent chapters show, fragmentation presumes and masks 
the prior assumption of disengaged subjectivity. 
 Taylor shares his philosophical approach to individualism with moral philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, the person orients himself against “virtue” which 
necessarily embodies a social practice. Morality has to emerge out of a communal practice in 
order to constitute morality at all. Individualism, the philosophy that morality originates in 
the autonomous individual, for MacIntyre, is the cause of interminable contemporary 
“moral” debates. Since there is no shared ethical horizon, consensus is apparently precluded.  
The history which Taylor traces here is in various ways informed by other studies. 
Ferdinand Tönnies’s frequently cited distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft or 
community and association, is the index of a deeper distinction. Tönnies gestures towards a 
similar observation to that made by Taylor regarding the Cartesian move. For Tönnies, all 
social relationships originate in human will. He distinguishes between Wesenwille or 
“natural will” which is superseded by Kurwille or “rational will.” While the former is 
constituted, “Not only [out of what the person] has learned but also the inherited mode of 











conscience”; the latter refers to when “the thinking has gained predominance and come to be 
the directing agent” (15). Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber and R.H. Tawney draw attention to 
the different ways in which Christian fellowship is conceived in the period of modernity, of 
which the Reformation is part. Karl Joachim Weintraub’s work on representations of self in 
autobiography also concludes, as Taylor does, that considerations of the self are inextricably 
linked to questions of moral sources, “ … self-conceptions are rarely detached from men’s 
vision of the desired society” (378). Maine, at the interface of law and jurisprudence, traces 
an evolution from status to contract societies. Emile Durkheim associates individualism with 
the increasing division of labour in society. For Marcel Mauss, the individual is a created 
category which originates in primitive ritual masks and develops through Roman law in 
particular (Sociology and Psychology).  
 While Charles Taylor is not necessarily expressing a wholly original view on the rise 
of  modern identity, his achievement consists in articulating very clearly what often is only 
implicit in the arguments of the other writers considered. What Taylor says and the way in 
which he says it yields a highly productive approach to the dilemmas of the modern 
postcolonial world. The individual rather than the person is the product of the particular 
historical trajectory of the modern West. But, while for many of the authors above 
individualism is a triumphalist history, Taylor’s ambivalent reading of individualism regards 
it as the source both of the positive valorization of human freedom, dignity and equality, but 
also negatively as the origin of instrumentalist views which lead to the exploitation of both 













II Modern Identity and the Novel 
It is not fortuitous that Farah’s vision of the utopian potential of the individual comes to be 
embodied in the genre of the novel. Early in his career, Farah imagined himself a playwright. 
So strong was this intuition that Farah “inserted stage directions into the page proofs of From 
a Crooked Rib, a device that his publisher [Heinemann] declined to adopt” (Alden and 
Tremaine 32). Farah subsequently wrote a few radio and stage plays, none of which is 
published and in the most recent novel, Knots, theatre seems significant to the political and 
artistic aim of the narrative. One could say, that the genre of the novel chose Farah since it is 
the cultural form which symbolically represents the conception of the person which powers 
Farah’s worldview. Understanding the origins of the novel and the dynamic which motivates 
its representational technique is central to the analysis of Farah’s oeuvre.   
It is commonly accepted that the novel developed as the central cultural form which 
is constituted by the Cartesian break consolidated by Locke (Watt). The person’s worldview 
(and the position of the person in the world) were subject to a profound change. This 
epistemological transformation in how knowledge or truth was acquired by the person 
registered as the requirement for realism in narrative. The novel was the form which 
constitutively embodied these fundamental shifts.  
Taking on board Taylor’s anaysis of individualism, requires that this preconception 
be expanded. Individualism and realism do give the novel narrative shape, but the novel is 
also crucially about morality, or, more accurately, morality sublimated in a secular 
worldview. Investigations into the rise of the novel seem to prove Charles Taylor’s 
philosophical contention in Sources of the Self, that any inquiry into the subject is also an 











some framework of happiness, eudaimonia or higher truth. Investigation into the subject is 
always an ethical inquiry. Studies of the novel tend to enter into a dialogue with morality 
through the epic and almost invariably become locked into a reconciliation of opposites: this 
binary assumes various names but at root is the same dilemma. How does the novel resolve 
the contradiction  of “character and plot”, “individual life and overarching pattern”, “sjuzhet 
and fabula”, “self-determination and socialization”, “soul and the world of 
conventions/forms”, “realism of presentation and realism of assessment”, “the organic and 
the architectural”? The first term of each of the binaries represents the principle of individual 
freedom, while the second represents the social ethical horizon.  
Various moments in the history of the novel negotiate the contradiction encapsulated 
in the binary in different ways. The successful realist novel employs irony to effect a 
superficial reconciliation of the contradiction. The modernist novel, by contrast, flaunts the 
contradiction through making irony reflect on itself. Through this operation, contradiction is 
rendered uncontradictory. The modernist novel releases the truth of the fragmented self from 
the stranglehold of the autonomous, disciplinary self. The postmodern novel endorses the 
radically fractured self constituted by modernism in terms of the principle of pure textuality. 
But, of course, the understanding of the self that the modernist novel liberates is the self 
constituted by the realist novel and, by extension, of modernity. Non-modern understandings 
of the person do not figure in this argument since such conceptions are necessarily lost in the  
post-Cartesian world of the novel. Farah’s novels very interestingly narrativize the history of 
the various negotiations of the contradiction generated when individualism ultimately and 











The contradiction between the individual and an external higher order articulated in 
the novel is itself a product of a transformed understanding of the self in relation to the 
world. John Richetti’s observations are highly persuasive: 
For the novel, the ordinary and the specifically and concretely experiential (along 
with the everyday language specific to that realm) come into this world of narrative 
to define the absolute boundaries or limits of reality and by extension of moral 
significance. Such an understanding is, potentially at least, subversive of traditional 
notions of the individual and his or her decidedly subordinate relation to a 
communal and often hierarchical reality, and to a supernatural order which upholds 
that community. But within the materialistic and probabilistic assumptions of the 
realistic novel, the supernatural can be treated as an object of belief or faith, but 
never presented as a matter of direct and unambiguous experience for the new kind 
of person who is taken absolutely for granted by modern individualism. The novel 
tends in these preferences to validate the perspective of the newly conceptualized 
modern individual, whose particularized and personalized view of the world is 
explored as if it were somehow prior to a communal or social world. Most readers 
of novels now, at the end of the twentieth century, take such an individual very 
much for granted, but the notions of autonomy, agency and self-consciousness (as 
well as the skepticism about the ideal or the transcendental) summed up in the 
persons dramatized in most novels were in fact only emerging as new and 
controversial ideas for European thought at the turn of the seventeenth century 
when the modern individual is, in effect, invented and naturalized, that is to say, 
presented as an inevitable feature of the world rather than as an entity constructed 
in a cultural moment, conceptualized and in that sense produced by modern 
historical circumstances (emphasis added) (4-5).  
The history of the novel which Richetti cogently summarizes here runs parallel to the 











the realism of the novel form, is contingent upon the autonomous subject. The disengaged 
subject self-reflexively constitutes procedural truth. The novel is the most significant cultural 
form which embodies this fundamental shift of moral sources.  
 
III Defining the Novel 
Defining the familiar has the effect of making it unfamiliar. Defining the novel similarly 
“makes strange”, to use Viktor Shklovsky’s expression. In widest definition, novels are 
“extended works of prose fiction” (Abrams). But even the widest definition is not wide 
enough since it excludes the nonfiction novel (Quinn) and the verse-novel (Cuddon). Widely 
defined, the novel is a genre which significantly pre-dates the European Enlightenment. 
Novels exist which date back to c. 1200 B.C. E. from the XIIth dynasty Ancient Egyptian 
Middle Kingdom (Cuddon). Also extant are fictions in Demotic which date back to the 
seventh century B.C.E (Goody). The oldest surviving Greek novel is Chariton’s Callirhoe 
from c. 50 B.C.E. -50 C.E. (Hagg). Medieval chivalric romances (Pavel and Goody), 
pastorals, eg. Daphnis and Chloe, (Pavel and Cuddon) the picaresque (Abrams, Goody, 
Pavel, Cuddon and Quinn),  long elegiac narratives (Pavel) and the Italian novella (Abrams, 
Cuddon, Pavel) all satisfy the wide definition and so might be called novels. Extended prose 
fictions in Japanese date back to c. 850-920 C.E According to Henry Y.H. Zhao, Chinese 
novels develop out of historiographies and the first Chinese novel dates back to the twelfth 
century C.E. Widely defined, the novel is a global form with origins in ancient history. 
If, however, we consider the etymology of the word “novel”, a rather different 
understanding of the genre and its history emerge. The etymological origin of the word 











“news.” With the development of the printing press, news in ballad form came to be 
disseminated, called “novels.” By the sixteenth century, “novella” is used in Italy to refer to 
a short story. By the seventeenth century “novel” acquires its contemporary meaning, 
namely, a long fictional prose narrative distinct from a Romance (Goody 18). 
In the complex dialectic of signifier and signified, the word “novel” thus appears to 
enter the English language only in the seventeenth century and is projected back to 
encompass those long prose narratives without a name which stood somewhere between epic 
and tragedy. That the ancient Greek “novels”, for example, unassumingly stood somewhere 
between epic and tragedy and had no name,  until they proleptically come to be constituted 
by the new word, “novel”, suggests that they did not index any significant shift in the ancient 
Greek worldview. What distinguishes all of the pre-modern “novels” considered in the 
sources from their modern counterparts is that, while they foreground a hero, virtue remains 
indisputably an external horizon embodied by providence, God, the chivalric code and so on 
(Pavel 5-14).   
 
IV The Novel and Modernity 
The novel stricto sensu comes into existence only in the eighteenth century and is constituted 
around the morally self-validating hero, who henceforeward is constituted as “beautiful soul” 
or, less poetically, as individual: 
In the course of the eighteenth century, narrative idealism underwent a profound 
transformation. Moral norms ceased to be perceived as transcendent and were 
assumed to inhabit the human heart. […] The premodern period assumed that 
moral values originate outside the human domain and placed the ideal far away 











eighteenth century novel revived the axiological question and offered a new answer 
that inscribed moral ideals within the human heart. The soul, which had long been 
assumed to follow norms coming from above, came to be seen as containing within 
itself (and being capable of deciphering) the eternal laws of moral perfection. 
Through a process that we might call the interiorization of the ideal or the 
enchantment of interiority [inverting Weber’s disenchantment of the universe by 
procedural reason], all human beings, even the most ordinary ones, were deemed 
capable of seeking inner perfection, the beautiful soul being the one who always 
succeeds in the search for perfection. (Pavel 14-15)   
 This narrow definition of the novel suggested above as an extended prose fiction 
which foregrounds individual experience with moral sources internally located is variously 
pointed at. For Levi-Strauss, myth gives way to novel in the eighteenth century. For Bakhtin, 
the prehistory of novelistic discourse becomes the history of the novel in the late seventeenth  
to early eighteenth centuries. For Lukács the novel as the genre of “transcendental 
homelessness” is born with capitalist modernity. For Ian Watt, the rise of the novel is an 
eighteenth century phenomenon.  
 The novel, the “new thing”, thus in what must be more than happy fortuity, 
fundamentally shares in the newness of a self-proclaimed  modernity. [Modern is derived 
from “modernus” which derives from “modo” which since the fifth century C.E. was 
equivalent to nunc, “now” (Benavides).] The newness with which modernity identifies itself 
is fundamentally informed by the newness required of the art produced in the period of 
modernity. This intersection is echoed in Ezra Pound’s aesthetic maxim at the highpoint of 
literary modernism to “make it new.” 
 Since the novel constitutively is a modern form, it may be associated with Cartesian 











of the middle class (Watt, Richetti and Armstrong among others), with print capitalism 
(Anderson and Watt among others), with circulating libraries and the dissemination of 
journals, magazines and newspapers (Habermas and Anderson among others).  The novel, 
furthermore, is the genre of literate and leisured classes and comes to be identified, a point to 
be returned to later, with women. “Novels are also good commerce, and reading a novel 
commits the individual to no communal forum” (Thorel-Cailleteau 64-5). David Trotter 
observes that by 1899, Henry James “envisaged a profitable future for the novel. Popular 
taste had established it as a universal form, ‘the book par excellence’. […] James was 
fascinated by the sway the novel appeared to hold over its readers. ‘It is not too much to say 
of these that they live in a great measure by the immediate aid of the novel.’ The novel’s 
uncanny penetrativeness, its ability to arouse and resolve an array of anxieties and 
aspirations, made it the great ‘anodyne’ of the age” (1).  
 
V The Novel and Nationalism  
It is no coincidence that the period of the rise of the novel is also the period of the 
establishment of the nation state. Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities underlines 
the link between newspapers and novels, already suggested earlier in the etymological origin 
of  the word “novel” in broadsheets. Andersen suggests that the novel’s realism shares in the 
facticity of newspapers and newspapers share in the fictionality of novels. In a footnote 
Anderson points out that, “Reading a newspaper is like reading a novel whose author has 
abandoned any idea of a coherent plot (33).” What the realistic novel does is to “provide the 











Moretti suggests that: “[…] the nation-state […] found the novel. And vice-versa: the novel 
found the nation state” (Atlas 16-17 ). 
At the most fundamental level, the link between the novel and the nation state is 
necessary and inevitable. If the nation state is the necessary political resolution of 
philosophical individualism, then the novel, as the  primary medium for symbolically 
representing the modern subject, is the adjunct of the nation state. If the subject is 
autonomous, then community or the social is not a given – it needs to be explained. The 
nation-state is the logical outcome of the social contract which establishes the community of 
the disengaged self. The self-regulating individuals who populate the imagined community 
of the nation are produced by what Joe Slaughter names the “tautological-teleological” 
mechanism of the novel (especially the Bildungsroman) which in various ways replicates the 
tautological-teleological discourse of founding documents of sovereign  states: “We, the 
people …” The national people is only retroactively constituted through the performative 
statement of its founding document. Slaughter suggests further that if “The narrative of 
enlightenment articulates the individual in a ‘state/citizen bind as the ultimate construction of 
sociality’” (Slaughter quoting Chakrabarty “Enabling Fictions” 1409), then the novel “is the 
most supple cultural form most often implicated in modern problematics of both 
individualism and nation-state formation” (Slaughter “Enabling Fictions” 1409). Layoun 
echoes the centrality of the novel to national formation in her observation that the late 17th 
and 18th century novel “begins to delineate and make familiar (everyday or ordinary) the 













VI The Novel and Imperialism 
If the novel in some ways is constitutive of the nation and vice versa, the novel also is 
partially generated out of trans-national imperatives as Edward Said’s reading of Mansfield 
Park (Culture and Imperialism 95-116) and Spivak’s analysis of Jane Eyre show. Moretti 
shows that production and distribution make the novel the most centralized of all genres, 
with city life dominating provincial life and with the metropolises of  England and Paris 
dominating the semi-periphery of Europe :  
“… the novel closes European literature to all external influences: it 
strengthens and perhaps it even establishes its Europeanness. But 
then this most European of all forms proceeds to deprive most of 
Europe of all creative autonomy: two cities, London and Paris, rule 
the entire continent for over a century, publishing half, if not more of 
all European novels. It’s a ruthless unprecedented centralization of 
European literature” (Atlas 186).  
Furthermore, Moretti suggests that latecomers to this novelistic literary scene follow a 
“narrower” road to which they are “constrained” by the success of the products at the core. 
Moretti terms this “the development of underdevelopment in the literary field” (Atlas 191). 
When the novel spreads through the world, the form or plot remains constant, only the 
content changes and becomes “local”. The “dispersal of forms” suggests “the power of the 
center over an enormous periphery” (Atlas 195). Some sense of the “innocent” dissimulating 
power of the novel is hinted at anecdotally by Layoun whose research revealed that “colonial 
officers paid local writers or literate storytellers to write novels in a deliberate attempt to 











specifically the Bildungsroman, Slaughter suggests that the novel provides the “plot for the 
incorporation of the previously marginalized” (1410). The novel thus is disseminated to the 
periphery as the modern genre and is often consciously adopted, but not adapted in respect of 
form. Pavel suggests that newly emerging literary traditions “choose the novel as a means of 
affirming their modernity” (31). Or as Layoun underlines, “the modern Western novel is 
apprehended as a step into modernity” (9).  The Arabic novel is a case in point. Kilito asserts 
that there is no real precursor to the novel in the Arabic literary tradition. He indicates that 
“the form was borrowed from Europe precisely in order to speak about Europe. The 
discovery of Europe and of the novel are two simultaneous and correlative operations: one 
could not happen without the other” (Kilito “Al- Saq” 761). The Arabic Bildungsroman 
without exception is motivated by the encounter with Europe and the challenges of 
modernity (Al-Mousa).    
 Nancy Armstrong in How Novels Think makes the claim that the novel and the 
modern subject share the same history. She suggests further that the history of the individual 
in the novel is the story of how that subject had to fight “to keep other subjectivities at bay” 
(3). Extending the argument on an imperial scale, she suggests that “wherever novels are 
written, they’re reproducing the modern individual” (9) and that “new varieties of novel 
cannot help but take up the project of the universalizing individual subject” (10). The rise 
and dissemination of the novel may thus be read as the rise and global dissemination of 
modern individualism.   
 Moretti points out furthermore that the novel not only spreads modernity through its 
constitutive individualism but that wherever it goes, it decimates other genres. Moretti 











fearsome predator of the last half millennium” (235-6). The novel may be losing its 
predominance to electronic cultural forms in the periphery, as Farah’s most recent novel, 
Knots seems to suggest through its focus on electronic media, but such considerations lie 
outside of the ambit of this investigation.   
 
VI The Novel and Individualism 
Aristotle’s Poetics may appear an odd place to begin an enquiry into individualism in the 
novel.  The novel is the one genre about which Aristotle has nothing to say, precisely since 
the novel had not yet come into existence. The inverse of what Aristotle suggests about 
tragedy is, however, highly suggestive: “ … the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the 
Plot; […] the characters come second […]” (49). In the novel, on the contrary, character is 
primary and plot is the outcome of character. Some indication of the profundity of the 
transformation that occurs in the novel in respect of “character”, is suggested by Paul de 
Man in an essay on Lukács: “The emergence of the novel as the major modern genre is seen 
as the result of a change in the structure of human consciousness …” (quoted in Bernstein 
xiv). This transformation in human consciousness occurs as a consequence of the novel’s 
response to Cartesian disengagement. If knowledge no longer is to be found in the external 
realm of objects but rather internally in how the subject comes to know, then a cleavage 
occurs between the world and the subject. This registers in the novel as the hero’s separation 
from a unity with the world, the integrated world of the epic. In Lukács’s memorable phrase 
the exile of the novelistic hero is referred to as the “transcendental homelessness” (Theory of 
the Novel 41) of the genre. Lukács here alludes to Novalis’s formulation of the drive of 











Lockean empiricism drives the novel towards a representational realism in which the 
hero must be seen to find truth in experience. Wilhelm Dilthey expresses the idea of the 
construction of truth from experience thus. It is “the constant translation of lived experience 
into form and form into lived experience” (45).  Mikhail Bakhtin formulates the same idea as 
follows: “As opposed to a static unity, here one finds a dynamic unity in the hero’s image. 
The hero himself, his character, becomes a variable in the formula of this type of novel. 
Changes in the hero himself acquire plot significance, and thus the entire plot of the novel is 
reinterpreted and reconstructed” (Bildungsroman 21). In John Richetti’s assessment, “the 
reality the novel tends to deliver is, rather, a record of the productive interaction between a 
world of facts and heroic individuals who give it shape and meaning” (5).  For Georg 
Lukács, “The novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life is no longer 
directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in life has become a problem, yet which 
still thinks in terms of totality” (Theory of the Novel 56).  
 If one expresses these observations about the novel in the philosophical discourse 
forged by Charles Taylor, then one could say that the novel dramatizes the relocation of the 
moral sources within the modern individual. The challenge of the individualism presented by 
the novel is to show how at every point, morality is generated out of the individual’s 
experience; how “form”, “plot,” “pattern,” “fabula,” “socialization” is a product of the 
autonomous individual with no external, social, transcendental or ontic framework. Walter 
Benjamin expresses the idea thus: “ … the novel emanates from a solitary individual 
addressing other solitary individuals … its appearance is linked to the impossibility of giving 











 For Lukács, the novel resolves the contradiction of producing an apparently purely 
objective meaning generated out of the consciousness and experience of the “homeless” 
hero, through novelistic irony. For Lukács, irony is the means by which purely subjective 
meaning, truth or morality is given an objective cast. 
 Michael McKeon regards the reconciliation the novel effects between character and 
plot as the synthesis which is the outcome of the dialectic of truth and virtue. McKeon 
highlights the controversial contradiction in Ian Watt’s assessment of the rise of the novel, 
embodied in the dichotomy between Richardson’s realism of presentation (realism) and 
Fielding’s realism of assessment (romance). McKeon identifies this contradiction as an early 
modern epistemological crisis where “questions of truth” interrogate “questions of virtue”. In 
other words, how modern individualism negotiates the ethical with the loss of the ontic 
component. McKeon suggests: 
“This insight- the deep and fruitful analogy between questions of truth and questions of 
virtue – is the enabling foundation of the novel. And the genre of the novel can be 
understood comprehensively as an early modern cultural instrument designed to confront, on 
the level of narrative form and content, both intellectual and social crisis simultaneously” 
(22).  
 Ian Watt suggests that the perfect novel is the novel with a perfect interpenetration of 
plot, character and emergent moral theme. The novel type par excellence where this is 
achieved is the Bildungsroman. The classic Bildungsroman through effective use of irony 
reconciles the contradiction of individualism. The successful reconciliation of individual 
freedom and socialization creates an “objective” effect. Morality appears to emerge naturally 











imposition. This “objective” effect created by the novel is what Nancy Armstrong refers to 
as “bourgeois morality” : 
Contrary to prevailing critical opinion, bourgeois morality is not a value in and of 
itself so much as a way of reading, assessing and revising existing categories of 
identity and whatever cultural apparatus may authorize them – often the novel 
itself. From this perspective, bourgeois morality cannot possibly draw its 
tremendous and enduring authority from institutional religion, the Bible, or even 
Judeo-Christian ethics in the most general sense. Bourgeois morality appears to 
emanate from the very core of an individual as that individual confronts established 
systems of value and finds them lacking. Often suspicious of pleasure, 
unconcerned with profit and heedless of life’s little necessities, bourgeois morality 
appears to be the assertion of pure individuality (349-50).    
What the novel achieves thus is the complete naturalization of an historically and culturally 
contingent subjectivity. Armstrong suggests furthermore that feminist individualism, 
exemplified in particular by Jane Eyre, far from destabilizing structures of power, 
consolidates modern identity in the interests of middle class women (Domestic Fictions). 
Individualism is so integral to the novel that attempts to represent the person, 
constituted in orientation to a social or transcendental order, appear virtually impossible. 
This is the struggle which seems to lie at the heart of the nineteenth century Russian novel, 
torn between an Enlightenment form and the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
embodied memorably in the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. It is the failed struggle also 
of the working class (Trotter) or revolutionary (Denning) novel and the source of discontent 
regarding the “extroverted African novel” (Julien). The novel’s resistance to representation 
of heteronomous selfhood is fascinatingly played out in Close Sesame, the final novel of 













VIII Individualism and Somali-Islamic Culture 
Farah’s novels draw modern individualism into unequal dialogue with the Somali-Islamic 
culture they attempt to represent. Many critics note the “democratic openness” of Farah’s 
novels which pull a range of traditions, ideologies and opinions into polyphonic debate. 
While the Somali-Islamic worldview finds representation in the novels, this worldview is 
portrayed as uniformly and incontrovertibly static, authoritarian and bound by conformity. 
The one possible exception is the final novel of the first trilogy, Close Sesame, to be 
considered in a later chapter. In other words, the novels, in general, tend to represent Somali-
Islamic culture as a threat to the ideal of freedom which in an individualist culture’s 
reflection on itself uniquely represents the higher order. Paradoxically, the ideal of 
unqualified freedom as ethic ultimately precipitates the illusion of the absence of a higher 
order altogether, since freedom prescribes that one must be liberated from all ligatures.  
An assessment of individualism in Somali culture comes up immediately against the very 
terms in which the enquiry defines itself. What is meant by individualism varies greatly in 
the sources and these loose definitions may be distinguished from a more rigorous 
philosophical understanding of the term, suggested by Taylor’s analysis. The idea of “Somali 
culture” also runs the risk of hypostatizing in an archaic past a culture which has mutually 
interacted with a number of influences. Maritime trade accounts for most of Somalia’s 
contact with other cultures. There is evidence of Greek and Roman trade going back to the 
first century A.D. and contact with the Chinese dating back to the 1400s. Trade relations 











The Islamic influence has, however, been the most significant with contemporary 
Somalia virtually completely Muslim. Although historical evidence of Islam in the Horn of 
Africa dates back to the early eighth century A.D., popular mythology, particularly in the 
North, claims that Somalia was Muslim before there was Islam in Medina, the second most 
sacred Muslim city. Some Somalis also claim descent from the household of the Prophet of 
Islam. These links were forged when, very early in Islamic history, a group of adherents of 
the new faith fled to Abyssinia, seeking the protection of the Christian Negus, against 
persecution of the dominant powers in Mecca. 
In seeking to define “Somali culture” one also runs the risk, noted in respect of most 
of the early anthropological and ethnographic enquiries, of confining the idea of this Horn of 
Africa culture to the ways of life only of dominant groups within it.  
Sources on Somalia written in English or translated into English are quite limited. 
There is a significant corpus of Arabic sources, but none of these has been translated into 
English. The earliest source is The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (60 A.D.). The peripatetic 
Moroccan Berber, Ibn Battuta, called on Mogadiscio in the first half of the fourteenth 
century. The record of his visit exists in his Travels, which has been translated from the 
Arabic. The most well-known English source on Somalia is Richard Burton’s First Footsteps 
in East Africa, whose stereotypes of Somalis Farah frequently alludes to in A Naked Needle. 
Most early scholarship on Somalia has been anthropological, most notably the work of the 
“doyen” of Somali studies I.M. Lewis. In recent decades, scholarship has widened into 
various other disciplines, including the work of scholars who are themselves Somali.  
 A common strand in many of the above sources is what is perceived to be the 











reliant”, “self-sufficient”, “freedom of the individual” and egalitarianism in respect of the 
“traditional” way of life. Leaving aside for the moment the question of armchair speculation 
and essentialism which the above profile might suggest, this cluster of terms associated with 
individualism should not, however, be mistaken for the individualism of denied social and 
ethical framework described by Charles Taylor. In other words, although “traditional” 
Somali society is frequently discussed using some of the vocabulary of individualism, at no 
point in any of the sources is it suggested that the crucial move associated with modernity 
occurs, namely, the location of moral sources in the independent self.  
When the Somali are identified as “autonomous”, what is invariably implied is that 
both as single persons and as a group they are able to survive without any outside support in 
what is an excruciatingly hard natural environment.  
The “independence” of the Somali is often also associated with the extreme 
egalitarianism of the political order. Somali society recognizes no social hierarchy and no 
political authority vested in any one man or constituted authority. Any member of the reer, 
or extended family, is entitled to participate in the shir, or deliberative assembly. Who 
exactly constitutes the reer is highly fluid, depending on the context. The smallest social unit 
is the household, contained within the primary lineage, contained within the diya paying 
group. Diya refers to compensation, most often in the form of camels, for the wrongful death 
of another clan member by a member of one’s own clan. In this way, contrary to the legal 
trend in truly individualistic societies where individual punishment is justified for individual 
wrongdoing, in the Somali scenario, collective punishment encourages also collective 
responsibility for precluding infringements of the xeer or customary law. While the opinion 











religious law, the wadaad, or the oral poet may carry additional weight, in his own right, 
these figures have no authority to exact obedience – they would have to rely on their powers 
of persuasion. The absence of any politically constituted authority creates Somali democracy 
(often to the point of “anarchy”, as I.M. Lewis memorably described it), but this in no way 
suggests the equality-individualism nexus which is supposed to be the unique effect of  
individualism proper. (The shir in all the literature on the topic appears to be an exclusively 
male consultative forum.) In a study of traditional courts, A.H.I. Diblawe suggests the 
existence also in the Somali social code of  pre-modern human “rights.” But what is 
translated as “the natural right of every man” and the “freedom of the individual” held dear 
to Somali society exists without the logic of individualism which in modernity’s reflection 
on itself is supposed to give birth to these ideals.  .         
Similarly, the much vaunted Somali “self-restraint” and “self-sufficiency” is not an 
aspect of an autonomously generated moral paradigm, but an element of a social code of 
conduct. What it refers to are the capacity to survive in a brutal environment and the personal 
discipline of one’s appetites with hospitality and generosity to one’s fellows as consequence 
and goal. “Self-restraint” thus does not refer to personal discipline of the punctual self, 
identified by Charles Taylor in the Lockean identity. Locke’s move allows the Cartesian 
extensionless self to direct its procedural discipline onto itself, creating the fiction of a 
punctual self-controlling identity. Neither is Somali “self-restraint” the “self-restraint” of the 
Calvinist capitalist, identified by Max Weber (48-52), inducing  industry and frugality with 
wealth reinvestment rather than consumption as consequence.  
 Nomenclature also in the anthropological discourse on the subject is considered a 











personal names in a culture is a marker of the recognition of a degree of individuality. At the 
other extreme, teknonymy, or a name derived from one’s social relationship, for example 
“mother of” of “grandfather of” is supposed to play down individuality associated with 
individualism (Geertz 90). What is interesting about the Somali case, is that each child 
carries three names: the given name, the name of the father, and the name of the grandfather. 
Most Somali children have been able to recite their lineage history back to its founding 
fathers. What appears to be recognized thus is both individuality and an “upward looking” 
system which places the person in a defined social order.  
 To the extent that language constitutes worldviews, Laitin, in his assessment of the 
impact of the use of English on Somali political concepts, makes the following observation: 
One Somali intellectual had pointed out to me that Somalis rarely begin their 
sentences with the first person singular, and rarely use the word comparable to the 
English “I”. He told me that he always felt “ego-aware” when conversing in 
English, almost unnaturally so (Laitin 193). 
What this suggests, is that while the Somali language reflects/constitutes the existence of the 
notion of the person, the way in which personhood is constituted and the relation of the 
person to a whole range of social orders might be very different to the individuality 
constituted/reflected by the English language in contemporary usage. 
 What is called Somali “individualism” needs also to be gauged in terms of the 
relation of the person to human society and the natural world. Charles Taylor, drawing on 
Anthony Giddens, retrieves the history of the “disembedding” of the human person from the 
social order and the natural world. A consequence of this is the creation of subject–object 
relationships, where the human subject or more correctly, rational individual, views the 











manipulated, exploited and dominated. Taylor refers to individualism as creating an 
“instrumentalist” view of the world for the disembedded, self-developing, individual. But 
this does not appear to be the nomadic pastoralist worldview. Ben Wisner points out the 
inappropriateness of concepts born of instrumentalist individualism like, for example, “the 
carrying capacity of land” to Somali nomadic pastoralism. The natural context within which 
rural Somali find themselves are still viewed as “humanized places” within which a 
sustainable way of life is supported, rather than as exploitable environments.  
 The absence of the subject-object divide signaled by modernity is suggested also by 
the idea that the Somali seem to live very much in an “enchanted” rather than “disenchanted” 
world. In Taylor’s terms, there is an “open boundary” between the subject and object worlds 
which invests speech acts and objects in the material world with power over the person. This 
is reinforced by the Islamic worldview which, in an apparent paradox, privileges substantive 
rationality within an horizon which simultaneously endorses the supernatural. The power 
attributed to speech acts is especially evident in the context of oral poetry, the 
“individualistic” aspects of which will be discussed in more detail below. Said Samatar 
refers to the “superstitious awe” with which “the talented poet is viewed” who attributes an 
almost “mystical power” to his creation (Samatar Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism 1). 
Godob or poetic slander is regarded almost as a physical assault and the poetic curse is 
regarded as equally effective and certain as, for example, being stabbed. 
 But Somali oral poetry and “individualism” are linked in other ways also.  In the 
context of a nomadic society, where, for practical reasons, the volume of portable property is 
severely limited, the greatest importance has been attached to oral poetry rather than to the 











parts of Africa or the world and although it is the product of a nomadic pastoral society, as 
Alden and Tremaine warn, must not be confused with European pastoral poetry.  
 Somali oral poetry is wholly individually composed, albeit against a rigid and 
rigorous metrical, alliterative and stylistic paradigm. Alden and Tremaine go so far as to 
suggest that poems are associated with individual poets “to an even greater extent than in the 
Western written tradition” (Alden and Tremaine 13). Poems are never composed on the spot. 
They are the product of exhaustive labour, usually by those with a poetic talent and an 
extensive knowledge of the Somali language since, in order to achieve the prescribed 
alliterative pattern, an often archaic and “literary” vocabulary needs to be marshaled. Said 
Samatar notes that: “… the concept of ‘composition in performance’ associated with the 
propounders of  the ‘Formulaic Theory’ does not apply to Somali oral poetry, nor do 
Romantic/folklorist notions of oral poetry as a ‘communal product … an instinctive, artless 
outburst of feeling” which ‘naturally’ springs to life without prior deliberation” (Samatar 
74). On every occasion that a poem is recited by someone other than the composer, the 
original poet must not only be acknowledged, but also, in the exordium, the circumstance of 
the composition needs to be provided, while every word of the text must be faithfully and 
accurately reproduced. Infringement leads to strict penalties. In this sense then, Somali 
poetry is wholly individual, but against an external traditional aesthetic and social 
framework. Samatar emphasizes this social dimension of the poetic craft in the following 
way: 
The phrase “communal experience” brings us to the heart of an important source of 
inspiration for Somali poets. While composition is intensely individualistic, 
pastoral verse finds its appeal by being firmly committed to the moral and spiritual 











in a given community would know and appreciate. As one scholar put it, “Somali 
poetry establishes truth by arousing in the people a sensation of shared memory.” It 
prefers the obvious, the known and the communal to the ambiguous, the esoteric 
and the individualistic (Samatar 86). 
Thus, although the person is foregrounded in the Somali poetic tradition, the person is shown 
in relief against a social horizon. The artist does not as in the culture of modernity become a 
kind of creator-god, shaping the world anew. The artist remains firmly placed within the 
moral order of the social framework within which he is constituted.  
 What presents itself as “individualism” in Somali culture thus is not the 
individualism described by Taylor. Some of the markers of individualism which have been 
applied to the Somali worldview are more correctly an index of socially constituted codes of 
ideal conduct. Individualism proper, by contrast, presents itself as proceeding from the 
disengaged, procedurally rational subject. This independent subject oriented against an 
autonomously constructed morality then negotiates social bonds, primarily through contract. 
On this model, the social is constituted by a collection of autonomous subjects. 
Philosophically, this transformation of conception of self and society is indexed by the 
Cartesian break consolidated by Locke. 
It is extremely difficult to winnow Islamic influence out from Somali practice since 
Islam in the Horn of Africa dates back so far. Where disparities exist between the provisions 
of Islamic law and Somali practice, however, the differences between the two worldviews 
become apparent. For example, Somali customary law ignores women’s right to inheritance 
inscribed in shari’a. Similarly, individual retribution for criminal misdemeanour dictated by 
Islamic law is trumped by collective compensation of the diya paying group governed by 











Ash’ari theological speculation, with the predominance of two sufi brotherhoods, namely, 
the Salihiyya in the North and the Qadiriyyah in the South (Ahmed, C.C. “God, Anti-
Colonialism and Drums”). In contemporary Somalia, this position is shifting with more 
literalist interpretations shaped by political Islam suppressing the sufi practices of Somalia’s 
recent past (Jazhbay). 
 The study of “individualism” in Islam is limited since the person as the focus of 
critical attention is an avenue only recently being opened in Islamic scholarship in European 
languages. And while the person has a very prominent place in Islam, the scholarly focus on 
the person is paradoxically and necessarily a product of the individualist standpoint of 
modernity which constitutes the Islamic unthought. As Ebrahim Moosa suggests: “Our 
knowledge of how the self  is culturally conceived in Islamicate societies and how it has 
served as a historical index of personal and social transformation is still at its infancy” (213). 
 In Farah’s novels, Islam, like Somali culture, is represented, confirming dominant 
media images, as an authoritarian, highly conformist influence. This is contradicted in the 
scholarly sources which present Islam as one of the earliest expressions of “individualism.” 
In significant ways, Islamicate history parallels the history of individualism traced by Taylor. 
Crucially for Taylor, individualism is associated with reason and interiority. Plato makes the 
first move which privileges thought, associated with the mind, over the desiring body. The 
higher life in relation to which the self orients itself thus is associated with reason located in 
the mind. This pre-history of individualism in the modern West in which reason comes to 
play so important a part is significantly replicated, sometimes controversially, in the 
religious philosophy and history of thought in Islam also. Reason often is rendered in Arabic 











second) emanation from the divinity (Encyclopaedia of Islam) and the importance of “aql” 
or reason is undisputed.  
What is disputed both between theologians and between theologians and 
philosophers are the sources and consequences of reason. In terms of theological debate, the 
most historically important exchange on the place of reason in Islam occurs between the 
Mu’tazili and the Ash’ari “schools”. Reason, on the Mu’tazili account, allows independent 
access to the higher order to which God, because He is God, also conforms. Revelation on 
this view exists more as a moral prompt for man to do good. The Mu’tazili creed dominated 
briefly in the third/ninth century in Baghdad, oftentimes ruthlessly. Ultimately, however, its 
philosophical opposite, Ash’arism held sway in Sunni Islam. Ash’arism holds that ethics 
cannot be independently determined by human reason without revelation and that good is 
good and evil is evil because God ordains it so. God thus is the ultimate source of morality 
and is not subject to a universal morality. God represents the ethical source. 
 The position of philosophy in Islamic tradition is also an index of the significance of 
reason. Philosophy (what is referred to here is classical Greek philosophy) is supposed to 
enter Islam in the ninth century. Jurists in Abbasid Baghdad relied upon Greek philosophy to 
extend the rules of legal reasoning. Philosophy thus was seen as a facet of “ijtihad” or 
limited independent reasoning, distinct from accepted tradition and authority. If one of the 
hallmarks of individualism is the place of privilege assigned to  human reason, then the 
centrality of individualism in Islam is indicated by the vigour and vitality of philosophical 
speculation which is part of the Islamic tradition. 
 Taylor traces the interiority of individualism to St Augustine’s “radically reflexive” 











Interestingly, this move towards interiority forms part of the trajectory of development of 
Islamic theology and philosophy and occupies a crucial place in sufism. Persian 
Illuminationist philosophy comes remarkably close to the Augustinian intuition that God is 
the light which allows one, taking a reflexive step back from the self, to see. Sufism which 
develops out of poetic readings of the sacred text and contemplation of the spiritual 
dimensions of revelation, most frequently is associated with the interiority of 
“individualism.” This radically reflexive stance develops out of Qur’anic injunction and the 
concept of ihsan emerging from Prophetic tradition. Ihsan refers to the Prophetic advice to 
“worship God as if you see him” which, according to Annemarie Schimmel, leads to the 
“complete interiorization of Islam” (29).  
 According to Taylor, individuality is a spin off of the process producing interiority 
which can be traced back to Montaigne. Individuality or uniqueness is a recognized and 
celebrated aspect of the Islamic understanding of God’s creation of the human being. In 
terms of its cosmology, the Islamic concept of personality shares both universal and 
particular characteristics (Hamid). Man is the special creation of God, and enjoys, unlike 
other creation, limited free will, higher faculties and a moral conscience and original human 
nature which tends instinctively towards the ethical source in God. But the human 
personality displays also unique characteristics which are physically (and symbolically) 
embodied in the singularity of each person’s fingerprint, described in the Qur’an (75:4). 
Rashid Hamid suggests that: “By analogy, we should see that, like the physical fingerprint, 
each individual is a unique personality in a universe of personalities.”(265) Hamid quotes the 
philosopher, Seyyid Hossein Nasr, for an enlargement on the frequent trope which 











each individual indicates that each microcosm is a world of its own, not identical with any 
other microcosm” (Hamid 265). The concept of the uniqueness of the person is contained 
also in the frequently used term in Islamic texts, “shakhsiyyah”, which refers to “the 
distinctive character, identity and way of life of a person” (Hamid 257). Ebrahim Moosa 
suggests furthermore in relation to the work of eleventh/twelfth century jurist, theologian and 
mystic, Abu-Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali that , “the idea of the individual was well 
entrenched in Ghazali’s Persianate world” and that “the notion of individuality” is an 
emphatically stressed idea (222). In some ways, thus, the history of the person in Islam is 
similar to the history of the rise of individualism. 
Some of the themes associated with individualism include: self-development, 
autonomy, privacy and the dignity of man. Each of these themes, as will be shown below, is 
well articulated in Islamic literature. 
The Iranian intellectual, ‘Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977) expands on the Qur’anic 
distinction between “bashar” and “insan”, which foregrounds the idea of self-development. 
Bashar refers to man as biological being and insan signifies man as a process of becoming. 
Self-development  is perhaps most strongly represented in the sufi concept of the path or 
“tariqa” along which the initiate has to pass in order to reach self-fulfillment. Pilgrimage, 
with which frequently rituals of affliction are associated, be it to the shrines of sufi saints or 
the annual pilgrimage or “hadj” to Mecca are the symbolic equivalent also of a kind of  self-
formation (Moosa  Poetics of Imagination 124). Personal development is also a key idea in 
the Islamic concept of adab, once again a general Islamic code, but achieving its apogee in 











as “civility” or “etiquette” and often is associated with the classical Greek notion of paideia, 
or the practical instruction in self-realization as a member of the polis.” 
Autonomy in the discourse of individualism is a product of man’s unique capacity to 
access universal reason. Reason is what elevates man above the beasts. Distinguished in this 
way, man has a dignity shared by no other creature. Human dignity appears also to be at the 
heart of Islamic teaching. Mohammad Hashim Kamali locates the source of the idea of 
human dignity in the Islamic worldview in both Qur’an and Hadith. Human dignity is also 
the source of human rights, those non-negotiable entitlements which attach to the human 
being simply through his being human. In its encounter with modernity, the protection 
accorded the person in Islam has also been articulated in the discourse of human rights. The 
most frequent Arabic word used to translate the idea of a right is “haqq”. Those who claim 
an Islamic rights dispensation suggest that the fundamental human rights recognized by the 
secular and republican break of the French Revolution in Europe only in the 18th century 
were already secured in 7th century Arabia. Both Qur’an and Hadith may widely be quoted to 
support individual liberty, equality and brotherhood. Women’s rights are deemed more 
extensive and to afford more protection than do modern, secular rights regimes. The 
“Medina Charter” is frequently cited to support Islam’s protection of minority rights. Islam 
is seen to protect the rights of children, the environment and animals before these categories 
were recognized in the North-Atlantic as constituting rights bearing legal “personalities”. In 
addition Islam, it is suggested, recognizes special rights categories which do not appear on 
the conceptual horizon of modern rights schemes: These include the rights of the self (in 
short) to lead a justly balanced life, the special rights of others, for example, neighbours and 











(Mawdudi, Kamali, Moosa “Islamic Rights Schemes”). An Islamic rights framework is also 
sometimes constructed using the Qur’anic exhortation to mercy as basis (Osanloo). On this 
understanding, the scriptural encouragement to grant mercy to an offender is a recognition of 
the basic human rights of each person.  
Privacy is another significant theme of individualism which finds expression in 
various ways. The separation of the private space of the home from the public sphere is 
suggested both by Qur’an and Hadith. The “Verse of the Veil” (33:53) in the Qur’an 
legitimated the separation of the private household of the Prophet from the business of the 
community. Privacy is also a very strong element of the self-realization which is the quest of 
sufi practice.  
Based on the Islamic foregrounding of the themes of self-development, autonomy, 
dignity and privacy, a fundamental similarity may be suggested between Islamic culture and 
individualist culture. 
 Some of the effects of individualism include the transition from status to contract, the 
social reconceptualization of marriage, a transformed relationship with the transcendental, 
the development of autobiographical narratives and an attention to man’s creative powers. 
The highly individualistic nature of shari’a (Messick “Indexing the Self” and Ruthven), 
seems to attest a move from a status model to a society where responsibility is determined by 
contract. Marriage in a culture of individualism is conceptualized as the contractual union of 
two free and equal individuals. In various ways marriage in Islam appears to support this 
model. Marriage is highly contractual. For example, the female party to the union may 
contract away the male right to polygyny. Marriage is a voluntary union. Forced marriage 











parties are equal before God, and obligations are determined against a conception of a 
natural order.  
  Individualism achieves its contemporary form in part consequence of the  Protestant 
Revolution. The Reformation brought the believer into an individual relation to God and 
salvation came to depend upon belief and conduct alone. The church as corporate body no 
longer was seen as the vehicle to the sacred. Again, many commentators on Islam confirm a 
similar transformation in 7th century Arabia, crystallized most strongly in the Qur’anic 
affirmation that redemption does not depend on intercessors but on the piety of the believer 
alone. In fact, the direct unmediated access of the believer to God is even more radical than 
in the Protestant traditions since Islam ordains no priestly class. A consequence of 
individualism of belief is what Taylor terms the “affirmation of the ordinary”. In other words 
marriage, family life, work are imbued with a kind of divinity. Weber demonstrates how the 
spiritualization of work in the Calvinist ethic lays the foundation for capitalist take-off. 
Similarly, in Islam, apart from the ritual forms of worship, the quotidian round itself comes 
to be seen as a form of “ibadah” or worship. The ordinary is spiritualized.  
Autobiography is also regarded as a marker of individualism. George Makdisi in an 
analysis of the eleventh century diary of Ibn Banna, suggests that this diary was “not an 
isolated phenomenon peculiar to him alone, but was rather the product of a wide-spread 
practice not only in his eleventh century but also in the preceding one, with its origins hidden 
further back still” (174). Another related genre is that of the biographical dictionary. Al Qadi 
defines the biographical dictionary as “a prose work whose primary structure is that of a 
series of biographies, regardless of the order in which these biographies succeed each other” 











the Islamic community” (Makdisi 175). Importantly, Al-Qadi suggests these biographical 
dictionaries are not genealogies, for which the primary criterion is the clan, tribe or race, but 
biographies which delineate the identities of prominent men. The biographical dictionaries 
may be traced back to the ninth century and were preceded by the single biography or 
monograph, of which none survive except the Prophetic biography or “sirah.” Prophetic 
biographies in the earliest period were transmitted orally; later in written form. Ebrahim 
Moosa suggests that by the eleventh century, the autobiographical genre was already firmly 
established in Muslim societies (Poetics of Imagination 84-5). 
Based on the analysis above, Islam might appear, if not as an individualist 
worldview, then potentially at least as tending towards individualism. However, if the 
ultimate criterion for  individualism  is the internal relocation of moral sources within the 
disengaged, disciplinary individual rather than in an external idea of the good, socially or 
transcendentally defined, then only a highly acrobatic interpretation of Islamic sources can 
posit an Islamic individualism.  
Reason in all Islamic philosophical speculation reveals the perfect order which exists 
externally, either in the universe or in the divine. In Taylor’s terms, reason in Islamic thought 
remains substantive and at no point becomes procedural. The Mu’tazili position, outlined 
above may be seen as fundamentally rationalist, similar in some ways to the Neo-Stoicism of 
Justus Lipsius of sixteenth century Europe, similar in others to eighteenth century Deism, 
both, for Taylor, steps in the path to an exclusive humanism (Taylor A Secular Age 117). 
While Mu’tazili rationalism may be seen to be tending towards anthropocentrism, it is 
distinguished in the following ways: Firstly, the Mu’tazili were theologians not philosophers, 











the Hadith (actions and utterances) of the Prophet of Islam. Secondly, while the break 
embodied by the Enlightenment makes reason procedural, that is, knowledge is deemed true 
based on the method by which it is acquired, for the Mu’tazili, reason remains substantive, in 
other words, reason reveals a truth which exists in the world. Thus, while Mu’tazili doctrine 
may appear supremely “rational”, it is a rationalism which reveals an external universal 
ethics, rather than the individual as moral source. Rationalist Mu’tazili philosophy holds that 
human reason is independently able to perceive the order of the universe. Revelation 
confirms reason. But revelation is an indispensable aid in supporting man to make the right 
moral choices. Reason on this analysis is substantive. Reason is even more patently 
substantive in Ash’ari speculation where the universal order may be perceived only through 
prophecy. Good is good and evil because God ordains it so. The divine is the exclusive 
ethical source. These are the extremes of conflicting theological views. 
 There is another interesting Islamic variation on European Enlightenment tropes 
which are located in the source of discrimination. Taylor suggests that the origins of 
individualism lie in the privileging of reason associated with the inwardness of the mind. 
Lockean empiricism privileges the visual. The mind is the “eye” which sees. The privileged 
location of discrimination in the Islamic tradition, by contrast, is the heart, “kalb”. The heart 
according to the Qur’an is “the source of man’s good and evil aspirations”, “the seat of 
learning and religious apprehension” the origin of “man’s knowledge or ignorance of God” 
(“kalb”Encyclopaedia of Islam). Messick suggests that in litigation, the interpretive problem 
which exists for Muslim jurists is that the heart is the source of intention, truth is regarded as 
residing in the “heart”, which is inward and therefore inaccessible. (“Indexing the Self” 176-











the mind, in Islamic discourse, the inwardness of the self is located in the heart. (Al-Attas 
149) If for the one tradition the mind is the eye which sees Truth, for the other, the heart 
perceives Truth. Thus the “shahadah” or the testimony of faith in Islam is “an assent from 
the heart” (“Islam” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online ).  Consequently commitment or “will” 
emphasized by Taylor in European discourse is powered by the mind, while in the Islamic 
tradition commitment is powered by the heart. In other words, and this is the significant 
difference, if in the history of individualism reason is privileged, in the Islamic tradition 
spirituality, symbolized by the heart, is the precondition of reason. Myein, the Greek word 
from which “mysticism” is derived, means “to close one’s eyes.” Spirituality thus comes 
before reason and represents that which, on the Islamic interpretation, makes reason possible. 
The ethical source in the Divine enables reason and reason remains substantive not 
procedural. The limits of reason are the ethics of revelation. The Faustian predicament 
constitutes the unthought of the Islamic conception of reason.  
 Similarly, individuality in the Islamic conception is not a product of the inwardness 
of the disengaged self but an attribute granted one by God. The Qur’an acknowledges the 
uniqueness of the person, but it is an individuality granted by God. 
The suggestion was earlier made that elements of the sufi quest for self-realization 
was similar to the autonomous individual’s quest for self-development. In some ways the 
spiritual quest is a lonely, individual, hermetic journey, but also, paradoxically, it is a 
journey of confraternity in which the “murid” or initiate is induced into a brotherhood and 
where the most significant social bond is the allegiance to “sheikh” or spiritual guide. The 
Sufi brotherhood, unlike modern forms of association is not the coming together for mutual 











system that comes into being out of a spiritual purpose whose codes are determined by 
revelation. The goal of this development is clear: “fana” or annihilation in God where man’s 
paltry self is subsumed into the majesty of the Divinity. So far from independence and 
autonomy, the quest in Islamic spirituality is complete absorption of the self. This idea of 
self-realization, as will be explored in a subsequent chapter, is negated by the representation 
of the sufi central character in Close Sesame.   
As discussed above, “adab”,  or “instruction” in the creation of a particular kind of 
person is a crucial element of development. While the education of the individual always 
quite literally is a self-instruction where the subject, through his independent reasoning, 
fortuitously comes to the conclusions ordained by society, “adab” quite categorically is 
social. In some ways adab is like the ancient Greek “paedeia”,  but unlike classical 
instruction in citizenry is also wholly spiritual: “Though often brought to bear on men of 
deep religious belief, Hellenistic and late-antique paideia contained no religious code and 
imposed no religious sanction whatsoever” (Brown 29). The codes which come to constitute 
adab are the product of a hermeneutical engagement with revelation, and through revelation 
come to be social. Adab is never a self-constructed code, the product of procedural reason.  
On the question of human rights, while Islam recognizes specific entitlements of the 
human person, the source of these “rights” and the form of their expression is significantly 
different from modern human rights frameworks. Moosa argues that “secular human rights” 
and “Islamic rights” are “conceptually different things” (“Islamic Rights Schemes” 187) and 
that “Islamic rights discourse has an entirely different genesis and pedigree compared to the 
secular human rights discourse” (“Islamic Rights Schemes 188). Moosa summarizes the 











The notion of human rights as we know it today arises in the context of the 
evolution of the nation-state as a political system … The legal culture 
generated by the nation-state increasingly imposed its own logic of social 
behavior and social conditions in societies receptive to it. A crucial feature 
of this model of statecraft is the relationship between the individual and the 
state, which brought about an awareness of the individual’s encounter with a 
powerful and dominant entity unknown in pre-modern times. The state is a 
permanent legal entity, which exercises its claim over a territory and 
community through a legal order and organized government, and also 
demonstrates a measure of political identity. Those rights, now known as 
“first generation” human rights were especially designed to protect the 
individual from the overwhelming powers of the modern bureaucratic state. 
Since then human rights, [sic] have already advanced to second and third 
generation rights that cover socio-economic and political rights as well as 
environmental rights. (“Islamic Rights Schemes” 190).  
The foundation of these understandings of citizen, state and rights, of course, lie in the idea 
of the disengaged, rational individual and its consequent need for explanations both of 
community and submission to authority described in Lockean political theory.  
 The Arabic word most often employed to translate the idea of a human right is 
“haqq”. The semantic possibilities of this word already suggest some of the conflicts 
involved in equating Islamic and modern human rights schemes: 
In Arabic a “right” or “claim” is called haqq (pl. huquq), but also has a 
wider meaning. While the original Arabic root of the term “haqq” is 
somewhat obscured it can be recovered from its corresponding Hebrew root. 
It means among other things “to engrave” onto some object, “to inscribe or 
write”, “to prescribe and decree”. And, it also means that which is “due to 











and therefore it has more in common with the terms “reality” and “truth”. 
For this reason the opposite of haqq is “falsehood” (batil). The term haqq is 
considered polysemous or multivalent and thus could mean 
right/claim/duty/truth depending on context and the use of the word in a 
specific context (“Islamic Rights Schemes 191). 
Moosa, as we shall see, elaborates on some of the conflicts between the two schemes, but 
does not fully explore the possibilities contained within the word “haqq” itself. Firstly, if 
haqq suggests “truth”, in Islamic metaphysical speculation, ultimate Truth lies with God. 
Thus God is the source of the truth embodied in rights. Moosa confirms: “The crucial point 
in the Islamic rights scheme is that God is the one who confers rights on persons, via 
revealed authority although human authority mediates these rights” (“Islamic Rights 
Schemes 193). Unlike modern human rights schemes where the right flows from the 
disengaged individual simply since he is human, Islamic rights originate in God, known 
through revelation.  
 Haqq suggests another contradiction between Islamic and modern rights conceptions. 
If the polysemic possibilities of the word “haqq” includes both the idea of “right” and the 
idea of “duty”, then it encapsulates also the Islamic idea that rights are created not in and of 
themselves, but rather as a consequence of duties or obligations. In this way, the word  
“haqq” crystallizes the ways in which rights in Islam are conceived as both constitutively 
theocentric and social. 
The privileging of the ideal of autonomy in modernity above other ideals also is a 
consequence of the faculty of reason of the disengaged subject, where reason is procedurally 
defined. If all action must be justified only by reason, an autonomy is generated, producing a 











which appears to generate its own ethical boundaries and seems to develop itself out of its 
own resources. Islamic freedom paradoxically arises from submission – submission to the 
Divine. For Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, the Pakistani revivalist, it is only through liberation from 
the self and submission to a Divine ethics that true freedom can be achieved (105-6). In the 
articulation of Sayyid Qutb, whose ideas are regarded as providing the theoretical framework 
for political Islam, ultimate freedom similarly is achieved when one bows to the law of God 
rather than man. Freedom is brought to man on earth by, “The establishing of the dominion 
of God on earth, the abolishing of the dominion of man …” (104). Moosa also suggests the 
paradox of self-liberation through self-submission  vis a vis the thought of Ghazali: 
True knowledge, for Ghazali, is that which leads to the ethical. Knowledge 
has to lead to the path of the afterlife, to the ultimate salvation and the 
fulcrum of liberation. The emancipated subject is thus one who is truly 
liberated from all material dependencies. A truly free subject does not 
behave like a pseudodivinity on earth, one that perpetrates genocide and 
epistemicide – two notorious crimes often perpetrated by humans in 
material and mental bondage. Indeed, in his interpretation which is 
consistent with the Muslim tradition, the imperative of knowledge is to act. 
And an index of freedom is ethical action in the world. For a Muslim, a 
double emancipation inheres in a moral act: emancipation in this world and 
salvation in the hereafter (Poetics of Imagination 267).      
Islam appears to resist the now commonsensical notion in a large part of the globe that there 
is an outside of religion. In Islamic terms, religion, that is, God, and the person’s 
heteronomous contact with the divine/ethical source, is everywhere. There is no outside of 
faith since in its fundamental philosophical constitution the person locates eudaimonia in an 











impossibility, it is unthinkable. Since there is no outside of religion, the split into public and 
private spheres where religion is a dimension of the private sphere cannot occur. 
On the question of the extreme “individualism” of Islamic law or shari’a, suggesting 
a “status” rather than “contract” society, again what is missed in the analyses or better what 
is suggested by imprecise terminology is not that there exists a radically autonomous Muslim 
who establishes relationships through contract, but rather a heteronomous person who is 
constitutively linked to the Divine and is immersed in community through the Divine. The 
fine details of what this means in legal terms is comprehensively suggested by Brinkley 
Messick in his assessment of the implications of modern state formation in highland Yemen. 
What Messick observes is the transformation of what he terms the “shari” subject into the 
modern nation-state-era subject. The transition is not from one culture of individualism to 
another, but from a “status” society in which the person is variously acknowledged to a 
society which claims a pure contractual base, but variously creates status.  
 Taylor suggests that the autonomous self is a “buffered” self which creates the 
subject-object distinction which has as ultimate consequence Weber’s “disenchantment” of 
the world. The world of the autonomous self is not the world of magic and spirits since the 
objects in the world are fundamentally separate from the subject. The world created by 
Islam, on the other hand, remains an “enchanted” world. The heteronomous self is a 
“porous” self open to the influence of the world from which it has not disengaged. What for 
rationalism would constitute the supernatural is an undisputed part of the Islamic worldview. 
The Qur’an refers to God’s creation of both man from clay and djinn from fire. The djinn are 
invisible to the human eye, but are possessed of reason and responsibility and are more prone 











Islam, based on the above analysis, appears to be between individualism and 
conformity and between status and contract. It appears in this light, I would argue, since it 
recognizes the person but orients the person clearly in relation to an external higher order 
encompassed in God as ethical source. The external orientation of the Islamic self constitutes 
a necessarily social being further entrenched by the inherently “public” nature of the content 
of revelation. Islam necessarily is social since it is embedded in a practice which cannot be 
construed exclusively as private.  
In his study of Al-Ghazali, whose work is regarded  as harmonizing Ash’ari theology 
and sufism, Ebrahim Moosa suggests the concept of “heteronomy” to describe the person in 
Islam: 
For Ghazali, ethics was heteronomous. “Heteronomy” means “other” and 
“law”. The ethical imperative, for Ghazali, was not derived from the will of 
the autonomous agent, as Immanuel Kant would have it. Rather, the will of 
the agent is a response to the divine address and an invitation to give willing 
assent (tasdiq) to revelation. Thus, it is the Other which provides the human 
will with the law, instead of human reason being the provider of the 
universal law. A heteronomous agent derives principles of action from 
outside himself or herself. Such agents allow themselves to be influenced by 
the will of others – in this case by God’s will – by giving primary 
consideration to the goal or consequences of their choices. Thus, in the 
heteronomy of the will, morality and ethics are external to reason. A 
heteronomous ethics is derived from religious beliefs; it depends on social, 
cultural, and theological sources. Ethics, piety, and ritual, for Ghazali, were 
in the end designed to construct a largely heteronomous self, not an 
autonomous one. However, it does not follow that a heteronomous self is 











Rather, individuality is the locus of agency and ultimately responsibility 
(Poetics of Imagination 231). 
In terms of the Islamic conception, the moral source of the person remains indisputably 
external. Ultimately, God is the “only true subject” (Schimmel 146). The word “islam” itself 
suggests an external moral orientation. The word “islam” is translated as submission, related 
to the root “salaam” which means “peace.” Islam thus is the submission to peace. Another 
semantic shade of the word  “islam” is that of  “giving one’s whole self over”, in this case, a 
giving of oneself over to God (Arkoun Rethinking Islam 15). The “muslim” formed thus in 
relation to the external transcendental constitutively is not an individualist subject. 
 These then are the fundamentals of the Somali-Islamic view of the person which 
Farah’s novels purport to represent. As will be shown, however, this worldview is 
constitutively denied representation as a consequence of the novel form which privileges the 
individual. The only representational possibility for the novel is the autonomous subject 
whose moral sources are located internally. In the modernist and postmodern novel, moral 
sources are projected onto the form itself but through the medium of the fragmented identity, 
which remains nonetheless a disengaged subjectivity. To represent the person oriented 
against an external moral framework is a constitutive impossibility for the novel. The 
attempt leads only to what may be termed the “failed novel.” These are some of the issues to 
















From a Crooked Rib and the Bildungsroman: Developing the Self, 
Developing the Nation 
 
From a Crooked Rib (1970), Farah’s first published book, drew its author onto the 
international literary scene, despite what were considered its aesthetic shortcomings. The 
book is supposed to have been written in less than a month when Farah was a philosophy 
student at the University of Chandigarh in India. Perhaps because of its perceived 
inadequacies it has not received as much critical attention as the later fiction, especially the 
trilogies. This novel is fundamental, however, in defining the boundaries of the novelistic 
sub-genre which constitutively embodies Farah’s worldview. The features which 
characterize this sub-genre of the novel also define the novel itself. These elements are 
explored, expanded and sometimes even apparently subverted in Farah’s later fiction. This 
chapter thus attempts to reveal the foundational individualist premise of the realist novel, 
from which the later modernist and postmodern novels proceed.  
 The novel takes its title from a Somali proverb: “God created woman from a crooked 
rib; and anyone who trieth to straighten it, breaketh it.” The reference to origins in the title is 
echoed in the circumstances of the book’s publication. From a Crooked Rib is both Farah’s 
first published novel and the first Somali novel. It is also a novel composed and published in 
English since a script and orthography for Somali was determined only two years after the 
novel’s publication. Like Farah’s other novels, the first novel has never been translated into 
Somali. In these ways, From a Crooked Rib is an “original” novel; it is completely new, it is 











But the book is “original” in another paradoxical sense also, suggested by the 
etymology of the word “original”. As Ian Watt points out in The Rise of the Novel, the 
modern meaning of the word “original” as “underived, independent, first-hand” came to be 
fixed only in the epochal eighteenth century. In the Medieval period, “original” meant 
“having existed from the first”. By a strange “semantic reversal” (Watt 14-15) then, a word 
that suggested tradition, existing from the start and perpetuated through the ages, came to 
mean new, spontaneously generating itself out of itself, significantly untraditional. From a 
Crooked Rib reflects all of these nuances of “originality.” In terms of the eighteenth century 
definition, it is Farah’s first novel, the first Somali novel and the first Somali novel in 
English. It is completely new, underived. But “original” also, in the older semantic 
association of the word, continues a tradition. The novel in part emerges out of older 
inherited forms which ultimately tend to be occluded in the genre which paradoxically 
identifies itself as being “underived, independent, first-hand”, “new”, “novel” in its 
presentation of unmediated individual experience.  The novel then goes on to create a 
tradition of its own. The novel form which Farah inherits is inaugurated in another 
geographical space. It does not emerge from the material conditions of the Somalia Farah 
writes about. Like the development of the novel genre itself, From a Crooked Rib, shares in 
the paradoxical, superficially denied reconciliation of tradition and newness, or as it may 
also be termed, modernity.       
From a Crooked Rib has not really been the focus of sustained critical attention. Brief 
analysis of the novel usually forms part of broad author or thematic surveys. What emerges 
from these considerations of the novel is the sense of a generic engagement which has no 











woman, Ebla, who escapes from her nomadic household and passes through the small town 
of Belet Wene, where she stays in the home of a distant relative. Here she attaches herself to 
a young man who takes her to the city of Mogadiscio. This story is read virtually without 
exception as a story of individual development. The heroine’s is a “journey towards 
enlightenment”, “independence”, “freedom”, “awakening” (McDowell). What sustains Ebla 
is her “consciousness of her own subjectivity”, of her power to reconceive herself and her 
world” (Alden and Tremaine Nuruddin Farah 47). Ebla strives after “individuality and 
independence” and “self-definition” (Wright Nuruddin Farah 25-26). Ebla’s escape is a 
“self-emancipation” which allows her to test her “self-reliance”  and allows her to establish 
“herself as her own self-creator”, in this way finding her own “self-fulfillment” (Okonkwo 
“Individual’s Quest for Self-Fulfillment” 68-9). Ironically, while defining the novel using the 
vocabulary of both eighteenth century European Enlightenment Idealism and Romanticism, 
the critics classify the novel as an example of picaresque adventure of the feudal period. 
(Okonkwo “Changing Roles of Women” and Wright Nuruddin Farah). Although the critics 
identify Ebla as a female picaro, for Bakhtin a hero-type with no development potential, 
merely a “point moving through space” (“The Bildungsroman” 10), the language which is 
used to describe her experience in the novel is the language of Bildung.  
For a Somali example of the picaro, one might do better to look at a character like 
’Igaal Bowkahh the hero of Somali folktales, whose adventures have been recorded by 
Margaret Laurence (A Tree for Poverty). Like Ebla, he is a character of a world in transition 
to modernity, a world in which, what Lukács terms “the circle of life” (Theory of the Novel), 
is beginning to collapse. Like Ebla, ’Igaal Bowkahh also leaves hearth and home to seek his 











inward development of the protagonist, the focus falls on the adventures themselves. The 
language of inwardness, the sense of a character with great inner resources is, by contrast, a 
significant part of Ebla’s characterization. While the character of ’Igaal Bowkahh is a 
satirical response to a world in which the nomadic ideal is failing and cannot be revived, 
Ebla’s character constitutes the entry into modernity. In the critical literature on From a 
Crooked Rib, the novel quite clearly is defined without being named as that sub-genre of the 
novel which seems constitutively to define the genre itself, namely, the Bildungsroman.  
 
I Rise of the Bildungsroman / Rise of the Novel 
Karl Morgenstern is credited with the first use of the term “Bildungsroman” to define 
through naming a sub-genre of the novel whose outline by the early 1820s was already 
apparent in the novel theory not only of Germany, but also France and England. 
Morgenstern’s definition perspicaciously discerns the parallel functions with which the 
Bildungsroman is encumbered: 
It will justly bear the name Bildungsroman firstly and primarily on account of it’s 
thematic material, because it portrays the Bildung of the hero in its beginnings and 
growth to a certain stage of completeness; and also secondly because it is by virtue 
of this portrayal that it furthers the reader’s Bildung to a much greater extent than 
any other kind of novel (quoted in Swales 12).  
Already at this early stage, the double task of the Bildungsroman is intuited: The genre both 
represents the schooling of the autonomous hero in a particular kind of subjecthood and 
simultaneously schools the reader in a similar lesson of personality acquisition, consequent 
upon the particular dynamic of its representational technique. For this reason, the 











self-realization of the hero is “in itself formative and encouraging to others” (Lukács Theory 
of Novel 135). 
 The term Bildungsroman is re-introduced by Dilthey towards the end of the 
nineteenth-century  in his Leben Schleiermachers (1870) where he proposes “to call those 
novels which make up the school of Wihelm Meister … Bildungsromane” (Beddow 1-2). 
The term, however, only acquires general popularity in literary circles in the early twentieth 
century when in Poetry and Lived Experience (1906), Dilthey favours the term with a crisp 
definition: 
A lawlike development is discerned in the individual’s life; each of its levels has 
intrinsic value and is at the same time the basis for a higher level. Life’s 
dissonances and conflicts appear as necessary transitions to be withstood by the 
individual on his way towards maturity and harmony. The “greatest happiness of 
earth’s children” is “personality,” as a unified and permanent form of human 
existence (Dilthey 336).  
What this definition does not emphasize, but which is apparent elsewhere in the essay, is that 
the life which the Bildungsroman seeks to develop is the life of a young man. The novels 
Dilthey analyses “all portray a young man of their time: how he enters life in a happy state of 
naïveté seeking kindred souls, … how he comes into conflict with the hard realities of the 
world, how he grows to maturity through various life experiences, finds himself and attains 
certainty about his purpose in the world” (335). In Dilthey’s definition which is determined 
by Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, the commonly acknowledged apogee of the sub-genre, another 
implicit element of the Bildungsroman may be identified. Dilthey (referring to Goethe) 
suggests that the Bildungsroman form has a universal imperative – “personality”, becoming 











the “ ‘greatest happiness of earth’s children’ … is personality as a unified and permanent 
form of existence”. Dilthey stresses that what makes the Bildungsroman different from all 
previous biographical narratives is that it “intentionally and artistically depicts that which is 
universally human in [the] life-course” of its hero (emphasis added) (335). 
 The clarity of Dilthey’s definition of the Bildungsroman masks a contradiction which 
lies at the heart of the sub-genre. Wieland’s Agathon is supposed to be the precursor to 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister novels in which the Bildungsideal is supposed to achieve its 
perfect resolution. The paradox for criticism has been the fact that “one nineteenth-century 
German novel after the next failed to fit into the pattern allegedly established by Goethe” 
(Kontje 13). In fact, even Goethe’s supposed apotheosis of the sub-genre seems to be flawed: 
“… it seems debatable … whether even Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship depicts that 
fulfillment and harmony which Dilthey sees as the necessary goal of the Bildungsroman 
[sic]” (Swales 3). 
 For Lukács, the paradox of the Bildungsroman is a particularly manifest case of the 
contradiction which lies at the heart of the novel genre as a whole. While for Lukács the epic 
is the cultural product of an integrated world, the novel is the genre of “transcendental 
homelessness” (Theory of the Novel 41). The loss of evident meaning in the world is 
replaced by the search for meaning within the hero himself – the novel’s acknowledged 
interiority. In other words, if the epic hero discovered meaning in a cosmic home, the novel 
hero finds his home within selfhood itself. For various reasons, finding the transcendental 
home within the individual is an inherently contradictory project. Lukács suggests that while 











inner form of the novel has been understood as the process of the problematic individual’s 
journeying towards himself” (Theory of the Novel 80).  
It is apparent that through drawing into sharp focus the process of subject formation 
itself, the Bildungsroman sub-genre accentuates the contradiction constitutive of the novel as 
a genre. Lukács regards Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship as a failed attempt at a 
synthesis of this constitutive contradiction. For Lukács, Goethe’s is an attempted Humanistic 
reconciliation of Abstract Idealism and the Romanticism of Disillusionment. In narrative 
terms, this is the reconciliation of “the problematic individual, guided by his lived experience 
of the ideal , with concrete social reality” (Theory of the Novel 132). In Lukács’s analysis, 
Goethe’s synthesis fails since closure in Wilhelm Meister requires improbable elements 
whose “epic quality” the author attempts to disguise through “using them lightly and 
ironically” (Theory of the Novel 142). In other words, while in the epic the “ring of life” is 
complete or meaning is apparent, in the novel, the circle of life cannot be closed – it is 
constitutively impossible  given the form of the novel since the “meaning of life” cannot be 
generated out of autonomous individualism. Lukács suggests that Goethe attempts to escape 
the constitutive contradiction of the novel through irony.  
While Lukács reads the resort to irony in the novel of formation as failure, the 
development of irony as a narrative strategy may embody the novel’s triumph, as will be 
considered in the chapter on modernism in Farah’s novels. What is curious in Lukács’s 
reading of Meister is that he does not link the irony of Goethe’s closure in the 
Bildungsroman with his observation that the novel as genre is inherently and constitutively 
ironic. It is precisely irony, which the Bildungsroman brings into relief more clearly than any 











development, cultivation, socialization, education, in short Bildung, but with a self-
constituting legitimacy, that appears to exist without external authority.   
What then is the paradox at the heart of this sub-genre of the novel which, on the face of 
its purpose, seems so clear? Martin Swales in The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to 
Hesse addresses precisely this paradox. Swales examines the various debates which arise in 
Bildungsroman criticism and finds that they, without exception, articulate a similar 
contention. The dialectic Swales identifies in the Bildungsroman is one constituted out of the 
opposition between the founding principle of the sub-genre and the necessity for erasure of 
the founding principle in order for it to be represented. Very simply expressed, this is the 
paradox of the need to reconcile the life of the hero which seems to generate meaning out of 
itself with the life of the community.  
One form the opposition takes in German literary history is that between Romanticism 
and Idealism: The inward, self-constituting, self-reflexive, creative potential of the human 
imagination of necessity comes up against practical social reality. Romanticism comes up 
against Idealism. Expressed in a different discourse, the linearity of experiential reality needs 
to be contained within the closure of a plot (or the plot of closure) since otherwise the 
Bildungsroman and the Bildung it represents would be interminable. Swales refers to Hegel’s 
observation that in the Bildungsroman, “modern bourgeois reality” has to be anchored in a 
“time-honored epic pattern” (Swales 21). For Swales, the reconciliation of contradiction is 
unachieved even in the eighteenth century highpoint of the Bildungsroman which defines the 
sub-genre. For Swales, the Bildungsroman at the outset, is “an inherently self-critical genre” 
(Kontje 17), a self-criticism located largely in irony, which, as was suggested above, is the 











 Like Swales, Franco Moretti in The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in 
European Culture identifies the intrinsically contradictory nature of this sub-genre of the 
novel. For Moretti, the Bildungsroman “codifies the new paradigm” that sees youth as the 
most meaningful part of life. The shift from a traditional or status society where one is born 
into a role gives way to a social structure which “impose[s] a hitherto unknown mobility”. 
Defining one’s place in the world generates the interiority of the Bildungsroman. This 
narrative is charged with “build[ing] the Ego, and mak[ing] it the indisputable centre of its 
own structure” (11). The novelistic youth of this sub-genre (as Dilthey reminds us above) is 
the symbolic form of modernity, since only youth shares in the restless dynamism of 
modernity. Novelistic youth, in achieving self-realization, replicates the inner contradiction 
of modernity. For Moretti, this contradiction consists in the limitlessness of the new 
philosophical and economic paradigm which necessarily must betray itself in order to be 
represented. The “dynamism” of novelistic youth must be foreclosed by “limits.” The 
“restlessness” of youth must be curbed by the “sense of an ending.”  The boundless 
“freedom” of the individual needs to be contained by “happiness.” “Socialization” seals 
“self-determination.” “Individuality” succumbs to “normality” (Moretti The Way of the 
World 3-72). These are the poles of the dichotomy which the Bildungsroman needs to 
negotiate.  
For Moretti, the classical Bildungsroman, represented by Goethe and Austen, 
successfully negotiates the poles of the dichotomy. In doing so, the classical Bildungsroman 
provides modernity with its script for socialization through not resolving, but learning to live 
with contradiction. The dynamism of youth needs to be bounded by maturity. Like youth, the 











and youth would become monsters. The ring of life must be completed – somehow. The 
limits, the sense of an ending, closure is provided in both Goethe and Austen by prevailing 
aristocratic norms. Read in terms of an ethical understanding of the rise of the novel 
suggested in Chapter 1, one might say that reconciliation, socialization of the individual, is 
achieved only through modernity’s adoption of the morality of pre-modernity. One might say 
that the Bildungsroman in some ways fuses tradition and modernity in a way that makes it 
superficially appear a rejection of tradition. But the sheer magic of modernity’s resolution of 
this paradox is to make the limit disappear. The limit disappears when it seems to emerge 
from within the autonomous hero himself. As Moretti suggests, modern socialization is 
complete when the hero is able to proclaim, “I desire to do what in any case I should have 
done” (21). The limits imposed by morality appear to emerge from the free individual. For 
Moretti, this is the panacea of the Bildungsroman in modern culture; it is the “comfort of 
civilization”: 
It is also necessary that, as a “free individual”, not as a fearful subject but as a 
convinced citizen, one perceives the social norms as one’s own. One must 
internalize them and fuse external compulsion and internal impulses into a new 
unity until the former is no longer distinguishable from the latter. This fusion is 
what we usually call “consent” or “legitimation”. If the Bildungsroman appears to 
us still today as an essential pivotal part of our history, this is because it has 
succeeded in representing this fusion with a force of conviction and optimistic 
clarity that will never be equaled again. We will see in fact that here there is no 
conflict between individuality and socialization, autonomy and normality, 
interiority and objectification. One’s formation as an individual in and for oneself 












Drawing on Moretti, Slaughter remarkably compresses this idea in the observation of the 
Bildungsroman as: “The tautological-teleological complex of inherency in becoming [which] 
articulates the impossibly anticipatory and retrospective (proleptic and analeptic) temporality 
of the story of modern citizen-subjectivation …” (Slaughter “The Bildungsroman and 
International Human Rights Law” 1415). 
 The quotation from Slaughter preempts another dimension of the Bildungsroman. 
The Bildungsroman accentuates in a way that may remain fairly nebulous in other sub-
genres the constitutive role the novel has played in the formation (Bildung) of the modern 
nation-state. It is no coincidence that the eighteenth century, the age of the classical 
Bildungsroman, is also the age of the birth of the modern nation state. Slaughter suggests 
that the Bildungsroman offers a “socio-aesthetic model of development and integration that 
served the emergent nation through two cooperating centripetal forces: centralizing the 
nation state and centering its citizen-subjects” (1410). In other words, the Bildungsroman 
“conventionalize[s] a narrative pattern for participation in the egalitarian imaginary of the 
new bourgeois nation-state, a plot for incorporation of previously marginalized people as 
democratic citizen-subjects” (1410).  
In Atlas of the European Novel 1800-1900, Moretti shows how national space is a 
constitutive part of the Bildungsromane of this period, “what happens depends a lot on where 
it happens” (70).  In this century, the “Bildungsroman of the European in Africa” (70) is 
inconceivable. This type of novel (and the novel generally) evolves in a national space and 
provides the plot for the incorporation of marginal subjects into the national imaginary, a 
process which simultaneously constitutes what Slaughter refers to as “the Westphalian 











the Bildungsroman of the European in Africa is unthinkable, by contrast in the early 
twentieth century the colonies represent the only space where Bildung of the middle class 
European male is possible, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness constituting the paradigmatic case.  
In the later twentieth century, Bildung of the European male “survives only as parody 
(Felski 133), whose “absolute end” is embodied in Gunter Grass’s Tin Drum, “ ‘the 
uninhibited tale of a dwarf whose most remarkable growth is purely phallic’ ” (Miles, quoted 
in Abel and Hirsch 13), or “in the form of a purely inward development which renounces all 
social activity (Felski 133-4).  
By the second quarter of the twentieth-century, the novel genre is actively promoted 
among the colonized at the expense of oral forms (Layoun xii). The sub-genre of the novel 
which is most widely invoked is the Bildungsroman. Slaughter, drawing on Gauri 
Viswanathan and Leela Gandhi, emphasizes that the centrifugal drift of the Bildungsroman 
exports  individualist subject formation to the margins with the difference that in the colonies 
the sub-genre is tasked with creating “subjects” not “citizens”: 
The Bildungsroman is enlisted by colonial authorities to transmit “humanist ideals 
of enlightenment”: “the shaping of character or the development of the aesthetic 
sense or the disciplines of ethical thinking.” However, … colonial literary 
education enabled those ideals “to coexist with and indeed even support education 
for social and political control.” The differential application by the colonial power 
of universalist principles in the colony and at home has led a number of critics to 
conclude that the official modes of importation of the Bildungsroman to the 
“periphery” deployed the genre “as an intensely conservative discourse of 
socialization, viz.; one which aims to achieve the symbolic legitimation of 
authority” not by producing citizens (as it had in Europe) but by producing 











consolidate a split between citizen and subject that, in Europe, the genre aimed to 
reconcile (Human Rights Inc. 123-4).  
The project of the Bildungsroman thus is the pro-jection  of an evolutionary individualist 
ideal for all humanity which occludes its specific history and ideology  in a paradigm which 
demonstrates the meaning of life as generated from within the modern autonomous, 
disengaged self. The Bildungsroman simultaneously occludes its enablement in pre-modern 
socially and/or transcendentally constructed models of subject constitution. 
 What troubles this scenario further is the insight that, paradoxically, the 
Bildungsroman is the sub-genre of the novel which, in its fundamental premises, 
retrospectively defines the genre of the novel itself. Moretti suggests that even other sub-
genres are evaluated in the terms established by the Bildungsroman: “Even those novels that 
clearly are not Bildungsroman … are perceived by us against this conceptual horizon; so we 
speak of a “failed initiation” or of a “problematic formation” (15). The  Bildungsroman 
brings into focus the fact that the novel is the form which originates both to constitute and 
give expression to the new relation of the subject to the world. The philosophical realism of 
Descartes and Locke is embodied in the Formal Realism of the early novel (Watt). 
Privileging the representation of the everyday experience of the ordinary individual gives 
symbolic form to the seismic shift of reason substantively defined to reason procedurally 
defined. No longer does the hero find the meaning of life in an external paradigm. The 
novelistic hero discovers the meaning of life out of his everyday experience of it. Events in 
the novel do not simply test the apparently static and unchanging hero as in the picaresque. 
No longer is the hero simply a “point moving in space” , as noted above, or “the immobile 
and fixed point around which all movement in the novel takes place” (Bakhtin “The 











focus in the eighteenth century novel moves onto the hero himself rather than on events. This 
is Bakhtin’s novel “of human emergence” (“The Bildungsroman” 21); it represents “man in 
the process of becoming” (Bakhtin “The Bildungsroman” 19).  
The mutually constitutive relationship between the hero and event is captured in 
Henry James’s observation: “What is character but the determination of incident? What is 
incident but the illustration of character?” (quoted in M.H. Abrams 137). Where in the epic, 
plot is external to the hero, in the novel, the hero is the plot. But as in the Bildungsroman, the 
uncontradictory fusion of plot and character cannot be achieved. The plot, it appears, cannot 
be constructed out of the moral qualities of the hero alone. Elements of traditional or 
transcendental plot surface in various ways, particularly in closure. This is the impasse 
identified by Ian Watt, and re-interpreted by McKeon, at the outset of the development of the 
novel between Richardson’s “reality of representation” and Fielding’s “reality of 
assessment”. This is a variant expression of the dichotomy of the Bildungsroman between 
self-determination and socialization respectively. It might also be expressed as the 
dichotomy between the imperative of a modern morality putatively generated out of the inner 
core of the  disengaged self coming up against a pre-modern paradigm of an external higher 
order.   
It is not coincidental that the titles of most early novels take the form of a proper 
noun, the name of an individual, for example, Robinson Crusoe, Moll Flanders, Pamela, 
Clarissa, Tom Jones. The novel is the symbolic form for the representation of the subject as 
individual, and in the Bildungsroman the dynamic and contradictions of this representation 
achieve sharpest crystallization. Although in narrow definition the Bildungsroman and all of 











the genre appears to emerge out of a continental imperative. Goethe’s is a response to the 
“interest in inner culture that Rousseau had inspired in Germany” (Dilthey 335). Wilhelm 
Meister in Book V acknowledges Fielding, Richardson and Goldsmith’s attempts to 
represent emerging individuality in the novel as opposed to the static representation of 
drama. Although Carlyle’s translation of Wilhelm Meister was published only in 1824, 
Goethe was well known in England by reputation, even though it may have been a distorted 
reputation. Carlyle suggests that Goethe is known only “by the faint and garbled versions of 
his Werter” (3). The ideals of the Bildungsroman thus are implicated in the novelistic ideal 
from its origins to the highpoint of the genre as Otto Flake suggests: “The highest form of 
the novel was the novel of personal development: a man passed through the richness of the 
phenomenal world and attempted to discover its meaning” (quoted in Swales 2). 
 What makes Farah’s novels completely compelling, is the way in which they 
severally and as a progression encapsulate this apparently incontrovertible history, 
incontrovertible since it “teleologically and tautologically” (Slaughter) seems to prove its 
own veracity.   
 
II From a Crooked Rib and Postcolonial Bildung: The Paradoxes of Individualist 
Personality Development 
What makes Farah’s first novel also one of his most interesting is the way in which From a 
Crooked Rib replicates the intertwined histories of the novel and the Bildungsroman, 
reviving Enlightenment tensions and contradictions in a postcolonial context. As noted 
earlier, critical commentary on the novel classifies it as “picaresque adventure” (Okonkwo 











however, employing the vocabulary of both eighteenth century European Enlightenment and 
Romanticism. From a Crooked Rib remarkably carries all the hallmarks of the classical 
Bildungsroman in both its German and English literary historical embodiments. For Dilthey, 
as indicated above, the Bildungsheld passes through various developmental stages, with 
inner transformation at every level gradually leading the hero on to “maturity and harmony” 
(336). Farah’s debut novel fits the pattern thus established insofar as the protagonist, Ebla, 
sets out on a physical trajectory, abandoning her homestead, which leads her through various 
“stations”, represented by the four parts through which the novel develops. At each of these  
“stations” experience impacts upon her, dialectically altering her worldview, leading her on 
to the self- realization of closure.          
 Jerome Buckley, in an overview of the English Bildungsroman proposes a plot 
template for this type of novel, which may not be absolutely true in every detail of all the 
English novels under consideration, but is virtually completely true of the Somali novel 
focused on here: 
A child of some sensibility grows up in the country or in a provincial town, where 
he finds constraints, social and intellectual, placed upon the free imagination. His 
family, especially his father, proves doggedly hostile to his creative instincts or 
flights of fancy, antagonistic to his ambitions, and quite impervious to the new 
ideas he has gained from unprescribed reading. His first schooling, even if not 
totally inadequate, may be frustrating insofar as it  may suggest options not 
available to him in his present setting. He therefore, sometimes at a quite early age, 
leaves the repressive atmosphere of home (and also the relative innocence) to make 
his way independently to the city (in the English novels, usually London). There 
his real “education” begins, not only his preparation for a career but also … his 











sexual encounters, one debasing, one exalting, and demands that in this respect and 
others the hero reappraise his values. By the time he has decided, after painful soul-
searching, the sort of accommodation to the modern world he can honestly make, 
he has left his adolescence behind and entered upon his maturity. His initiation 
complete, he may then visit his old home, to demonstrate by his presence the 
degree of his success or the wisdom of his choice (17-18).   
Substituting heroine for hero and grandfather for father, Buckley, perhaps not fortuitously, 
provides an admirable plot summary for From a Crooked Rib. Like the English hero, Ebla 
independently moves to the city where her true Bildung begins. Like the heroes Buckley 
describes, she has two sexual encounters, the one with the already married, Tiffo, “debasing” 
and the one with the man she has chosen, Awill, “exalting.” However, while the English 
hero’s estrangement is determined by excessive “unprescribed” reading, the alienation of 
Farah’s heroine, who is an entirely oral creature, becomes a creation more of the 
Bildungsroman itself rather than of the material and social conditions which shape her. If the 
“ring of life” or socialization of the classical English hero is completed with a temporary 
return home, in From a Crooked Rib  the circle is completed when the rural “home”, 
embodied in Ebla’s brother, comes to the postcolonial city to inform her of her grandfather’s 
death. The symbolic break of the finality of the death of the patriarch suggests, as will be 
shown, an exacerbatedly irreconcilable postcolonial resolution to the contradiction contained 
in the Bildungsroman form. 
If, as has been shown above, the Bildungsroman is the symbolic form which captures 
the dynamism and volatility of modernity, then the focus on youth is no surprise. Determined 
by the form, Farah’s first novel cannot be the Bildungsroman of the grandfather. The form 











Bildungsroman is the genre of the individual’s emergence, not the emergence of the group. 
At the moment before Ebla catapults herself to freedom from the homestead, she hesitates. 
She is not sure as she leaves the nomads’ hut whether she should wake her unnamed, 
sleeping female companion who “was still snoring her head off” (16). Ebla decides not to. 
Not that the decision is Ebla’s. The form would not permit the “divine emancipation of body 
and soul” (Crooked Rib 13) of the apparently accepting, somnambulant young woman and 
the numerous other women, young and old, who populate the nomadic encampment. What 
would the Bildungsroman of an entire marginalized group look like? It probably no longer 
could be called a Bildungsroman since the genre is predicated on the development of the 
individual.  
Similarly, the trajectory traced by the youthful heroine, plotted by the form, must be 
the path from the country to the postcolonial city of Mogadiscio. For it to be otherwise 
constitutes the unthinkable of the genre in its classical form. This may be contrasted with the 
female novel of self-discovery where the heroine might retreat from city life to discover 
herself in nature (Felski 142-3). This trajectory might also be compared with the reverse 
journey central to the sociology of fourteenth century Tunisian, Ibn Khaldun, frequently 
cited in Somali social and political science analyses, of the return to Bedouin life as a return 
to the natural attitude of submission to a higher order, referred to as  “fitrah” or “original 
human nature” (Dhaoudi). Ebla’s trajectory may also be compared and contrasted with what 
Ali Jimale Ahmed suggests about the journey motif in Somali narratives. Here there is a 
similar movement “from the known to the unknown and back to the known.” The journey in 
these narratives “emulate[s] the paradigm of the rite of passage…”. Unlike in the 











extend its social horizons. The journey to the urban centre, in the experience it allows the 
hero to accrue, “bring[s] a benefit or credit to his community” (50).   
It cannot be fortuitous that Ebla story shares striking similarities with the 
Bildungsroman heroines who with the rise of the novel define the genre. Ebla shares with 
Moll Flanders, the earliest novel heroine, an inconsistency and contradictoriness, crystallized 
in the heroine’s claim to be entirely determined by oppressive social conventions, yet 
signally free and independent. As genres of a transition between two epochs, both novels 
bear the traces of an earlier mode, namely, the picaresque. Both characters manage to profit 
out of giving free rein to their desires. Like Clarissa, Ebla may or may not be the victim of a 
rape, depending on how one reads consent: Is Clarissa/Ebla’s consent manifested in her 
actions - she elopes with Lovelace/Awill - or is consent inwardly manifested in intention? 
Like Pamela, whose virtue in holding off her master is rewarded with entry into the middle 
class, Ebla’s lack of virtue symbolized by her prostitution (in an interesting postcolonial 
twist on the eighteenth century scenario), nevertheless secures her entry into the indigenous 
post-independence elite. The prostitute motif, incidentally, is a frequent feature of 
postcolonial novels (Stratton “The Mother Africa Trope”).  Although the primary expression 
of individualism is male (Pateman), in significant ways, women secure entry to the middle 
class through perfecting personality ideals (Armstrong).  
Lukács identifies the novel as the expression of “transcendental homelessness” (41). 
The novel hero, furthermore, “is the product of estrangement from the outside world” (66). 
Farah’s heroine, Ebla, exemplifies these dicta in the most fundamental way: “Escape! To get 
free from all restraints, from being the wife of Giumaleh. To get away from unpleasantries. 











thought of all this, and much else” (12). Thus begins the process of Ebla’s Bildung in the 
novel. In desiring to be “homeless”, to “break the ropes society had wrapped around her” 
Ebla reflects a prior more fundamental metaphysical “homelessness”. The heroine is 
presented at the outset as being radically “out of joint” with her society and her times. She 
experiences the nomadic community of which she is a part not as enabling of herself, but as 
a limit of her self-realization. To fulfill herself, she must “Escape!” this community and its 
founding presuppositions. In this feeling of being confined, restricted, at odds with society 
around her, Ebla replicates the originary tension of the classical Bildungsheld.  
Usually, protagonists of dissensual postcolonial Bildungsromane experience 
alienation; but alienation comes after the evolutionary development has begun. Consider, by 
way of example, Tambu, the heroine of Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Bildungsroman,  Nervous 
Conditions. The two stories are remarkably similar. Both are set in the same historical 
period, the period just before independence. Both focus on spirited young women. In both 
texts, movement occurs from country to city. But, while Tambu is alienated from her 
homestead, becoming aware of its embarrassing inadequacies only after the process of 
induction into modernity and modernization has begun, Ebla, by contrast is alienated at the 
outset. Ebla displays a radically modern consciousness despite the fact that she herself has 
not yet entered modernity. The text emphasizes in fine detail Ebla’s ingenuousness: The first 
time she sees a car, “she was almost petrified on the spot” (Crooked Rib 52). She touches the 
radio which plays the song of a female artiste thinking she may find the woman inside the 
magical box. She doesn’t eat spaghetti since she thinks the tubes are tapeworms. She thinks 
“police” is the name of a tribe. Despite these suggestions of a non-modern protagonist, Ebla 











modern reconceptualization of the moral order. Ebla wants the space “to be herself”. She 
does not want the role of daughter, wife or mother allocated by traditional kinship relations, 
neither does she want the status of “abd”, servant or slave of God in a cosmic conception of 
the world. She wants (the self-reflexivity of the language reflecting the reflexivity of the 
idea) to be herself. She will autonomously generate identity out of her self. By the deftest 
sleight of hand, the Bildungsroman narrative assumes as entirely natural a subjectivity that is 
through and through historical and ideological.  
 Ebla constitutes the unthinkable in the context which creates her. While the alienation 
of the Bildungshelde of the European generic models is created by too much “unprescribed 
reading”, Ebla’s alienation is spontaneously and autonomously generated. This does not 
mean, however, that in a non-individualist context the person may not behave in a wholly 
idiosyncratic or self-reflexive way. But idiosyncracy and self-reflexivity occur within the 
parameters of that society’s worldview. Indeed, it is against the social norm that idiosyncracy 
and self-reflexivity are gauged. What makes Ebla as a character unthinkable in her context is 
that the nature of her idiosyncracy catapults her into an entirely transformed social frame.  
Ebla is an oral being in a society which does not yet even have a script and an orthography. 
The text’s premonition of this objection is evident from the disclaimer that: “She thought of 
many things a woman of her background would never think of” (Crooked Rib 8). There is 
one character in the novel who reads. That character is Awill, Ebla’s first husband. She 
interrupts him in his aunt’s home while he is reading an Italian novel. Lennard J. Davis has 
noted the tendency among novelists of “forever slipping other novel into the pockets of their 
characters” (148). Specifically in relation to the novel of development, Slaughter refers to 











of other Bildungsromane” (“The Bildungsroman and International Human Rights Law” 
1418). Despite this, Ebla’s evolution towards individuality seems in advance of Awill’s. In 
fact, it is Ebla’s disciplinary fantasy that she will shape, mould, develop Awill into a fully-
realized self. She contemplates her prospects with Awill to whom she intends to attach 
herself in marriage: 
Will I get a positive reply? Only God knows. 
‘But he is a man - like any other. But he may be different. In all probability he will 
be – otherwise I will try to reform him, to teach him, to break his pride, to turn him 
into a human being’ (Crooked Rib 85). 
Ebla thus proposes to develop Awill if the Bildung which is associated with novel reading 
should fail.  
 Ebla in the postcolonial context is somewhat different from her eighteenth and 
nineteenth century counterparts in another way also. Franco Moretti suggests that with the 
attention of the novel to the ordinary life of ordinary people, rather than characters as types 
as in Medieval drama, the focus then falls on “language primarily as conversation” (49). The 
art of conversation is a significant technology of socialization. It allows “the double 
operation of ‘expressing oneself’ and of ‘understanding others’” (49). Conversation allows 
reconciliation, “reaching an agreement” (49). But the art of conversation, Moretti reminds 
us, is “something artificial … one of many possible modes of discourse” (50). While there is 
a development of conversation as a rhetorical mode in Farah’s later novels, there is a signal 
lack of conversation in From a Crooked Rib. There is no conversation in From a Crooked 
Rib since there is no one Ebla may exchange thoughts with. She is an exceptional and 
egregious creature; she is out of place in her society. Whatever dialogue there is in the novel 











forward. Conversation requires putatively free and equal individuals. In its Enlightenment 
ideal, it requires a fluid, procedural rational moral horizon which alters when it alteration 
finds. Conversation contains the possibility of the “converse”, the opposite, allowing the 
other to see the opposite point of view. Conversation is the potential of persuasion, an art 
which Austen arguably perfected and reflected in the title of one of her novels.  
Conversation is an attenuated art in Farah’s first novel, since there literally is no one 
Ebla may talk with. The most significant parts of the novel are constituted out of Ebla’s 
thoughts which take the form of dramatic monologues. The observation of the narrator in the 
opening sequence that “Ebla thought of all this, and much else” has to be taken quite 
literally. A number of chapters, including the “Escape!” chapter cited above and the 
climactic Chapter 27, for example, where Ebla takes stock of her life and which precipitates 
her reconciliation in the final chapter, consists in nothing but Ebla’s thoughts. While we 
know a few things about Ebla’s external appearance from descriptions often shocking in 
their naturalism, it is an inward Ebla that we know through the text. We quite literally 
experience Ebla through her thoughts in the process of becoming in the novel. Although the 
text suggests Ebla’s thoughts are unplotted, the free, rational response to experience, canny 
use of free indirect speech masks authorial emplotment. Like the Bildungsroman form itself, 
quasi-direct discourse operates to occlude the narrator’s direction of the character who seems 
to create herself out of her own moral resources.   
 In Ebla’s textual representation as a creature of thought rather than constituted out of 
words or actions, a model of subjectivity already is suggested. It is a model of subjectivity, 
however, which does not emerge from a dialogic relationship with Somali culture and 











break with her social and cultural environment is signaled by the narrator’s uneasy 
consciousness of her implausibility as a character, which has been alluded to earlier: “She 
thought of many things a woman of her background would never think of” (Crooked Rib 8). 
It is an uneasiness which the character shares: “She had been reticent all her life, because it 
turned out her opinions were different from what others expected” (Crooked Rib 65).  
But Ebla’s uniqueness is more fundamental even than the text’s representation of it. 
Ebla is exceptional not because of what she thinks which may not find societal approval, but 
the way she thinks. The community around Ebla find limits to reason in tradition, going back 
to time immemorial, in some idea of a natural order, in a cosmic transcendentally inspired 
plan; or in some combination of the aforementioned. Ebla, it is apparent, is estranged from 
all external sources which orient the self. She is alienated from the logic of the cultural 
practice which allocates the care of camels to boys and goats to girls, a logic which reflects 
in some way the limits imposed by an external natural order. Only young men, not girls or 
women encumbered with children, neither old men care for camels. The brutal exigencies of 
environment make this untenable. The text both reveals and ultimately conceals this 
dimension in its description of Ebla’s brother, who, it appears, may have as compelling a 
reason to “Escape!” but does not at the beginning, and adamantly refuses at the end when the 
now urbanized Ebla half-heartedly suggests that he too remain in Mogadiscio, a month away 
from independence. The text describes the unnamed brother thus:  
He was about sixteen, but, being the only son of a family whose mother and father 
had both died a long time ago, hard labour had aged him. He had a piece of cloth to 
cover his rough body – rough, because nothing protected it from the sun or the 











     Ebla, by contrast, is not limited and defined by nature. She seeks independence from 
the harsh laws of nature: “She wanted to fly away from the dependence on the seasons, the 
seasons which determine the life or death of the nomads” (Crooked Rib 13). She wishes to 
escape the tedium of existence in the countryside, the monotony of which is struck home by 
the description of Ebla’s home: “A dwelling. It was a dwelling like any other dwelling in the 
neighbourhood. Not in the least different” (Crooked Rib 7). Against this “homogeneity”, 
Ebla’s individuality is all the more startling. It is interesting to observe, as has been noted of 
her brother above, that all of the characters in the encampment are named generically, for 
example, the grandfather, the archetypal patriarch is called “the old man.” Her somnolent 
friend is referred to as her “colleague” and none of the young men in the clearing whose 
sleeping bodies she passes as she makes her way out of the encampment are named.  
 It is salutary to compare the response of the Bildungsroman heroine to the rights 
infringements from which she has no option but to flee with the response to injustice of the 
heroine of another genre. John William Johnson notes the ways in which oral genres have 
been used by the marginalized in Somalia. A newly urbanized Mogadiscian housewife uses 
the burambuur, a specifically women’s genre, to address what she perceives as injustice in 
the household. Her husband’s nephew, taking advantage of kinship obligations (much like 
Ebla at her cousin’s home in Belet Wene) has come to stay with them. The woman feels the 
nephew unnecessarily burdens her. She composes a poem which she recites in the course of 
her work within earshot of her husband. The next day the nephew is subject to the husband’s 
vituperation for a host of transgressions, chief among them “interfering with the smooth 











“ Message sent … Message received … All is now well between you and your husband. 
Confidence is restored” (Johnson 113). What is different between the two generic responses 
is that Farah’s Bildungsroman, in challenging what is primarily a perception of Somali 
patriarchy, and only secondarily a conviction of a more universal domination, addresses his 
work to a non-Somali audience, as is evident from the numerous textual glosses on the 
norms of Somali culture. The author of the burambuur, addresses the person whose 
obligation it becomes to make amends.  While the Bildungsroman heroine escapes injustice, 
apparently creating her own freedom, “the divine emancipation of body and soul”, the 
Burambuur heroine appeals to an external, socially determined conception of justice, which 
in this case is unbalanced. While an external idea of eudaimonia is built into the burambuur, 
an internally generated conception of the good is built into the Bildungsroman, but not 
without paradoxes and contradictions. In this context, the free woman then is the woman 
who escapes (usually alone and into the middle class) and, through the power of liberated 
imagination, narrates her own life and freely constructs her own world (which the 
“tautological- teleological” structure of the Bildungsroman  ultimately reveals to be a 
fiction). The unfree woman is the one who remains behind and finds freedom in openly 
recognizing the necessary limits to freedom.  
Farah’s novels tend to invite a reading of all characters who do not “freely” choose 
“freedom” as submissive Somali women, victims of patriarchal, patrilinear, virilocal Somali 
culture. Consider, just as one example, a character sketch of Aowralla, Ebla’s cousin’s wife 
whose baby she helps deliver in Belet Wene: “The traditional impotence and subjugation of 
Somali women is epitomized in  Aowralla … who accepts her abject position in her 











“colleague” whom Ebla leaves behind in the hut is so somnolent as to appear almost “dead”. 
In representing Somali women, Farah appears unwittingly to replicate the Orientalist 
stereotypes Christine Choi Ahmed identifies in anthropological studies of the Somali. The 
liberation Ebla assumes will come in her move to the modernity of the colonial city of 
Mogadiscio is also in some ways illusory. Liedwien Kapteijns suggests that with 
modernization and urbanization, women lose the power they have in a traditional setting. 
Women’s work is absolutely indispensable in the nomadic pastoral Somali mode of 
production. And in their indispensability, Kapteijns argues, resides their strength. 
 A possible generically determined difference in response to similar issues is 
suggested in a consideration of the 1968 play by Hassan Sheikh Mumin, titled Leopard 
among the Women: Shabeelnaagood. The tradition of staged drama was unknown among the 
Somali. The oral poetry tradition is the most highly developed aspect of Somali culture. 
Somali theatre, however, successfully brought together foreign and indigenous traditions, 
and like Farah’s novels, sought through art to transform social conditions. Mumin’s play, 
like From a Crooked Rib, seeks to expose patriarchal exploitation of women. Like Ebla, who 
is taken advantage of by Awill and goes through the motions of a sham marriage, a young 
country girl in the play is lured into a “mini- marriage”, “ a secret relationship, with the 
ceremony presided over by a fake sheikh, a co-conspirator who mumbles Arabic-sounding 
nonsense and fools the ignorant girl into thinking she is properly married to an important 
government official” (Castagno 84). There is a striking difference between the resolution of 
the play which was in Somali, for a broad ranging Somali audience,  and the novel. While 
the novel is compelled “lightly and ironically” to make “epic” closure or the closure of 











quite explicitly sets the plot in relief against a subplot which without contradiction 
dramatizes the higher order, virtue or eudaimonia.    
            That Ebla is free in terms of her moral philosophy even before she escapes the 
encampment is suggested by other considerations also. Not quite a secular being, Ebla’s 
estrangement from an identity shaped by religion is suggested by  subtle variations in the 
parallel tableaux which introduce Ebla’s grandfather and herself. The Prologue of the novel 
is a flash forward in time to the period after Ebla’s flight. In a posture charged with 
symbolism in Somali culture, the grandfather squats on the ground with his rosary in hand 
contemplating whether or not to curse his granddaughter. The curse in this context is not 
bare vituperation. The curse is a potentially destructive weapon like a dagger. In this world, 
not yet disenchanted, the curse can kill. He contemplates his action carefully since he loves 
his orphaned granddaughter. Elopement is not unknown among the Somali. He himself 
eloped with his wife. What cuts him to the quick is the mutual knowledge that Ebla’s 
absence in the harsh, unforgiving Somali environment means his death; just as his refusal to 
care for Ebla as a child would have meant her death.  
The rosary, symbol of a transcendental orientation of the self, is both the limit and in 
its infinite circularity, the limitlessness of his thinking. There are ninety nine beads on his 
rosary, each representing one of the Asmaa’ul Husna or the Beautiful Names of God, 1) 
Allah or God, 2) Ar-Rahman or the Compassionate, 3) Ar-Rahim or the Most Merciful, and 
so on. He grips the beads of his rosary and prays: “Alhamdulillah. Istagfurullah. 
Subhanallah … He repeated and repeated and repeated the words. They aged with him. He 
must have said them more than a hundred billion times. They were on the tip of his tongue 











(Crooked Rib 5). The circle of life is complete in the rosary and the old man who tells it. The 
one is embodied in the other.  
When Ebla escapes from the thorn gate of the encampment, she also prays, 
“Alhamdulillah, Subhanallah, Istagfurullah”, but the words no longer are hers and they do 
not constitute her as they enabled the existence of the grandfather: 
She kept on repeating these words, which did not convey much to a young woman 
of her background. She said them because she had heard others say them. She 
knew the words were Arabic and that they were God’s words, and sacred. She 
counted on her finger-joints just as she had seen others do it. Actually, she let her 
thumbs run over her fingers one by one. Thus rhythmically, and sometimes 
inaccurately, she counted, saying each word three times, until she had said every 
word ninety-nine times: that was the number which represented God’s names 
(Crooked Rib 18). 
The categorical words of faith no longer are her words. She says them because she has heard 
others say them. As Volosinov suggests of the historical development of speech genres, the 
“subjectivization of the ideological word-utterance” makes it no longer “a monument, nor 
even a document, of a substantive ideational position; it makes itself felt only as expression 
of an adventitious, subjective state” (158-9). In the world in which Ebla “tautologically and 
teleologically” belongs even before she enters, the “the word ‘from one’s own mouth,’ the 
declaratory word” has an attenuated existence. 
 Delinked in this way from an external “higher order,” Ebla appears to rely on her 
own  rational resources to create meaning in the world. Reason here no longer consists in 
discovering an external order. Instead it derives from Ebla’s own thinking processes. Ebla 
replicates the Cartesian break Charles Taylor identifies in the development of modernity in 











Ebla quite literally reasons with herself. Large tracts of the novel consist in Ebla’s debates 
with herself. No longer is her moral horizon external to herself. The horizon is within. The 
horizon consists not in what one sees, but how one sees. With reason procedurally defined 
comes a sense both of the subject’s freedom and a sense of the subject’s power. Ebla is free 
even before she has escaped the forced marriage and the encampment. Ebla displays the 
fundamental freedom of the being who has shed an external higher order. The higher order 
henceforward is in Ebla’s own self. The philosophical move Ebla has made even before she 
has set foot out of her home apparently is “from pure subjection to self-regulation [which] 
describes the plot trajectory of the dominant transition narrative of modernization (Slaughter 
Human Rights Inc. 9). Ebla is “free” to choose the development plot which is already 
scripted. And, as Slaughter points out, this development which may be “freely” chosen is the 
development not only of the individual man, but also, in terms of the Kantian paradigm, of 
all of mankind, once mankind has sloughed off the dross of enslavement to tradition and 
religion. But, as Charles Taylor underscores, to be free in this radical sense of being without 
a social moral orientation is philosophically unthinkable; or as Aristotle suggests, man 
conceptualized outside of the polis can only be a beast or an angel.  
   If man no longer is a constituent part of the world, but is rather disengaged from it, 
if reason no longer reflects a cosmic order, but only its own procedurally rational powers, 
then the world becomes subject to man. Instrumental reason views the world as matter to be 
dominated and controlled. An impression of triumphant power over circumstance is similarly 
suggested in Ebla’s relationship with the world.  
 Ebla embodies the historical road from Descartes to Locke which maps both 











representation inaugurated by the novel genre, namely, formal realism. Ebla is an empirical 
creature receiving and evaluating sense impressions, experiences, out of which she 
constitutes meaning. A through and through Lockean protagonist, she clears the ground and 
builds composite impressions of the world out of simples, on the basis of which she makes 
decisions. She responds with revulsion when her grandfather pledges her hand to an old man. 
But she controls her instincts and instead walks “out into the warm night to think over the 
situation.” She then proceeds to “sort out her ideas” and “see what [she] can do about them” 
(Crooked Rib 11). The decision she subsequently reaches is to leave.  
For Charles Taylor, the development of a “disciplinary self” is part of modern 
identity, a subjectivity which, appealing to “natural reason” self-reflexively controls itself. 
This conception of identity is suggested by the way in which Ebla is represented. The first 
stage in her development is the town of Belet Wene. She has never been in a town before and 
finds the townspeople’s dress indecent. A sense of the supremely magisterial self which Ebla 
represents is suggested by her response: “ ‘But maybe I am wrong – let me get closer,’ she 
told herself, ‘and see how they dress exactly. Tomorrow; I will be able to pass judgement 
tomorrow, perhaps’ ” (Crooked Rib 23).  
The model of a coherent subjectivity formed out of one self scrutinizing another, is 
potentially susceptible to the breakdown of schizophrenic identity, an idea to be explored in  
Chapter 6. Farah’s first novel suggests this idea in germ when Ebla shrinks back from the 
fully realized implication of interminable debates between different parts of her personality: 












C.A.B. Macpherson suggests that when the “disengaged”, “punctual” identity 
inaugurated by Locke and developed in subsequent philosophies articulates with the modern 
economy, then individualism takes the form of “possessive individualism”. What is meant by 
this term is that the self and its various skills and capacities come to be seen as “objects” to 
be owned on the model of the ownership of property. This element of modern identity is an 
aspect of Ebla’s textual representation also. Responding to the landlady’s contradictory 
objections to her polyandrous marriages, Ebla responds “Asha doesn’t have to tell me what 
to do and what not to do … In future I will be myself and belong to myself, and my actions 
will belong to me. And I will, in turn, belong to them … I am master of myself” (Crooked 
Rib 142).  
As in subsequent novels, the centrality of individualism to the genre of the novel is 
symbolically realized in a scene with a mirror. When she realizes she is pregnant with a child 
of uncertain paternity, Ebla, like Dorian Gray in an earlier postcolonial Bildungsroman, 
studies her reflection in a mirror, a picture of herself - self reflecting self, a completion of the 
circuit of the internalization of moral sources, the ring of life seemingly hermetically sealed 
in the individual. (It is useful at this point to remember the fate of Narcissus.) 
 If Ebla’s mirror image towards the end of the novel is the symbol of the apparently 
closed circuit of disengaged individualism, it is nevertheless inadequate as novelistic closure. 
Ebla’s  “monadic” self may find representation in the mirror, but her Bildung may only find 
representation in closure. In order to achieve representation, Ebla’s self-realization must be 
sealed by socialization. Youth cannot go on infinitely. Development has to stop - 
somewhere. Moretti suggests:  
Self-development and integration are complementary and convergent trajectories, 











meaning that is “maturity.” When this has been reached, the narration has fulfilled 
its aim and can peacefully end (19). 
How does Ebla’s Bildung end? Ebla’s development ceases when she gives up freedom for 
happiness. As is frequently the case, happiness is symbolized by marriage, the institution par 
excellence, which in its modern form replicates the ideal of the social contract. So frequently 
is marriage the culmination of development in the idealist Bildungsroman that it is satirized 
by Hegel as the form where “In the last analysis [the hero] usually gets his girl and some 
kind of job, marries and becomes a philistine just like the others” (quoted in Swales 20-1). 
The marriage envisaged by the Bildungsroman is not the inevitable marriage of status 
societies where the plot of life is pre-scripted. Marriage is the voluntary union of free and 
equal individuals, the “companionate marriage” which is one of the indices of modernity. 
This type of marriage is the symbolic cultural equivalent of the political union represented 
by the social contract. While in status or pre-modern societies community is built into the 
conception of the person, in individualist societies, collective association of the atomic 
subject needs to be explained by contract.  
 In an interesting twist on the classical Bildungsroman structure, From a Crooked Rib 
displays a double closure in a double marriage. These marriages are the same in the 
fundamental respect that, unlike Ebla’s other potential forced marriages, these marriages are 
the product of her “free” choice. Ebla chooses to marry Awill even though she coyly initially 
refuses in order not to appear too forward. The circumstance of her agreement validates the 
notion of a free union of equals. Ebla and Awill are alone in the widow’s house. They are not 
represented by family members as is the case for a traditional marriage. They negotiate the 
terms of their own contract. In a further reversal of the traditional scenario, when she 











fee, “an inversion of the traditional method of contracting marriage in Somali society” 
(Ahmed 79). Awill goes away to Italy on a work assignment. His friend, by accident, allows 
Ebla to see a photo of Awill consorting with a “white” woman when he reads a letter from 
Awill to the illiterate Ebla. Ebla, in a familiar response which entrenches the construction of 
the idea of the individual as male, decides that if a man can cheat, then so can a woman. In 
what is thinly veiled prostitution, Ebla then of her own “free” choice marries Tiffo. If 
religion and society allow men polygamy, then Ebla will allow herself polyandry. If society 
treats girls like “materials, just like objects, or items on the shelf of a shop”, who can be 
“sold and bought as shepherds sold their goats at market-places” (Crooked Rib 84), then Ebla 
decides to be her own shopkeeper or broker and determine her own price. In another 
epiphanic moment Ebla “scratches her sex, then chuckle[s]. ‘This is my treasure, my only 
treasure, my bank, my money, my existence” (Crooked Rib 160).What is interesting and 
ironical about this scenario is that the man Ebla enters into a polyandrous union with is as fat 
and old and rich as Giumaleh, the man her grandfather had arranged for her to marry. The 
only difference, is that marriage to Tiffo is the product of her “free” choice. Likewise, Ebla 
initiates divorce from Tiffo when she realizes Awill is expected home soon and she will not 
manage to keep up the bedroom farce. Her self-realization in the image of male 
individualism is suggested by her retort to Tiffo: “No. I am not telling you a lie. Why should 
I? You have another wife and I have another husband. We are even: you are a man and I am 
a woman, so we are equal. You need me and I need you. We are equal” (Crooked Rib 145).  
 But Ebla’s self-fulfillment is completed only in the closing lines of the novel once 
her true husband, Awill, has returned home. Already before his arrival Ebla is confident that 











she says. (Again, the nature of the discourse of self-realization suggests the installation of a 
male model of the individual.) The closing sequence of the novel suggests successful 
Bildung, confirmed when Ebla reappears as a successful shopkeeper in A Naked Needle and 
as a widow in Sardines who is a fully-realized individual (and completely  financially 
independent to boot). In the final scene, Ebla wonders whether she should tell Awill about 
her amorous escapades during his absence: 
                       “Tomorrow,” said Awill, moving towards her with desire. 
“Tomorrow. We will tell each other everything tomorrow. You’ll tell me 
everything, and I shall tell you everything.” 
Ebla smelt his maleness. She touched his forehead and, as usual, he was hot with 
desire. He smiled at her and she smiled back at him. 
“Poor fellow, he needs me,” she thought. “He is sex starved.” 
“Yes. Tomorrow,” Ebla murmured and welcomed his hot and warm world into her 
cool and calm kingdom (Crooked Rib 179). 
The parallelism of the verbal structures of the sequence suggests the equality that exists 
between the two partners in the dialogue. This equality, in fact, is paradoxically emphasized 
by the failed parallelism of the final sentence. But what the words say suggests a little more 
than complete parity. Ebla retains her Olympian rationalism right to the end, and with “cool 
and calm” control directs Awill’s impetuousness. Ebla in some ways embodies the feminist 
individualists Nancy Armstrong analyses who manipulate the male model of the individual 
in such a way as to suggest that, as particular kind of women, they  represent the very 
apotheosis of the new individualism and so guarantee their entry by marriage into the middle 
class. This is an idea which will be developed in Farah’s later Bildungsromane. 
 Although the novel, as Lukács suggests, is the genre of transcendental homelessness, 











She ends up as her grandfather had intended her - married to a man with prospects, but with 
the crucial “difference” that she has “freely” chosen her union. The “tautological-
teleological” structure of the Bildungsroman revives the dictates of 
traditional/patriarchal/religious authority while perpetuating the illusion of self-authorship. 
Totality, the meaning of life, is presented as immanent rather than transcendent or ontically 
determined. As Lukács suggests, the novel “surmounts itself” by “transforming itself into a 
normative being of becoming” (Theory of the Novel 73). Slaughter refers to this effect in the 
Bildungsroman in particular as its “normative and normalizing” social work. In this way then 
the external moral orientation of the self is presented as being a product of the disengaged, 
procedurally rational self. 
Moretti suggests that the classical Bildungsroman is a genre of the transition from the 
aristocratic ethic of feudalism to the individualist ethic of early capitalism. The 
Bildungsroman is the “comfort of civilization” since it permits the illusion that the 
socialization of pre-modernity emerges out of the individualism of modernity. For Moretti, 
the Bildungsroman is “the symbolic form that more than any other has portrayed and 
promoted modern socialization.” But it is also a highly contradictory form. Contradiction, 
however, is not a weakness of the genre. “Interiorization of contradiction” is its strength 
since it teaches the modern individual “to learn to live with” contradiction (Moretti 10). In 
this sense it is fundamentally a “Novel of Education”.  
The plot structure of From a Crooked Rib which is simultaneously linear and 
circular, highlights how pre-modern socialization is presented as the freely desired product 
of modern individualism. The point of departure of the Bildungsoman is the enlightened 











by procedural reason. The Bildungsheld then proceeds to discover a morality which develops 
immanently out of his experience. This conviction held by the genre ought to be evident 
from the analysis above, but is encapsulated in the epigraph with which Part Three of the 
novel is introduced. Farah quotes Arthur Miller’s After the Fall, which itself alludes to 
William Butler Yeats’s “The Second Coming”: “Why do I ever think / of things falling 
apart? / Were they ever whole?” While Miller may or may not allude also to Chinua 
Achebe’s novel, Things Fall Apart, it is certain that Achebe’s work does constitute an 
intertextual echo in From a Crooked Rib.  Achebe’s novel dissects the consequences of 
modernity upon a pre-modern worldview. With the arrival of modernity, the ring of life 
within which meaning is constituted for the protagonist, Okonkwo, is broken. The impact of 
Farah’s use of the Miller epigraph is to implode a romanticized idea of traditional societies, 
which Achebe may be seen to be promoting. From a Crooked Rib rejects the ethical 
foundations of non-modern modes of existence and puts forward instead a potentially 
utopian ethics for which the individual is source. But for various reasons, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the individual as moral source is a philosophical impossibility. The recourse of 
modernity reflected in the Bildungsroman is to assume an ethics which it then demonstrates 
to emerge out of the autonomous self. Oriented by the moral sources of pre-modernity, 
modernity installs a regime which excludes such sources.  
 
III From a Crooked Rib and National Development 
If From a Crooked Rib tells the story of individual development, it also tells the story of 
national development. The novel frequently is read as a national allegory. Jameson’s 











off the mark. The postcolonial novel may simply be revealing in clearer delineation the 
mutually reinforcing constitution in the novel generally of the nation state and the nation 
state era subject. Ebla’s character has been read as “a symbolic analogue for Somalia on the 
eve of independence, her various polyandric marriages mirroring the nation’s oppressive 
relations with imperial masters (Wright Nuruddin Farah 29). Ebla’s escape to a plotted 
equality and freedom in various ways in the novel replicates Somalia’s escape to the pre-
scripted democracy and freedom of the modern nation state. In this way, Farah’s 
Bildungsroman is a genre of the transition from pre-modernity to modernity, but it is a genre 
which in the Somali context is rootless. It replicates the tensions and contradictions which 
shape the eighteenth century European form, but in a philosophical, cultural, social and 
economic context where a smooth transition is precluded. The material conditions of the 
Somalia which receives Farah’s Bildungsroman are not an environment where the genre can 
do its incorporative work with large scale potential success.  
But even in the European context, the life of the classical Bildungsroman was 
relatively short-lived. For Moretti the idealist Bildungsroman runs to its end with Flaubert. 
The “bright normality” (Moretti 73) of classic Bildungsroman closure can no longer be 
achieved. As noted above, for others, Grass’s Tin Drum embodies the end of the genre even 
as parody.  This marks the terminus of the humanist ideal for the white, male, middle class 
hero. Hereafter the ideal is exported to the semi-periphery and the periphery in the attempted 
inclusion of marginalized groups, with greater or lesser success.  
 The way in which the Bildungsroman adapts and transforms itself hereafter is written 
into the genre itself since its inception. An inkling of the protean development of the genre is 











of definition. At the outset, the Bildungsroman, in particular, closure in the Bildungsroman, 
was either undermined or overdetermined (depending on one’s interpretation) by irony, 
authorial irony. How seriously does Goethe (or Farah) want us to take the improbability of 
the ending? Is it really plausible that Wilhelm Meister desired what the Tower Society 
plotted for him? Does Ebla really think freedom consists in the freedom to trade herself? In 
both novels there is an irony at work that suggests the resolution whereby morality emerges 
out of autonomous identity is only a temporary one. The ethics which seem to come from the 
autonomous self are provisional. It ushers in the subsequent ultimately triumphant idea of an 
“ethics” which is purely relational, which emerges out of the instability and openness of 
artistic form itself. This development in the history of the novel is replicated in the 
development of the idea of the individual in Farah’s later works, to be explored in 























The “Gynocentric” Bildungsroman : Sardines and Gifts 
 
Autonomous personality development is so crucial to Farah’s vision that Bildung is an 
element of virtually every novel, even if the formation ideal is invoked only to be in some 
way  challenged. Frequently, however, the challenge to autonomous development 
paradoxically affirms disengaged subjectivity. Baldly stated, all Farah’s novels are 
Bildungsromane which, whether classical or dissensual, naturalize and normalize the 
disengaged self. Critics observe similarly that there is almost no novel by Farah which does 
not share some generic affinity with the detective novel, the narrative form constituted 
around the interrogation of  a mystery which must be solved. These dual generic affinities 
may not counteract each other. The central mystery which Farah’s oeuvre may address is the 
question of identity – “Who am I?” – a question explicitly posed by the boy protagonist, 
Askar, in Maps. Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self  observes that the question of identity, 
framed as an existential question cannot arise in non-modern cultures. He suggests, this 
“issue [the question of identity] cannot arise in the reflexive, person-related terms that it does 
for us [modern individuals]” (42). While in a non-individualist culture the question may be 
asked as a consequence of  momentary amnesia – I temporarily forgot that I am the daughter 
of X or the griot of the village – in an individualist culture, the question is an index of a 
disengaged, interiorized self. The answer to the question, “Who am I?” in modernity, in the 
novel generally, and in Farah’s novels in particular, is an answer which originates seemingly 
wholly from within the subject himself. The appeal, “Who am I?”, the quest and the 











 From the beginning of his career, Farah’s social commitment has been articulated 
through the discourse of the liberation of women. In various ways across his fiction and non-
fiction, Farah stresses that only when women are free can society be free. In the previous 
chapter an attempt was made to show some of the contradictions inherent in expressing 
emancipation of woman through the individualist male genre of the idealist Bildungsroman. 
In From a Crooked Rib, the familiar contradiction of the form emerges when the narrative is 
compelled to rely on traditional ethical horizons in order to achieve closure. The genre 
negotiates this tension through introducing the element of irony. Responsive to the multiple 
limitations of narrating individual freedom through a genre which reconciles with tradition’s 
apparent foreclosure of freedom, none of the subsequent novels is structured around the 
classical template. Similarly, the contradiction involved in the attempt to narrate woman’s 
freedom through a male form which brings traditional plot closure in the form of marriage, 
proves insurmountable.  
After From a Crooked Rib, Farah does not again rely on the pattern of the idealist 
Bildungsroman in its classical form defined by Dilthey. Development remains a key aspect 
in the subsequent novels, but development is refracted through paradigms which apparently 
respond to the gender and historical specificities of the classic genre. In significant ways, 
Farah’s response replicates a broader reaction to the exigencies of the classic genre. In 
various ways, Farah’s subsequent novels with central female protagonists seem to imitate the 
new patterns established by the female Bildungsroman. The novels in question are Sardines, 
Gifts and Knots. In what must be more than mere coincidence, each of these female novels of 
self-realization occur at the centre of the trilogies of which they form a part, sandwiched 











publication, which in all likelihood is the second novel of Farah’s third trilogy.) While these 
three novels in significant ways are sufficiently similar to be discussed in a single chapter, 
Knots engages with the question of the public sphere, a key element in what Charles Taylor 
terms the “modern social imaginary”, an horizon against which Farah’s novels appear to be 
conceived. While, Sardines and Gifts will be considered here, the analysis of Knots will be 
reserved for a later chapter. This chapter thus seeks to show that Farah’s subsequent 
challenge in the later novels to the classic Bildungsroman paradoxically reaffirms the 
disengaged, autonomous subject, in part constituted by the idealist novel of formation.  
The first part of the chapter analyzes the novel, Sardines. What is suggested is that 
while Sardines superficially displays the pattern of the female novel of development, in fact, 
the novel resolves the contradiction of the classic Bildungsroman by extending the powers of 
the self-creating subject to the instrumental construction also of the world inhabited by that 
subject. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the novel Gifts. This section explores the 
connection between various understandings of the concept of the gift to conceptions of the 
person and the person’s relationship with society. It is suggested that this novel implicitly 
distances itself from the idealist resolution of the earlier “gynocentric” Bildungsroman, 
Sardines. The “pure” gift in this novel symbolically represents “pure” individualism, 
unfettered by the limit prescribed by the social. Since the wholly autonomous identity is a 
moral philosophical impossibility, Gifts is obliged to resurrect ironic closure as discussed in 
relation to From a Crooked Rib. But Gifts is also a female Bildungsroman  which makes the 











allows the irony of closure to reflect on itself. Textuality – the idea that “There is no outside-
the-text” - is generated as consequence.    
 
I Trends in the Female Bildungsroman  
Even though the Bildungsroman in its classical form is critiqued as a consequence of the 
patriarchal, bourgeois limits of its representation of subjectivity (Abel and Hirsch 13, Felski, 
122-123, O’Neale 25-27) it nevertheless remains a vital genre for female self-realization. If, 
as has been suggested earlier, the male form peters out in parody, the female form remains 
popular, reflected in the vast numbers of novels of female development. Authors  Elizabeth 
Abel and Marianne Hirsch stress that the Bildungsroman  remains a viable symbolic form in 
contemporary times for women since in various ways women remain unincorporated: “It is 
‘the most salient form of literature’ for contemporary women writing about women” (13). 
Female Bildungsromane do not simply adopt the genre, they also in the process adapt it 
since, “Even the broadest definitions of the Bildungsroman presuppose a range of social 
options available only to men” (7). The authors suggest that if in the male form the 
protagonist’s quest is for reconciliation of individual desire and social convention, the 
struggle of the protagonist of the female Bildungsroman consists in the attempt “to voice any 
aspirations whatsoever” (7). In the nineteenth century European Bildungsroman, adultery is 
the only form of resistance, marriage is the only conceivable “happy ending”, while socially 
irreconciled development encounters the abrupt closure of suicide or death.  
It is interesting, casting a backward glance, to contrast Farah’s first heroine, Ebla, 
discussed in the previous chapter with the various eighteenth and nineteenth century 











generally unable to leave home for an independent life in the city” (Abel and Hirsch 8), for 
Ebla, leaving home is not only conceivable, but does not appear too fraught with life or 
personality threatening risk. If the patriarchal tradition is that which chains Ebla, its mores 
also represent the possibility of her freedom of movement. She is guaranteed safe passage 
with an all male caravan to the town of Belet Wene, even though the young man who escorts 
her into the town gives her sexually charged glances. Similarly, her male “cousin” in the 
town unquestioningly takes her in based on kinship obligations even though he conveniently 
uses her as midwife and nurse to his wife who has just given birth. It’s ironic that tradition, 
the “unthinking” practices from which Ebla flees, are also the enabling conditions of her 
escape. It’s also interesting that a wider range of options seem available to the postcolonial 
heroine as opposed to the nineteenth century European heroine.  
Abel and Hirsch identify two narrative patterns in the female “Coming of Age” 
novel: The first is a continuous development from childhood to maturity and the second is an 
“awakening” later in life, usually after marriage. But with both types, the hallmarks of the 
female Bildungsroman are the substitution of “inner concentration for active 
accommodation, rebellion or withdrawal” (8) and a deeper social embedding of the 
protagonist in a community of other women (12).  
Rita Felski suggests that the move away from the classical Bildungsroman among 
incorporated males is a consequence of a radical aesthetics of decentering of the autonomous 
self which, in actual social contexts, is not in fact politically radical for excluded groups. 
Felski confirms the key features of the female Bildungsroman identified by Abel and Hirsch 
but situates these not within a discourse of essential feminine difference from males, as 











(Felski 123) which constitute these modes. In other words, the pattern established by the 
female Bildungsroman is not an index of women’s essential difference from men, but an 
indication of women’s marginalization which is addressed through the genre. For Felski, the 
contemporary female Bildungsroman develops the two patterns established by its nineteenth 
century predecessor. If the male hero has a voice and is free to participate in the rational-
critical discourse of the public sphere, the heroine, by contrast, struggles to be heard. The 
apprenticeship type of novel traces the heroine’s trajectory into the public sphere. The novel 
of awakening in the twentieth century involves an explicit rejection of (male) social norms of 
the public sphere. The heroine frequently abandons society in a Romantically inspired return 
to the true sources of nature. While the former type of novel is strongly represented in 
Farah’s oeuvre, it is interesting that in the postcolonial context the latter, the novel of the 
return of the marginalized to nature as source, appears inconceivable.  
An analysis of the Bildungsromane of black American female novelists notes the 
generic transformations above and augments the patterns established. These novels display 
altered conceptions of time and development. Time is not linear and teleological. 
Development does not reflect the childhood-adulthood dichotomy. Invoking John S Mbiti, 
what is reflected instead is an ontological sketch of an “African psyche”: “Time is not an 
opponent lineally marking man’s end. It is an accommodation in a circular journey between 
eternities. Likewise human age is not a measure of dichotomies between childhood and 
adulthood but is rather a seven-tiered lifetime developmental process” (O’Neale 36). As an 
aside, it is interesting that Farah does not draw upon this tradition at all. 
The following general observations may be made of the twentieth-century 











is often closed and constricted, frequently limited to a purely inner psychological self-
fulfillment. The female novel of self-discovery rejects the “heterosexual romance plot” 
(Felski 122). Some form of physical separation from husband, family and society is 
prerequisite to self-knowledge (Felski 124). The gynocentric Bildungsroman generally 
begins when youth has ended, often after marriage. Strongly developed in the narrative is a 
supporting community of other women. The journey undertaken by the heroine does not 
involve social compromise. Instead, at the end of the journey, the woman is in a position to 
undertake oppositional activity. 
 While these critics make a very strong case for the psychological, social and political 
valency of the Bildungsroman form in the demarginalization of various excluded groups, 
what these analyses completely ignore is the prior and virtually invisible installation of the 
person as individual which the form itself in part constitutes. The classical Bildungsroman a 
priori proceeds from a conception of a disengaged subject (situated in nation-time and 
nation-space). The response in many of the variations on the classical structure is not to the 
idea of the subject as individual, but rather for the inclusion of significant others to 
individuality with the attendant modifications to individuality this entails. This is apparent 
from the “common ground”  Abel and Hirsch claim is shared by variant novels of formation 
with the traditional Bildungsroman:  
belief in a coherent self (although not necessarily an autonomous one); faith in the 
possibility of development (although change may be frustrated, may occur at 
different stages and rates, and may be concealed in the narrative); insistence on a 
time span in which development occurs (although the time span exist only in 











While a “coherent self” may complicate the Enlightenment “autonomous” self, it assumes 
the same fundamental disengagement from an external ethical orientation which the rational 
self inaugurates. “Development” thus remains the teleological transformation of the 
independent self out of its own moral sources. Time in the variant Bildungsroman is a 
response to the linear-historical (nation) time of the classical form and “social context” refers 
to Tönnies’s Gesellschaft based society or what Edward Said terms “affiliation”, which 
together constitute the modern social imaginary. Similar to Abel and Hirsch, Felski’s 
assertion of the radical political engagement of the variant Bildungsroman “proceeds from 
the assumption that autonomous selfhood is not an outmoded fiction but still a pressing 
political concern” (151). These rejoinders to the classical Bildungsroman operate upon the 
assumption that genre is simply an empty container into which new content can be filled, 
unpersuaded by Hayden White’s insight that form “already possesses a content prior to any 
actualization of it” (The Content of the Form xi). Privileging this genre operates to exclude 
other forms which may construe the subject in fundamentally different ways.  
 
II Sardines as a Female Bildungsroman 
On  the face of it, Sardines might be construed as a novel which challenges the assumptions 
of the classical male Bildungsroman. If the hallmarks of the female novel of self-
development are the restriction of action to small, enclosed spaces, explicit repudiation of 
stereotypical romance and marriage, some degree of physical separation from conventional 
confines to achieve self-realization, a more mature heroine supported by an enabling female 
network and closure which reveals the protagonist’s empowerment, then Sardines might be 











 The canvas of From a Crooked Rib was an expansive one which depicted its 
protagonist’s journey across semi-desert wastes through small town to city. The narrative of 
female development in Sardines, by contrast, is a cameo which sets its heroine in 
compressed relief against a city beneath the thrall of dictatorship. The novel tells the story of 
Medina, a leading member of the Mogadiscio “priviligentzia” who leaves the marital home 
since she is unable to compromise. She cannot compromise with her husband, Samater, who 
has acquiesced to the pressure placed upon him by the military regime. Unless he agreed to 
assume the post of Minister of Constructions, the regime would liquidate some of his 
kinsmen. Neither can Medina compromise with her mother-in-law, Idil, who came to live 
with them when her own daughter, Xaddia, put her out for interfering in her marital affairs. 
Idil insists upon a strict religious and traditional morality, which Samater and Medina do not 
observe. Soon after her installation in the home, Idil threatens that she will arrange for her 
granddaughter, Ubax, to undergo a traditional clitoridectomy and infibulation. Thereafter, 
Medina packs a few belongings, takes her child and relocates to her brother’s apartment in 
the city. (The sequence of events is purely coincidental. The threat of her daughter’s genital 
mutilation is not what actually motivates Medina to move as will be shown.)  
Farah has remarked, “if you studied the structures of the novel, you could see that 
you could have done it in just two rooms” (Alden and Tremaine 56), presumably a room in 
Medina’s own home and a room in her brother’s home. Like Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
which inspires Farah’s novel, the more traditional developmental plot is contained in the 
protagonist’s memory. Medina is the product of the union of her mother, Fatima bint Thabit, 
a Mogadiscian of Yemeni descent, and her father, Barkhadle, an orphan discovered on the 











(Sardines 55). How this rather unlikely union between a Yemeni woman “bound hand and 
foot”  and strangled by the strings of purdah, governed by a tyrannical despot of a father (a 
domestic reflection of the political tyranny of the Dictator) and an orphan of unknown 
cultural background, doubtless unacceptable to the ruthless father, came to be married is not 
explained by the novel. Similarly, the highly unlikely circumstance of Medina’s 
clitoridectomy and infibulation is not explained. The novel explicitly confirms that female 
genital mutilation is not part of the Yemeni tradition of the mother and the orphaned father, 
“a foreigner in his own country” (Sardines 55),  is portrayed as a male feminist who certainly 
would not have forced upon his only daughter a tradition alien to his upbringing. But Medina 
must be infibulated to add persuasive force to the dichotomies of freedom and “unfreedom” 
established by the novel. Although Medina’s mother “lives as though inside a whale which 
hardly came ashore” (Sardines 6-7), the beautiful, intelligent Medina has a cosmopolitan 
upbringing in the glittering capitals of Europe. 
The confined spaces to which the novel restricts itself is indexed in the title even 
before the narrative opens. Sardines, also the name of a Somali children’s game of hide-and 
seek , dhundhunmashaw (Vivan 790), alludes to the lack of privacy of life under 
dictatorship, the General’s incestuous hold on power concentrated among his clan family, the 
intimacy of female networks of support and the compressed space within which the narrative 
unfolds. The narrative opens with Medina’s highly charged, highly symbolic dream of 
“castles in the sky.” Medina constructs in her imagination a mansion which is wholly her 
own independent and autonomous construct, where she can be free. In what doubtless is an 
echo of Virginia Woolf’s essay of the same title, Medina wants a room of her own: “A room 











which one was not a guest …” (Sardines 3). The novel thus introduces itself as a narrative 
about women’s lack of freedom of movement in the closed, confined spaces available to 
them. 
 If the ending of From  a Crooked Rib suggested acceptance of stereotypical gender 
roles in bourgeois companionate marriage – “Ebla welcomed his hot and warm world into 
her cool and calm kingdom” – then Sardines signals a determined refutation of this scenario. 
Medina and Samater do not represent gender stereotypes, in fact, their representation 
studiedly reverses gender roles. Samater is the family cook and dishwasher. The family bank 
account is in Medina’s name. Medina’s development in the novel is motivated, but it does 
not in any way appear motivated by heterosexual romance. The fact that Medina’s self-
discovery is detached from traditional marriage is suggested by her wish that her husband 
prove himself by having an adulterous affair after she leaves him. 
 If some degree of separation is pre-requisite in the female novel of self-knowledge, 
then Sardines complies. As already indicated, Medina moves out of the highly charged 
atmosphere of the marital home to the more neutral space of her brother’s apartment to find 
herself. 
 Like many other gynocentric Bildungsromane, the narrative relinquishes the 
magnetism of youth for the more mature stage of life after marriage, traditionally marking 
closure in the classic novel of development. 
 Sardines also sketches in fine detail the lives of the women who surround Medina 
and who in various ways provide indispensable support for women who narrate their own 
lives. For example, when Amina, the daughter of a minister in the government of the 











Amina is able to refuse the sop thrown to her by her cowardly father who cannot challenge 
the General since she knows she can count on the assistance of Medina and her group. 
Closure in Sardines also seems  very emphatically to affirm self-realization in 
Medina’s final empowerment: 
Medina would supplement her intellectual activities – her translations and original 
writings with these social responsibilities. With one hand she would revise her 
translations and continue to write; with the other, she would nurse, medicate and do 
the social work she had always meant to. A guest, was she still a guest? she asked 
herself. No, she was definitely no longer a guest in her own country (Sardines 
250).  
In all the ways noted above - compression of action, rejection of conventional marriage, 
separation and a mature heroine in a nurturing female network - the novel seems to conform 
to the pattern established by female narrative resistance to the classical male Bildungsroman. 
 Despite the convincing parallels between Farah’s novel and the paradigm established 
by the female novel of self-discovery, Sardines categorically is not a gynocentric 
Bildungsroman. The female novel of self-development is essentially an “optimistic” genre, 
testimony to the incorporation or empowerment of the marginalized. While an element of 
optimism is revealed in closure, as suggested by the quotation above, the happy ending is not 
the product of the heroine’s incorporation or empowerment, since Medina possesses agency 
ab initio. Medina is not any more marginalized than any of the men in her circle. When she 
is excluded, it is on her own instigation.  
However, there is  development in the novel. That development springs from the 
narrative attempt to render the contradiction of the male Bildungsroman uncontradictory. 











rearguard compromise with the morality of tradition. Sardines, by contrast, seeks the 
realization of a purely self-authoring authority. The challenge for Medina, her development, 
involves negotiating a resistance to the authority of dictatorship in the historical juncture in 
which she finds herself, but also resistance to tradition and religion. This resistance must not, 
however, become authoritarian. In other words, the challenge for the novel is to educate both 
Medina and its readership in a morality which is not repressive and authoritarian since it 
emerges as a “natural” response to context from within the self. Medina’s Bildung will be 
complete when she is able to resist the ideology of the dictatorship from a position which is 
unideological. She will have reached self-knowledge when she can challenge the irrationality 
of religion and tradition from reason which constitutively proves its own veracity. The end of 
Medina’s Bildung is the resolution of the contradiction of the idealist Bildungsroman and, by 
extension, the resolution of the contradiction of the novel and, by extension, the resolution of 
the contradiction of modernity. The project of development in Sardines is the project of 
presenting “totality” as self-authoring, self-validating and ultimately self-negating as 
“totality”. The project of Sardines is totality which masks itself as pure freedom. 
 The classical Bildungsroman, represented by From a Crooked Rib, develops out of 
the attempt to present the socialization of the self-authoring individual as the product of 
“free” choice. Sardines as variant idealist Bildungsroman takes the inevitable next step. The 
ironic tone of closure in From a Crooked Rib signals one negotiation of a potentially failed 
project. Sardines attempts to surmount the failure of the autonomous individual’s 
reconciliation with society by the more ambitious project of self-authoring both subjectivity 
and society. In Sardines this is symbolized by Medina’s quest for “a room of her own”: “A 











room in which one was not a guest. …” (Sardines 3). The constant refrain of “a room of 
one’s own” through the novel clearly alludes to Virginia Woolf’s essay of the same title. If 
Woolf’s heroine, Shakespeare’s sister Judith, had a room of her own which she could lock 
and five hundred pounds a year, she probably would not have had to run away from home, 
submit to male overtures to find a place in the theatre and finally kill “herself one winter’s 
night” (Woolf 74). Alice Walker, incorporating the history of American slavery, rhetorically 
points out the race and class blindness of Virginia Woolf’s seemingly universal formulation 
in relation to the black female artist: “What then are we to make of Phyllis Wheatley, a slave, 
who owned not even herself?” (Walker 34)   Woolf’s slogan taken up by Medina obscures 
the fact that for many women the struggle is not so much for a room of one’s own as it is 
simply to “own” one’s own body and find material means of survival. By implication also in 
an appeal for a “room of one’s own” to pursue artistic self-realization, is a consequent 
occlusion of women’s work. Ian Watt suggests that Woolf’s admiration for Defoe’s 
character, Moll Flanders, may proceed from the distance Moll manages to put between 
herself and traditional women’s work: “ … one cannot help but feel that Virginia Woolf’s 
admiration for her [Moll Flanders] was largely due to admiration of a heroine who so fully 
realized one of the ideals of feminism: freedom from any involuntary involvement in the 
feminine role” (Watt 118). One might more accurately replace Watt’s “feminism” with 
“feminist individualism”.  So far from valuing women’s work, a “room of one’s own” 
creates a space for the construction as individual of the middle class woman in the image of 
the middle class male as individual. Jean Railla in “A Broom of One’s Own” points out also 
the economic and symbolic devaluing of traditional women’s work inherent in the feminist 











space and the privacy to construct an individuality gendered male. Ironically, as Nancy 
Armstrong has shown in Domestic Fictions, it is middle class women who perfect the 
individualist formation ideal. Most eighteenth century novelists were women and as Ian Watt 
suggests “feminine sensibility” seemed to embody the rational-empirical ideal represented in 
the novel (310-1).  
However, in the Woolf essay the room desired was the physical and psychological 
space for self-expression of the female artist. In Sardines the room more fundamentally 
represents the freedom of the already independent, autonomous self to construct a new 
world. Medina’s object is to have not just a room, but a room of her own, which she 
constructs to her own design. 
 Medina’s struggle is not for a room of her own in Woolf’s sense since as the text 
states at the outset, “She had a room of her own” (Sardines 3). Medina’s voyage, unlike that 
of other female heroines, is not from a space where she is not heard to a space where she is 
empowered to articulate resistance. From narrative opening to narrative closure, Medina 
possesses a freedom at odds with the stereotypes of oppressed Somali womanhood, or even, 
for that matter, Somali manhood. The privilege of her liberated upbringing is encapsulated in 
the following retrospective vignette: 
Medina’s father had been an ambassador … Medina talking about her past put it 
this way: “I prostrated before the powers of femininity at the age of thirteen in a 
hotel in Stockholm, looking like an over-nourished pet. I stood on the kerb of a 
cobbled street waving to the chariot which carried my father away into the winter 
silhouette of a Scandinavian night. … At fourteen, New York women’s magazines 
welcomed her as the daughter of the most well-known African ambassador at the 
UN. Paris a year later, pampered her with token presents, a hand-delivery of “Joy” 










As Alden and Tremaine and Okonkwo suggest about Medina, she has the power to imagine 
herself outside of Ebla’s impasse by virtue of her education. (Ebla, however, has not done 
too badly for herself – in this novel, she is mother to Sagal, Medina’s protégé, divorced from 
Awill from whom she obtained custody of Sagal, despite doubts about paternity, and owner 
of a five bedroomed house and shop, courtesy of a second husband whom she outlived). 
Medina has a degree in journalism from an Italian university and enjoys a polyglot command 
over Somali, of course, and four European languages as well as a lesser fluency in Spanish 
and Arabic. Not only does Medina have a room of her own, she also, unusually, owns the 
marital home, controls the joint bank account and has her own car. Her husband, Samater, 
studiedly performs the stereotypical woman’s work (to his mother’s profound disgust). He is 
the family dishwasher and cook. Medina’s predicament is not the compromised life of a Mrs 
Dalloway, the eponymous heroine of a novel which clearly informs Sardines. Indeed, 
Medina is not excluded from the centres of power. Medina is the successful feminist 
individualist who has broken the male hold on power. She is the only female member of the 
underground organization of ten which opposes the General and “was almost always a 
woman among men, sharing things with them, drinks, reading the same books as they, 
borrowing or lending them ideas” (Sardines 83).  
So profound is the power attributed to Medina that she is associated with 
Prometheus, the Titan who stole fire from the gods and also saved mankind from 
authoritarian extinction by the god, Zeus. This association is both implicit and explicit. 
Implicitly, fire is symbolically employed throughout the text to represent Medina. In this link 
with Prometheus, Medina is associated both with Prometheus as apotheosis of 











Dedalus. Explicitly, the protagonist is identified with Prometheus in the observation of 
Medina’s protégé, Sagal, that with power/fire concentrated in the hands of the Dictator, “A 
Promethean intervention is in order!” (Sardines 115). Medina alone can change the course of 
history. 
Medina’s lack of freedom, when it occurs, is not a consequence of her sex. It is a 
consequence of life under a dictatorship which affects men and women alike. But even her 
particular restriction by the military regime appears more a consequence of her own strategic 
maneuvering  than of victimhood. Medina is appointed editor of the national daily and within 
the space of just four days, through “daredevil” editorial changes that might be contemplated 
only by a “mad person” (Sardines 84), Medina manages to get herself sacked with a ban on 
publication of her work. The restriction imposed upon Medina is of much lesser magnitude 
than the curtailment of freedom of the male characters, some of whom are imprisoned or 
killed, or like her husband, Samater, tortured by the regime.  
 Bildung is a patently clear element of the structure of the narrative, but as has been 
shown, it is not the self-discovery of the woman who has been denied her freedom. The 
Epilogue repeatedly refers to Medina’s development as a “journey”, a journey after which 
she returns home.  
A frequently noted aspect of the Bildungsroman is the existence in the narrative of an 
alter-ego for the Bildungsheld, a double against whom the protagonist’s development may be 
measured. There is a developmental double or alter-ego in Sardines also. In Sardines, this 
role is played by Ebla’s daughter, Sagal. If the dominant trope in Medina’s textual 
representation is fire, the metaphors which surround Sagal are the metaphors associated with 











the backdrop of patrilinear Somali society. Right to the end of this novel also, the identity of 
the man who impregnated Ebla remains uncertain, so in a sense, Sagal has no father. 
Medina’s father, Barkhadle, an orphan left on the steps of the Catholic church, cannot trace 
clan linage. Thus Medina also is without a father since she is without clan. While Sagal’s 
failed Bildung is revealed in the final chapter of the novel, Medina’s successful Bildung is 
revealed in the Epilogue.  
Before the final touch is placed on the portrait of each of these characters, they 
experience an autotelic mirror moment: For Sagal it occurs when she sees her reflection, the 
“distorted shadow” of which she stares at “with horror”, in the pool before the swimming 
competition (Sardines 230). Medina stares at the “full-length mirror” before the closing 
sequence imagining her development as a child, but in a suggestive allusion to Gunter 
Grass’s Tin Drum, she is a child “who willed not to grow; in the distance a tin drum was 
beaten and to its rhythm she marched one-two-three, three-two-one, one-three-two ….” 
(Sardines 241). The drumming image is significant also with closure of Sagal’s 
development, but with Sagal the discordant drumming suggests failed Bildung: “Would 
somebody loosen the braced drum, confiscate the drumsticks and break them into smaller 
pieces so they would create no noise and wouldn’t talk the secret of the drummer? If this 
continued for another second, she would faint” (Sardines 239).  
 But not everyone in the novel, it appears has the same potential for development, 
even if, as in Sagal’s case, it is a failed formation. Medina is often contrasted with two other 
women, her mother, Fatima bint Thabit, and her mother-in-law, Idil. The former is a Yemeni 
woman, who lives “as though inside a whale” and who is “chained ankle and wrist and foot 











represents Arab-Islamic tradition. Medina’s mother-in-law, Idil, represents Somali-Islamic 
tradition. Her lifestyle is nomadic and, having lost her husband who died “serving the 
Italians” (Sardines 77), she is economically independent. Idil, however, comes to represent 
the power of Somali traditional patriarchy which can be exercised by either sex and which, 
refracted through a national lens, supports the dictatorship.  
While the “democratic openness” of Farah’s novel allows everyone to be heard, 
including the articulate, dissensual voices of Idil and Fatima bint Thabit, not all characters 
have the same potential for development. This occurs not because “development” contradicts 
the worldviews of these two characters, but because the novel cannot recognize development 
which orients itself against a social and transcendental framework and does not emerge from 
the disengaged self. The democratic openness of the text thus allows representation of the 
mother and mother-in-law, but not their development. Lack of development in this respect is 
a symptom of the tendency to see all worldviews explicit in their external moral orientation 
as static and unchanging.  
The polyphony of the text is deceptive in that its spirit of openness masks authorial 
control over the content of speech. On the question of female genital mutilation, tradition as 
represented by Idil in Sardines is a non-negotiable cul-de-sac. The text occludes the 
transformations, the development, which occurs when paradigms of ethical horizons 
externally defined come up against each other. Regarding clitoridectomy and infibulation, 
one may cite the example of Somali oral poetry which, locating tradition within the higher 
order of religion, decries the practice in the name of justice. Both the poem, “Hufane” by 
male poet ‘Umar Ma’allin and the untitled poem by female poet Dahabo Eline Muse 











morality of tradition against the transcendental morality of religion. Monologia in the 
sheep’s skin of polyphony here seems more fraught than explicit monologia.   
      While Idil and Fatima bint Thabit in the spirit of democracy gain admission to the novel 
as types of the ideologies they stand for, other characters do not similarly qualify for 
representation. It is salutary to recall Raymond Williams’s observations on the ideological 
nature of conventions. Minor characters conventionally appear in the text “as instrumental 
[…] merely environmental […] or indeed as essentially absent” (Williams 175). Emile 
Durkheim furthermore, in The Division of Labour in Society suggests that, “The more 
primitive societies are, the more resemblances there are among the individuals who compose 
them. […] On the other hand, among civilized peoples, two individuals are distinguishable 
from each other at a glance, and no preparation is needed for such an observation” (133-4). 
These observations are true of the representations of Medina’s cousins whose lives are 
literally closed within the apparent hidebound absolutisms and superstitions of tradition.  
On a visit to her mother, a number of Medina’s cousins return to the extended family 
home. Because of their purdah, on the street they are unidentifiable, they are like ghosts. 
One cannot tell the one from the other. When they return home, they file in like sheep, one 
by one, and peel off their purdah. They are no longer ghostly and mysterious, but to Medina, 
they are still completely unidentifiable. “Do you remember me?” asks a woman, described as 
“completely shapeless”, of Medina. But Medina does not remember her nor any of the 
others, and their questions are dismissed as idle gossip-mongering. For Medina, these 
women live a “caged existence” as though they “ ‘lived in the innards of a whale which 
hardly went ashore.’ ” (Sardines 145). (Three days and three nights in the innards of a whale 











story the novel cannot tell.) This wholly unindividuated mass of covered Arab cousins and 
elsewhere thorn-scratched Somali cousins who inexpressively inhabit the pages of Sardines 
form the matrix against which the highly individuated Medina comes to matter. 
 When the novel opens, Medina already represents the fulfillment of the 
Humanitatsideal which is the outcome of Bildung. She is the autonomous, free subject, who 
potentially might integrate in a relationship of association into a society of other independent 
subjects. Medina’s dilemma in the postcolonial nation in which she discovers herself is that 
other fully realized individuals are few and far between. As a consequence, she needs to 
construct them. Medina’s imperative is to transform persons into Edward Said’s definition of 
novelistic characters: “[…] thus the novelistic character is conceived as a challenge to 
repetition, a rupture in the duty imposed on all men to breed and multiply, to create and 
recreate oneself unremittingly and repeatedly” (emphasis added) (Said 117). In short, 
Medina must transform a society where “repetition” occurs by “filiation” into a society based 
on “repetition” by “affiliation” (Said World, Text, Critic 110-2) , she needs, in short, to 
hasten the process of Bildung. Much like the colonial authorities of the Raj, considered by 
Gauri Viswanathan, who replace naked power with masked conquest, a sound literary 
education is employed to forge subjects. Medina assumes responsibility for the development 
of many of the other characters in the novel through the dissemination of a particular kind of 
literature and films. Medina, like Wilhelm Meister’s Society of the Tower, is in the business 
of constructing individuals who are in a position to choose “freely” what Medina has pre-
scribed for them. Among her charges are her husband, Samater, her young protégés, Amina 











 In Samater, Medina wishes to develop independence. He is dependent upon her and 
upon  traditional and postcolonial systems of authority. He tolerates the intolerant habits of 
his Somali mother and bows in obeisance to his Yemeni mother-in-law. He is a “bender of 
head.” He compromises with the regime which threatens the life and liberty of his clansmen 
and becomes the Dictator’s Minister of Constructions. During their courtship in Italy where 
they both studied, Samater has “difficulty adopting his nomadic ways to her uninhibited 
sophistication.” Medina says to him: “You will have to change your nomad ways.” She then 
makes him “read the world’s classics”, introduces him to “music, jazz, and to cinema.” She 
takes him “to see Bicycle Thieves, Casablanca and a series of Chaplin classics. She took him 
by the hand and led him through life’s unread guides” (Sardines 178). 
 In a similar way Medina channels the life of the two young women in her circle, 
Amina and Sagal. Medina’s endeavours with Amina are more focused after her politically 
motivated gang rape. The kind of literature Medina gives her shows the similar ways in 
which political and patriarchal power operate, so that Amina is led to see that every rape is 
political. When Amina compromises with her father who is a minister in the Dictator’s 
cabinet, Medina summarily excludes her from her circle. Medina’s relationship with Sagal is 
a little more complicated. Sagal is both Medina’s bridge with her youth and the bridge to the 
future. Linked through the opposite tropes of fire and water, Medina’s development and 
Sagal’s Bildung may be contrapuntally interpreted. The books Medina gives Sagal are a 
fascinating instance of the mise-en-abyme tableau in the Bildungsroman, noted by Joe 
Slaughter (“Enabling Fictions” 1418), where the Bildungsheld reads other Bildungsromane. 











[sic]” (Sardines 37). Sagal has promised Medina furthermore that she will read the O’Brien 
after the Goncharov “for comparison” (Sardines 37).  
The invocation of Oblomov takes Bildungsroman self-reflexivity to vertiginous 
depths. Oblomov is the nineteenth century Bildungsroman by the Russian author Goncharov, 
which had such impact on the Russian society of its time that it spawned a Russian 
neologism, Oblomovshchina, which signifies the pathological indolence of its eponymous 
anti-hero. Goncharov incidentally was the author of only four works all of which, including a 
travelogue, Frigate Pallas, have been identified as Bildungsromane (Rubins and Yevsukov). 
(Frigate Pallas, incidentally, is a Bildungsroman writ on a global scale, with different 
peoples at various evolutionary stages of Bildung.)  Goncharov himself was deeply 
immersed in European Enlightenment culture (Rubins and Yevsukov) as the references to 
Wieland, Herder and Goethe in Oblomov  suggest (153, 470). The Bildung of the central 
character, Oblomov, is a failed development, hardly surprising for a character whose journey 
in life rarely takes him beyond his bed. Oblomov’s failed development is calibrated against 
the successful  Bildung of his double, his (not coincidentally) German friend, Stolz. It is also 
contrasted with the Romantic development of the young woman, Olga, whom Oblomov 
loses to Stolz. Olga is the “beautiful soul” whom her husband, Stolz, in his realist 
pragmatism needs to assure that she has “completed the circle of life” (Oblomov 477), has 
“reached maturity, the time of life when one stops growing … when there are no riddles left 
and the whole of life is seen plainly. …” (Oblomov 481). [Stolz also in attempting to console 
his wife suggests that the anguish she experiences is the price “one has to pay for 
Prometheus’s fire” (482). The spark which has been stolen from the gods thus represents the 











Prometheus who challenges the authority of the Dictator.] Oblomovism is Goncharov’s 
explanation for the failed Bildung of the Russian people, why they cannot follow the 
precepts of the European Enlightenment. Failed Bildung of the traditional Russian landed 
gentry, Oblomovism, is also the reason, underscoring Moretti’s  conviction of the reformist 
nature of the genre, for the Revolution of 1917.  
 If Goncharov laments failed Russian entry into modernity, just less than a century 
later from the island on the Western periphery, Flann O’Brien laughs at his hero’s failed 
Bildung. Shea suggests that the ending of At Swim-Two-Birds parodies “one of the two 
traditional endings of the Bildungsroman in which a recalcitrant youth is finally reconciled 
with the prevailing adult community” (276). These then are the books which Medina gives to 
her protégé, Sagal. Whether these Bildungsromane decry a failure to develop or parody the 
Enlightenment ideal, they both assume a self-begetting individualism.  
Medina’s other charge is her eight year old daughter, Ubax. Medina refuses to allow 
her daughter to attend any of the state-run schools since she will be exposed to the 
indoctrination of the Dictator. Instead, Medina chooses to educate her daughter herself. 
Richard A. Barney, while acknowledging the cross-fertilization of British and European 
literary developments, locates the origin of the English Bildungsroman more specifically in 
the pedagogic treatises of the eighteenth century rather then in German models. The German 
distinction between Bildung, “formation” and Erziehung, “education”, in this context tends 
to be broken down (17).  
The thrust of Medina’s pedagogic strategy is to give Ubax stories to read. The stories 
Ubax is given are world classics. But Ubax does not read them in the original. They are 











subject to a ban on publication. A key story in Ubax’s formation is Medina’s version of an 
Igbo oral tale which she adapts from Achebe’s written version in Things Fall Apart. In both 
novels, the story is one told by a mother to a daughter, educating a new generation in the 
ways of life. But, while in Things Fall Apart Ekwefi’s is an oral tale told verbally to her 
daughter who responds verbally with another story  completing a circuit of  giving and 
receiving, Medina’s is a written interpretation of a written story which Ubax must read 
herself. While the context of the former induction is both social and sociable, the latter is an 
individual, solitary exercise. While the former story forms part of a repertoire of stories 
which suggests shared values and understandings, which enables the daughter’s return of a 
story which she heard from a co-mother/sibling/friend/grandparent to the mother, Ubax is 
not similarly enabled. (Interestingly, Ubax does crayon drawings which Medina then 
interprets.)  
The story in question is a trickster tale about tortoise who cheats the birds out of a 
feast in the sky hosted by the gods. He tells them that for the auspicious occasion they have 
to take on new names. He will call himself “All of You”. In response to tortoise’s 
preemptive enquiry regarding who the feast is for, the host replies “For all of you”. The tale 
thus is about wiliness and greed which ultimately meet retribution when the rest of the birds 
plan a nasty revenge on tortoise. (The tail end of the story is also a cosmogony myth.) 
Medina gives the Igbo tale which is unnamed in Things Fall Apart the interpretive title “He”, 
a clear allusion to the Dictator and his cunning manipulation of and personal accumulation of 
power. The context in which Ubax is exposed to the story and Medina’s individualizing 
interpretation, which robs the tale of its punch at the moment which matters most as 











into a doctrine where virtue consists in the process of determining meaning in a radically 
destabilized text. Ubax never really gets to the bottom of the story. It appears she is reading 
it from the beginning to the end of the novel, where still she walks around with the stapled 
pages, “pretending to read them.” (Sardines 219). 
Ubax is educated in the meaning of life. It is an education which plots, in all the 
multiple nuances of the word, the discovery of meaning in her self. She must freely discover 
her uniqueness, her independence, her originality. It is in the script her mother has written 
for her. Ubax cannot remember the title of the novel from which Medina drew the story 
which she calls “He”: 
 “At your age you should have a better memory,” Medina commented. 
 “You want me to be just like you, remember the titles of all the books I see,    
        remember every story anybody tells me, remember who said what to whom.    
        Leave me alone. I’m only eight years old.” 
        … 
      “Of course I want you to be like me. But I want you to grow up healthy and     
        independent. I want you to do what you please.” 
                              “Why don’t you let me go and play with Abucar, Omar and Sofia?” 
       “When you come home, your language suffers from lack of originality. You    
        keep repeating yourself, saying the same thing. I want you to speak like an  
        enlightened child.” 
                             “Why don’t you let me go to school like the other children then?” 
       “Because schools teach you nothing but sycophancy and praise names of the  
        General. And because I can teach you better than they. …” (Sardines 13). 
These are some of the paradoxes of Bildung: Achieving Medina’s personality ideal will 
allow Ubax to be “independent”. Ubax is trained to be “independent.” This reveals pre-











latent. She will be able to lay claim to an originality unfettered by repetition. Like others 
with free and full personality, she will be the same in her uniqueness. Through presenting 
Ubax’s resistance to development, the text may be acknowledging an awareness of these 
reservations. Ultimately, however, in declaring Medina’s closing resolution triumphant, 
polyphony is subsumed in monologia. 
 Criticism and resistance to injustice, independence and freedom do not appear 
possible in the text for the “subiectum” beneath the heel of repression who are not yet 
subjects. Apparently, they all sing the praise names of the General. But the text allows a little 
slip. One of the other reasons Medina does not allow Ubax to play in the streets is because 
the other children call the General “deprecatory anatomical nicknames” (Sardines 11). The 
General’s control of an essentially passive and docile Somali society which the text 
otherwise presents as absolute thus is revealed to be a product of a political vision in which 
there is no space for anything but individual resistance. Collective social resistance, a 
resistance grounded in what Tönnies refers to as Gemeinschaft rather than Gesellchaft, or 
what Said interprets as “filiation” rather than “affiliation” is occluded in the novel, revealed 
only in this one elusive glimpse.  
 Since the novel cannot represent collective resistance, the focus instead is on the 
group of ten who oppose the General. While the story of one of the ten, Loyaan, is narrated 
in the first novel of the trilogy, Sweet and Sour Milk, it is only Medina’s story which is 
foregrounded in this book. Of the ten, she is the only one who remains free, independent and, 
most importantly, uncompromised: 
… Medina … was counting to herself the names of the ten who began with her this 
arduous journey which they all hoped in their different ways would enable them to 











survived this terrible journey of self-discovery through sheer manoeuvring and tact; 
some failed the test and ended up unhappy and compromised; others encountered 
the naked violence of power and died … (Sardines 44). 
Medina is not one of those who has been incarcerated and killed. Neither is she one of those 
who has compromised.  
If Medina from the start represents the fulfillment of the Humanitatsideal, in what 
then does her Bildung  consist? Medina’s development is expressed through the metaphors of 
belonging and unbelonging, being at home or being a guest, being domiciled or being in 
exile. When the narrative opens, Medina experiences herself in various social and 
geographical contexts as a guest. She is a guest in all of the traditions at whose confluence 
she comes into being. She is a guest in the Arab-Islamic tradition of her mother, a guest in 
the Somali-Islamic tradition of her mother-in-law, a guest in the tribal dictatorship. When in 
Europe, she is the African guest not qualified by her origin to comment on the Marxist-
Leninist inspired ideology of the ’68 student rebellion. But Marxist-Leninists, represented by 
the Italian journalist, Sandra, are eminently qualified to interfere in Somali politics. As an 
African, she is also a guest in the Western technology of the twentieth-century. So even 
though Medina has a room of her own in the house which belongs to her, in fundamental 
ways she is a guest. (She does, not however, perceive the modern identity into which she has 
been inducted as alienating, since it “tautologically-teleologically” presents itself as simply 
releasing the true self from the bondage of tradition or totality.)  
Her quest in the novel is to find a space where she is at home. The stage by stage 
development she passes through is one which allows her to negotiate a position from which 
she is able to resist authority without herself becoming authoritarian. In other words, 











constituted absolutely out of individual freedom which does not impose individual 
obligation. Paradoxically, Medina needs to form Ubax, Sagal, Amina and Samater, according 
to a strategy where “form” as a noun masks “form” as a transitive verb, “to give form.” The 
individuality constructed must appear simply to be a realization of inherent potential. 
Expressed as a political ideology, Medina’s view is one which privileges individual 
resistance to an individualistic understanding of political oppression. Medina’s 
understanding of Somali politics is an almost megalomaniac perception of individual will 
which has the potential to bring down authority: “The General’s power and I are like two 
lizards engaged in a varanian dance of death; we are two duelists dancing a tarantella in 
which they challenge their own destiny” (Sardines 45).  
 Ebla in From a Crooked Rib also in fundamental ways is a “guest” in the tradition 
into which she is born. However, while Ebla’s individual freedom is reined in at closure by 
traditional plot, Medina seeks to evade the central contradiction of individualism through 
constructing, building, not only herself, but also the world around her. If finally Ebla is 
trapped by society, Medina will escape the trap through constructing society also in her own 
image. The novel cannot avoid the circle of life built into the Bildungsroman form. What it 
does instead is to project both the individual life and the meaning of life as both up for 
construction by the autonomous artificer.  
The novel ends where it begins, with one significant difference: Medina’s 
development starts and ends in the same place – in the Mogadiscio home which she owns. At 
the beginning of the narrative she is a guest in her own home, since the mutually implicating 
authority of her mother-in-law and the Dictator infiltrate her space. She thus dreams the 











worked it into a set of pyramids which served as foundations for one another. […] She then 
built mansions on top of it all, mansions as large as her imagination and with lots of 
chambers […]” (Sardines 2). Medina’s dream may allude to Keats’s “metaphor of a many-
chambered mansion” (Buckley 1) to represent the development from childhood to maturity. 
Ultimately, it is the room which she allots to her core self which becomes the central symbol 
of the novel. 
 It is fascinating how the architectural metaphor reflects the ambiguity of modern 
selfhood. The “room of one’s own” is the architectural expression of the “audience-oriented” 
(Habermas 49) privacy constituted in the eighteenth century bourgeois home. Habermas 
refers to Riehl’s observations on the process of privatization which , “made the house more 
of a home for each individual, but left less room for the family as a whole” (45).  This ideal 
is realized in the development in the nineteenth century of the “suburb.” Ian Watt cites Lewis 
Mumford’s The Culture of Cities (1945) which suggests that “the suburb is a ‘collective 
attempt to live a private life’; it is dedicated to an essentially feminine ideal of quiet 
domesticity and selective personal relationships which could only be portrayed in the novel” 
(194). A “room of her own” is also the feminist individualist expression of the artistic 
freedom which privacy allows. Ironically “a room of one’s own” is also the bequest of 
Bentham’s Panopticon, the symbol for Michel Foucault of modern methods of individual 
disciplinary surveillance and reform.  
 While at the beginning of the novel, the room is only a dream, at the end it becomes 
reality. What allows this development? It is allowed by Medina’s self-constituting proof that 
she has resisted without herself becoming an oppressive authority, like the authority of 











without relinquishing freedom measured? Her journey which takes her from her own home 
to that of her brother has repercussions. It provokes her husband, Samater, to throw his 
mother, Idil, out. This outrage against tradition is met with the ire of the Dictator. Samater, 
who compromised with the regime, now loses his job. Once again he becomes autonomous. 
To prove his independence, he also moves out of Medina’s house, has an affair and opens his 
own bank account. In other words, Medina has successfully resisted various authorities, she 
has challenged Idil and the General, without herself becoming authoritarian. She has 
constituted her idea of a higher order without imposing any moral obligation on anyone. 
Samater was simply responding to the “truth” deep within him, the “truth” which Medina’s 
literary education of her husband helped to constitute. Medina is able at the end of the novel 
to return to her own home and complete the ring of life since Idil has left and Samater’s 
formation is complete. She is able to return since the imaginary room, symbol  of her 
untrammeled self, through literary transfiguration, has become more real than Somali reality: 
A guest, was she still a guest? She asked herself. No, she was definitely no longer a 
guest in her own country. […] Medina a hostess? Why, when she altered the 
position of the chair the house fell in on her and the ground shook with seismic 
determination. No, she wasn’t a guest any more. She was a full and active 
participant in the history of her country (Sardines 250). 
The structure which Medina autonomously builds in her own imagination has the marvelous 
and megalomaniac potential to shake Somalia “with seismic determination.” But, of course, 
nothing much has changed. The General remains in power, a power bodily endured by 
Samater who is tortured. And Medina remains alienated from the respective traditions 
represented by her mother and mother-in-law. The idyll is complete when Medina, the 











family with Medina again at the head. If Woolf needed to kill the “Angel in the House” in 
order to express herself (“Professions for Women” 79), Medina similarly has to “kill” the 
“Angel” in her home – in this case in the form of a man, Samater – who must be tortured by 
the regime for Medina’s self-fulfillment to be accomplished. Bildung thus occurs at the 
expense of the literally broken man, the unusually acquiescent child and the numerous 
country and purdah-covered cousins whose alternative individualities cannot be 
accommodated in Sardines. Neither can their individualities be accommodated in the 
Bildungsroman nor in the novel, since these selfhoods orient themselves against an external 
horizon.   
 Thus Sardines, far from resisting the assumptions of the traditional Bildungsroman, 
instead, takes Bildungsroman assumptions about the representation of the person apparently 
a step closer towards reconciliation of contradiction.  
 
III The Subject and Economies of Exchange in Gifts 
Ebla represents the principle of individual freedom trapped in the social circle of life. 
Medina’s triumph, by contrast, is the successful reduction of the circle to a pure self-
generating point of her own construction. Duniya, the protagonist of Gifts, projects the 
contradiction which lies at the heart of the moral philosophy of individual freedom onto 
narrative itself. The only pure gift in Gifts is the truth of non-truth which constitutes the art 
of the novel.  
 There is a clear Bildungsroman element in Gifts which again goes unrecognized in 
criticism of this particular novel. There are textual clues which clearly allude to the genre of 











into Somali “great European classics” (Gifts 96), including the works of Goethe, the 
apotheosis of the classical genre. There is reference at the end also to the “journeys” various 
characters have to take to the “destination” of self-fulfillment. Like Sardines, Gifts 
superficially appears to follow the pattern of the gynocentric Bildungsroman. The heroine, a 
senior nurse at a Mogadiscio maternity hospital, begins her journey to self-discovery not in 
youth, but in maturity as the once widowed, once divorced mother of three children. Unlike 
Medina, she is not a fully empowered, materially independent woman. While Medina’s story 
is set at the height of the Dictator’s power, Duniya’s story is set towards the tail end of 
Barre’s power, against the backdrop of a Mogadiscio with rampant crime and commodity 
shortages. Duniya and family are able to enjoy a middle class lifestyle thanks to the dollar 
remittances of Duniya’s brother, Abshir.  
Duniya’s journey towards self-realization is crucially tied to an understanding of 
what constitutes a gift. Duniya’s development is from a state where she literally is a gift, 
property to be gratuitously passed on, to a state where she possesses the autonomy to make a 
gift. But gifts in the novel bear a significance wider than Duniya’s personal progression. 
Gifts in various forms appear to subtend virtually all relationships in the narrative. The text, 
furthermore, is a collage of different genres whose full significance depends on 
juxtaposition. The narrative is interspersed with dream sequences, folk tales and newspaper 
articles. The newspaper articles, in particular, widen the angle of focus. As with From a 
Crooked Rib, the woman’s story appears to bear the burden of a national allegory. In the 
same way that gifts operate to keep Duniya dependent,  the self-interested motives and 
manipulation of foreign aid in Somalia appear both to entrench corrupt leadership and keep 











 Farah acknowledges the novel’s central theoretical inspiration to lie in Marcel 
Mauss’s The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, an 
anthropological study of the gift economies of Polynesian and Melanesian peoples. “Pure” 
gift economies operate before the use of money, “minted and inscribed” (Mauss 4). Mauss 
describes the gift economy, the “potlatch”, as a total system of reciprocity whereby the clan 
head passes on “everything – food, women, children, property, talismans, land, labour 
services, priestly functions and ranks” (14) in an agonistic exchange with other chiefs. The 
gift economy involves three themes, namely, to give, to receive and to reciprocate. Lack of 
reciprocation results in a loss of honour, a suggestion which is the burden of the etymology 
of “gift” as both “prestation” and, from the Dutch, “poison” (O.E.D. Online). As with 
Mauss’s speculations on the development of individualism, an evolutionary paradigm is 
suggested which leads from barter, to sales for cash, leading finally to credit in the most 
evolved societies. What is interesting about the “primitive” system of prestation is that it has 
credit built into it in the expectation of return. Counter-donation incorporates credit. The 
simple evolutionary pattern is thus complicated. Mauss’s understanding of individualism as a 
teleological, utopian progression is contradicted by his analysis of gift economies, since, for 
Mauss, commodity exchange loses a constitutive element present in gift economies.  The 
effect of the gift economy is to set up, as Mary Douglas suggests in the Foreword to Mauss’s 
The Gift, “a perpetual cycle of exchanges within and between generations” (viii). In the 
practice of the endless cycle of donation and counter-donation, social bonds are forged 
which constitute the society. As Mary Douglas suggests, “The whole society can be 
described by the catalogue of transfers that map all the obligations between its members. The 











constituted out of the “gift-obligations” of its members. Mauss appears aware of the paradox 
of the gift which is not one: “If one so wishes, one may term these transfers acts of exchange 
or even trade and sale. Yet such trade is noble, replete with etiquette and generosity” (37). 
Thus even though the gift economy resembles commodity exchange, its logic is profoundly 
different. Patterns of exchange thus are an index of social relations and the nature of the 
subjects party to those social relations.    
 Jacques Derrida in Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, some decades later, enters into 
a debate with Mauss in which the gift comes to suggests something also about the 
ineffability of time  itself – and art. Derrida’s point of departure is that “a work as 
monumental as Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of everything but the gift” (24). Derrida’s 
challenge arises from the semantic requirement of “gift” that there should be no “expectation 
or receipt of an equivalent” (O.E.D. Online 3.a), which sets off a cycle of exchange. If 
Mauss reads the cycle, the ring of life, totality as enabling, Derrida interprets the circle as 
that boundary from which one needs to escape. The gift in order to be a gift must break free 
of the circle:  
If there is gift, the given of the gift […] must not come back to the giving […]. It 
must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, 
as a gift by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in 
the form of return to the point of departure […] (7).  
The circle is that which “encircles” and “besieges” both the gift and the subjects party to the 
social relations created by the gift. The idea of the gift for Derrida is a paradox which only 
the pure gift escapes. What constitutes pure gift? The gift which escapes the ligatures of the 
cycle of obligation is the gift which has no return at either points of donation or reception – 











since consciousness of generosity brings its own return in the form of self-satisfaction. The 
donee must not be aware of the gift since receipt generates obligation to return. For the gift 
to be a gift, it must not even be recognized as one: “For there to be gift, it is necessary that 
the gift not even appear, that it not even be perceived or received as gift” (16). The gift must 
“forget” itself. This fundamental effacement “should accord with a certain experience of the 
trace as cinder or ashes […]” (17). The true gift thus is a virtual impossibility, existing for 
Derrida possibly in a situation described in a short story by Baudelaire, “Counterfeit 
Money”,  where one of two friends, leaving a tobacconists, gives a counterfeit coin as charity 
to a beggar.   
 Published at roughly the same time as the Derrida essay, Farah’s novel, Gifts, appears 
to enter into a similar debate to the one Derrida initiates with Mauss. Gifts, in the form of 
presents, donations and aid, appear to be imbricated in both subject formation and subject 
relations. The central character, Duniya, assumes self-indentity and becomes an individual 
only when she is “self-possessed.” In other words, Duniya becomes a subject only when she, 
on the model of C.A.B. MacPherson’s “possessive individualism”, referred to in relation also 
to Ebla’s subjectivity, owns herself on the principle of the ownership of property. A related 
observation is that Duniya can only become the subject of a novel when she becomes 
proprietor of herself. Her pre-history, which is the matrix out of which the novel defines 
itself, is a pre-history where Duniya herself is owned. She literally is property. She is the gift 
given in marriage by her father on his deathbed to his blind, elderly friend. A fortnight after 
her elderly husband’s death, Duniya is on a plane in the familiar journey from country to the 
city of Mogadiscio. In the city, with the financial aid of her full brother, Abshir, Duniya no 











creating gifts which threaten autonomy. She warns her children not to bring home the 
luxuries given by “well-intended” uncles and aunts – she refers to these offerings as “corpse 
food.” As a woman, it is virtually impossible for her, however, to avoid debts of gratitude. 
She marries her second husband, the journalist Tariq, whose newspaper articles on foreign 
aid form one voice in the apparent polyphony of the novel, since she is grateful to him for 
renting her a home. Similarly, she “gives” Yarey, her child from Tariq, to her childless in-
laws in exchange for living virtually rent free in a house in a Mogadiscio suburb. In this 
novel also as in Sardines, homes and homelessness carry a huge symbolic burden.  
 The catalyst which hastens Duniya’s self-realization in the novel is the character 
Bosaaso who, in another example of the network of gifts which constitute relationships, 
makes a gift to his country of his professional expertise acquired in the U.S.A. Unlike the 
female Bildungsroman which eschews the “happy ending” of the heterosexual romance plot, 
Gifts is a love story which moves towards Duniya and Bosaaso’s union. The challenge for 
Duniya is to move from a conception of the gift which creates mutual return and obligation 
to the pure gift, the prestation which is epiphanic, which is completely unexpected and which 
creates no ties which bind, no ligatures. It is when she reaches this stage, which is both 
climax and conclusion of her development that Duniya and Bosaaso’s love may be 
consummated and closure is enabled. The challenge presented by the narrative then is to 
move from Mauss’s understanding of the gift as embodiment of social bonds to Derrida’s 
understanding of the gift as trace, reminiscent of cinder, ash or smoke.  
The closest the text comes to the pure gift is embodied in an anecdote told by Tariq, 
Duniya’s alcoholic ex-husband. He returns home one night in a drunken stupor and collapses 











blanket and keeps vigil to make sure that stray dogs do not harass him. When subsequently 
he meets the old woman at Duniya’s home, he enquires whether she was his benefactor. She 
responds: “why devalue the significance of the act by mentioning it in public?” (Gifts 124). 
All Tariq has to remember the gift of kindness is a drunken memory and a blanket which he 
cannot return since the identity of the donor is unknown. The gift here exists only as a 
Derridean trace and the donee is free of obligation. But it is still not the pure gift required in 
Derrida’s analysis since the donor, the old woman, may enjoy the “return” of self-
satisfaction of having done a good deed.  
Ironically, another potentially pure gift is the gift Duniya’s father makes of her to his 
elderly friend. Duniya’s father expresses his desire on his deathbed in earshot only of his 
wife who is hard of hearing. It is the wife, Duniya’s mother, who insists that the marriage 
take place, even though the brothers insist she may have misheard. In this case, at the point 
of donation the gift is inscribed in uncertainty and since the donor has died, the donee owes a 
debt of gratitude to no one. The difficulty here is that the gift itself is not merely a trace – it 
is the corporal existence of Duniya, the woman.  
 With the terminus of classical Bildung inscribed in the happy marriage, the text is 
impelled towards a pre-scribed end. The challenge for Medina in Sardines  was to resist 
without sacrificing the ideal of freedom. The challenge for Duniya, on the other hand, is to 
love without sacrificing independence. Duniya’s self-realization is also catalyzed by the gift 
of the “abandoned” baby brought home by her elder daughter, Nasiiba. The foundling is the 
first of a series of mythical children in Farah’s novels, the mystery of whose origins, 
suggests autotelic conception. There are overtones of both Moses and Christ in the 











surround him appear to be in awe of the baby; the old neighbour who generously helps in the 
baby’s care is called “Maryam”, Arabic for “Mary.” The text also refers to the Sunjata and 
Mwindo epics (Gifts 122). The infant inexplicably dies before there has been significant 
narrative progression, but not without changes wrought upon the heroine. Duniya appears 
finally to be able to break the bonds of dependence, signaled in the text by a number of 
transformations. For the first time through her actions she admits a romantic attachment to 
Bosaaso without fear of entrapment. She goes on a date where she allows her daughter – in a 
reversal of the Enlightenment motif where the child is the father of the man – to dress her, 
the daughter becoming the mother of the woman. For the first time, Duniya’s accoutrement 
does not include a headscarf, symbolically marking the abandonment of the sartorial style of 
repression for the sartorial style of universal personal freedom. Duniya also, not 
insignificantly, wears a pair of earrings since she is not wearing a headscarf which would 
cover them. Each earring is a blue, five-pointed star encircled in a silver band. The blue, 
five-pointed star is the emblem at the centre of the Somali flag, each point of the star 
representing one of the Somali territories. (Three of these territories were excluded from 
independent Somalia in the formalization of colonial boundaries.) In this national allegory, it 
appears, the woman achieves the development which the country does not. In an incident 
replete with significance, Medina loses an earring on her date with Bosaaso at the moment 
when Duniya sees “comets flying earthwards” (Gifts 139). After the death of the foundling, 
Duniya also goes for driving and swimming lessons. But most significantly, it is after the 
death of the foundling that Duniya is able to give herself physically to Bosaaso in what the 











 As at the end of From a Crooked Rib, when freedom reconciles with socialization, 
when sjuzhet comes up against fabula, when the individual life is subsumed within plot, 
closure is overlaid with irony. Duniya, it appears, is able to flourish in the epiphanic gift of 
mutually enhancing autonomy and freedom since she enjoys material independence from 
Bosaaso, a material independence ironically created out of material de-pendence upon her 
dollar wealthy brother, Abshir. Abshir flies into Mogadiscio at the end of the novel to reveal 
how he, like Meister’s Tower Society, has benevolently been directing Duniya’s life, 
allowing her to claim as hers the subjectivity which she always already had. There is an 
element of excess in the gifts showered on his sister by Abshir that is hard to ignore. Of 
course, he brings suitcases of clothes for the family. But he also promises to buy Mataan, 
Duniya’s son, a scooter. He is willing to fund any of the childrens’ university studies 
anywhere in the world. He wants to buy Duniya a city centre apartment when he hears she 
has moved out of his brother’s home. Again the national allegory is suggested in the fact that 
they meet him at the airport in a convoy like a visiting head of state, for whom the youngest 
daughter, Yarey, wants to wear a virginal white dress and to whom she would like to present 
a bouquet of flowers.  
 Contradiction is the inevitable conclusion of individualism constituted in and through 
the Bildungsroman. In From a Crooked Rib the resolution of contradiction occurs through 
irony. In Sardines contradiction is willed away through imagining a whole new world. But 
closure in Sardines is a little too studiedly emphatic to be convincing. By contrast then, 
resolution in Gifts seems infinitely successful. In terms of the debate with which the novel 
engages, pure gift is the ideal social relationship of wholly free, autonomous individuals who 











by contract rather than status. But the contradiction the novel seems to face is that pure 
mutuality is an impossible ideal. What Gifts does at the end, is to project this contradiction 
and the paradisiacal ideal it seems to embody onto novelistic form itself. The pure gift is an 
epiphanic gift, a gift which is “given” when least expected, which fulfills a deepest need 
which is not even realized. Finally, the only pure gift in Gifts is the story itself. In this sense, 
the culmination of Duniya’s Bildung occurs not in her happy marriage but in the story of her 
happy marriage. These are Duniya’s musings in the closing scene in the restaurant where 
Duniya is the centre of the attention of her lover, brother and children: 
As the others engaged in polite talk, Duniya thought to herself that little is revealed 
to one directly. Revelations are received from out of a mist of doubts, in caves, in 
the dark, out of a child’s mouth, or via the wise utterances of an elderly or mad 
person. She decided that her own epiphanic instant had occurred at a moment, on a 
morning, when a story chose to tell itself to her, through her, a story whose clarity 
was contained in the creative utterance, Let there be a man, and there was a story 
(Gifts 240-1). 
 This passage reverberates in various ways. It constitutes one dimension of the metafictional 
twist of the ending which self-reflexively transforms the entire novel into a purely fictional 
tale a woman tells herself one morning on the way to work, lonely for love. In other words, 
the entire novel is simply the story Duniya tells herself while walking to work. But it 
suggests also the fact that finally in Gifts the only pure gift is art itself since only art 
guarantees radical freedom of autonomy. The story is the only “epiphanic” gift in the novel.  
The profundity of this move is allusively suggested. The epiphany of art is the 
revelation of the pure, untrammeled moral freedom of the creative individual which creates 
no ties which bind, no ligatures, no obligatory exchanges, no circles or cycles. This is 











Revelation received in a cave refers to the divine message received by the prophet 
Muhammad in a cave on Mount Hira. Duniya’s creative utterance, “Let there be a man, and 
there was a story” echoes the Qur’anic formulation in which God’s creative power is 
conveyed. This utterance is repeated five times in the Qur’an: “We but say the Word, “Be”, 
and it is” (2:117, 16:40, 36:82, 40:68, 54:50). The prerogative to create here passes to the 
artist, whose work of art morally validates itself. In Gifts, the novel itself is the only pure gift 
which is liberatory. This strategy for resolution of contradiction is discussed in more detail in 
the analysis of modernism in the next chapter.  
 But the gift may not present a paradox. The gift is only virtually impossible to 
conceive on an individualist conception of the person and the person’s social relations. On a 
rather different view, the gift may not create the circle from which the individual must break 
free. The social exchange represented by the gift may be the prior enabling condition for the 
constitution of the person. The circle inscribed by prestation and counter-prestation may be 
precisely that which allows rather than precludes freedom – but that is a story which the 
novel constitutively is unable to tell.  
 
To conclude this chapter, one might make the following observations: After From a Crooked 
Rib, Farah appears to abandon the classical Bildungsroman form. Subsequent novels with 
central female protagonists appear to challenge some of the assumptions of the genre in its 
classical form. On the face of it, Sardines and Gifts appear to be dissensual novels of 
development. However, these novels, which bear all the features of the gynocentric 
Bildungsroman, in fact, do not critique, but appear to resolve the contradiction of the 











autonomous subjectivity, these novels negotiate two different strategies for resolving the 
contradiction encountered by the novel of formation. The novel of autonomous development 
is structurally bound to submit to socialization, a submission it yields to – ironically. 
Sardines attempts to escape this dilemma idealistically and Gifts presents a formal solution 
to the contradiction. If society represents the brake to potentially unlimited individual 
freedom, then the protagonist of Sardines, who does not compromise, must construct society 
itself anew. We encounter the idealism of this solution again in Farah’s most recent novel, 
Knots, to be analyzed in the final chapter. Gifts follows the path of lesser resistance. If it 
proves impossible to extricate its protagonist from social gift-giving exchanges, then the 
novel allows the irony of this realization to reflect upon itself. The solution is purely formal. 
Contradiction is resolved through textuality. The novel is only a story the heroine 
solipsistically tells to herself. This strategy for the evasion of the contradiction contained in 






















Modernism in A Naked Needle and Sweet and Sour Milk: Morality and the 
Aesthetic 
 
The analysis of Gifts in the previous chapter suggested resolution of the contradiction of 
individualist subject formation through the principle of textuality. Aesthetic resolution of the 
inherent contradiction of individualism, in fact, achieves its clearest expression in a much 
earlier novel, namely, A Naked Needle. The techniques of modernism employed in this novel 
ultimately allow form, the aesthetic, to represent the higher order which realism could not, 
without tension, allow to emerge from the autonomous self. 
Literary modernism is probably the most significant influence on the novels of 
Nuruddin Farah. With the exception of From a Crooked Rib which shares realism’s 
preoccupation with presenting a convincing character who constructs a moral order from 
reason and personal experience, the subsequent novels draw on the techniques of the 
“postindividualist” order scripted by modernism. Modernism informs Farah’s novels in 
various ways. Farah’s composition of his novels as trilogies, which as a series fully explore 
particular themes, is influenced by Samuel Beckett’s trilogy. Many of the epigraphs which 
introduce the novels and sections of novels are drawn from the works of modernist writers 
like Yeats and Conrad. Often in their structure, the novels allude to other modernist novels. 
A case in point is the similarity of the structure of Sardines to Virginia Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway, referred to in more detail in the earlier discussion of the transformation of the 











A broad fascination with literary modernism is articulated most clearly through its 
Irish manifestation. The allusion to Richard Burton’s reference in First Footsteps in East 
Africa to the Somali as the “Irish of Africa” (98) is more than just  incidental intertextuality. 
The Irish colonial experience, in particular the aesthetic modes it generates, appears for 
Farah to hold considerable value in the constitution of an ideal Somali polity. In the most 
recent novels, Links and Knots, the Celtic experience is physically embodied in the hirsute, 
Dedalian craftsman-figure, Seamus. In Knots, furthermore, modernism, expressed through 
the medium of theatre, where the stage and the props are quite literally constructed by the 
Irish character, appears to hold the utopian potential to build an alternative Somali 
community. So, although this chapter focuses on modernism in A Naked Needle and to a 
lesser extent on Sweet and Sour Milk, the observations made here are relevant to all of the 
novels after From a Crooked Rib. In other words, A Naked Needle hones the modernist 
techniques which inform the novels which follow. 
 
I Individualism and Textuality in A Naked Needle 
A Naked Needle is the novel in which Farah is at his most experimental. It is also the novel 
which precluded Farah’s return from England to Somalia since it offended the military 
regime even though the dictator, Siyad Barre, is the single figure who escapes the novel’s 
savage iconoclasm, a premature endorsement not to be repeated in any of the other novels. 
Barre is referred by the avuncular moniker, “the Old Man”: “The Old Man is decent, honest, 
wishes to leave behind a name, wishes to do something for the country – […]” (80). In a case 
of the real world imitating fiction, A Naked Needle is the novel which results in Farah’s 











Interestingly, A Naked Needle, Farah’s most modernist novel is also the novel which he has 
not permitted to be reprinted, perhaps for its premature endorsement of a ruthless regime; or 
perhaps for its parody of misogyny which Farah suspects may escape his readership and jar 
with his reputation as “the leading writer in Africa in feminist consciousness [sic]” (Ngugi 
716).  
 On the face of it, a wide gulf separates Farah’s first novel from his second. From a 
Crooked Rib traced through its unlettered heroine the journey from country to city which 
simultaneously constitutes individual and nation. A Naked Needle, by contrast, focalized 
through a cynical young man, is a hyperurban novel which challenges both autonomous self 
and nation. Farah’s novels condense within the space of roughly three years, an apparently 
radical transformation in consciousness which in Europe had to await three centuries. In 
these two novels, within a  truncated period, the transition is made from the proto-realism of 
Moll Flanders to the modernism of Ulysses.  
Although Farah categorically denies the influence of Joyce’s Ulysses on A Naked 
Needle (Ewan 198), however, whether intended or not, the similarities are too striking to go 
unnoticed and indeed have been noticed in criticism of the novel (Adam “Nuruddin Farah 
and James Joyce: Some Issues of Intertextuality”). We discover that Koschin, the protagonist 
of the novel, has done a thesis on Joyce and that a woman he bumps into on the street reads 
Finnegans Wake  as her “nightcap” (52). The onomatopoeia of the sound made by Leopold 
Bloom’s cat which, in its strange phonic configuration, draws attention to itself through its 
signal lack of mimesis is echoed in the sound of the sloshing of water in a pail which 
Koschin finally does not use to clean himself despite his landlady’s disgust that he stinks: 











Like Ulysses, A Naked Needle alludes to and parodies Aristotelean unity of time. Both 
novels cover the events of around twenty four hours in a postcolonial city, but while the 
unity of time in the Aristotelean universe imitates the integrity, the order which exists in the 
world, in these postcolonial novels, the meaning of life is elusive. In various ways in 
Koschin, the central character of A Naked Needle, Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus 
merge. Koschin is a disillusioned, cosmopolitan schoolteacher who, at the opening of the 
narrative, awaits the arrival from England of his wife to be, Nancy Stonegrave. In a moment 
of thoughtlessness, he had promised Nancy in a bar in London that if neither of them had 
met their partners within two years, they would marry each other. Nancy comes to Somalia 
to see this promise fulfilled. In the retrospective first person “Prelude” to the novel, Koschin 
remarks: “My marital status. I mean, am I married? The frank, honest-to-God answer to this 
is: I don’t know.” Koschin then muses on the legally binding nature of promises made “when 
one is skyriding.” One thus reads the novel’s parody of marital fidelity through Ulysses’s 
parody of the marital fidelity of Odysseus and Penelope. Bloom, of course, is no larger than 
life hero and Molly is far from faithful. The first part of the narrative, like Stephen’s 
perambulations in Dublin, describes Koschin’s wanderings through Mogadiscio. If 
Bloomsday is Joyce’s immortalization of his walk with Nora Barnacle to Sandymount Strand 
on 16 June 1904 (Norris vii), then Bloomsday is repeated in the walking tour Koschin takes 
Nancy on when she finally arrives. Joyce’s Dublin  is re-configured in Farah’s Mogadiscio 
as the respective heroes of the two novels wander around the streets of the city.  
Franco Moretti suggests that the mode of consciousness represented by Bloom 
embodies the ethos of capitalism in its consumerist phase: 
Words words words words. It is a bombardment that no one expects, and 











concentration: the old virtues are worse than useless. Instead of harmonizing with 
advertising, they perceive it as an irritating noise. A different style is required, in 
order to find one’s way in the city of words; a weaker grammar than that of 
consciousness; an edgy discontinuous syntax: a cubism of language, as it were. 
And the stream of consciousness offers precisely that: simple fragmented 
sentences, where the subject withdraws to make room for the invasion of things; 
paratactical paragraphs with the doors flung wide, and always enough room for one 
more sentence, and one more stimulus. (Modern Epic 135). 
 Although A Naked Needle does not adopt full stream of consciousness, nevertheless, 
parodic references to Bloom’s enchanted consumerist metropolis abound, for example: 
“Candy cans, all sorts of cans. Cans of Italian manufacture, fish bones crushed into tins, and 
human skins worked into wrappers” (22). A new note which enters A Naked Needle, 
however, is the sense that, in the specific context of postcolonial Mogadiscio, one is being 
led on a walking tour which is an uncomfortable parody of history as a kind of cultural 
tourism.  
Lennard Davis remarks upon the “ugliness” of modernist heroes, a repulsiveness he 
suggests might be intended to disallow realist identification with character, enabling full 
focus on form (Davis 124). Koschin obliges in this respect. Although a member of the 
Mogadiscio elite, as we realize through the description of the party he takes Nancy to in the 
closing section of the novel, Koschin nevertheless lives in squalid conditions in a brothel and 
never washes his underwear since “it is more economical this way” (4). The walk Koschin 
takes Nancy on is motivated by his reluctance to take her to his squalid home. In order to 
avoid taking her to his home, he also calls on friends. When he does take her to his room, it 











At his most experimental, Farah is not quite as experimental as Joyce. Ulysses calls 
into question realism’s constitution of the consciousness of the individual, autonomous hero 
through presenting three subjects not one, namely, Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom and 
Molly Bloom. A Naked Needle, by contrast, presents only the consciousness of its single 
hero, Koschin Qowdhan. Similarly, Farah draws back from the full exploration of 
fragmentation witnessed in Joyce. Where epiphany in Portrait of the Artist is developed 
through interior monologue into full stream of consciousness, A Naked Needle, as was 
mentioned above, moves from first person to third person narration with focalization through 
Koschin sometimes approaching interior monologue. 
 But modernism in A Naked Needle is reflected also through African modernism. 
Modernism in the African novel may be widely or narrowly defined. David I. Ker in The 
African Novel and the Modernist Tradition adopts the viewpoint that modernist despair 
allows the African novelist the critical lens through which to challenge both the precolonial 
and postcolonial worlds. The concept of modernism with which Ker operates is wide enough 
to include writers like Soyinka, Armah, Awoonor and Okara, on the one hand, but also (and 
somewhat surprisingly) Achebe and Ngugi, on the other. Simon Gikandi in Reading the 
African Novel (72-110) interprets modernism in the African novel rather more narrowly. For 
Gikandi, the critical stance towards pre- and post-colonial social conditions is insufficient in 
itself to constitute modernism. Novelistic modernism involves, crucially, the use of the 
formal techniques of modernism with the necessary philosophical underpinnings of these 
techniques. Gikandi does however find, primarily through a reading of Soyinka and Armah, 
that modernism in the African novel does not leave the author as expressed by Joyce, “… 











modernists are not formalists. In A Naked Needle, self-conscious scatological imagery 
associates the novel with Armah’s The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born. There are also 
references to Christopher Okigbo and we are informed that Soyinka’s The Interpreters is 
Koschin’s “favourite novel of the year” (46). In some ways Koschin models himself on 
Soyinka’s hero, Sekoni, whom we come most significantly to know in the space of twenty 
four hours in the first part of The Interpreters.  
What liberatory potential does Farah identify in modernism? Simon Gikandi suggests 
that modernism allows Farah to go “beyond the discourse of cultural nationalism and 
identity” (“Postcolonial Textuality” 753). How do the techniques of modernism permit a 
projection beyond identitarian politics? Gikandi proposes that “modernist style […] 
privileges an interiorized private narrative over the collective myths of the Somali people 
…” (754). The wholly subjective perspective of Farah’s novel is suggested by the gestures it 
makes towards the stream of consciousness ultimately engendered in Ulysses. A Naked 
Needle moves from first person narration to third person with a focalization so intense that 
the boundary between third person narration and interior monologue is blurred.  
The interiorized, individualized, private style of narrative does not only, however, 
make critique of all community based on identity a structural possibility. The implicit 
consequence also is the alienation of the hero from community in any sense. The epic hero, 
Odysseus, is exiled from his wife, Penelope, and from his kingdom, Ithaca. But there is an 
order in the universe dictated by the Gods. Odysseus is not exiled from this order and 
through this order is bound in community with his crew. The hero of the realist novel is 
exiled from the meaning of life, which he then has to locate for himself, within himself. But 











with the social code. But the compromise is “tautologically and teleologically” revealed to 
be the product of individual free choice. Thus, while the hero of the realist novel is exiled 
from an external order, the hero of the modernist novel, by contrast, is exiled from other 
people.  
The modernist novel hero is in this sense more fundamentally alienated than the 
realist hero. Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom and Koschin Qowdhan are exiled from 
society through the apparent liberation of a radically individuated horizon embodied in the 
interior, subjective narrative. In Lukács’s terms, the modernist novel finally installs as truth 
the “distortion” of the realist novel which locates a social idea of virtue internally (Realism 
in Our Time 33). Modernism realizes the epiphanic, not by working through the compromise 
realism is obliged to accept, but by projecting the higher order onto form itself. If the 
individualist ethos is forced in the realist novel to justify the social code, the modernist ethos 
denies the existence of ethics altogether. On this paradigm, the aesthetic comes to embody 
morality. Inherent in modernism thus is not only critique of the epic world of tradition, or the 
individualist world of the nation-state, but critique of any higher order which is not the 
higher order of art. Modernism in Farah thus allows not only the critique of tradition and the 
manipulation of tradition by nationalism, but constitutively critiques every position which 
does not order itself around the infinite irony of modernist art.  
This leads one to Gikandi’s second significant point. For Gikandi, in its interiority 
and subjectivity, Farah’s politics of writing resemble the practice of Soyinka and Armah. 
But, for Gikandi, Farah proceeds beyond the other African modernists in assuming the 
strategies of what he terms the “avant-garde”, namely: “…promotion of the innovative and 











content; and the use of art to dissolve and hence pluralize the postcolonial experience” (756). 
Gikandi’s description of the techniques of the avant-garde draws the avant-garde pretty close 
to postmodern textuality and hybridity. But Gikandi here is tapping into the almost 
indistinguishable distinction between the modern and the postmodern. The fuzzy boundary 
between modernity and postmodernity is clearly evident in Ulysses and, through Ulysses, A 
Naked Needle. This instability is reflected also in the fact that what, for Gikandi, quite 
unquestionably is modernist technique in A Naked Needle, for Derek Wright, quite 
unquestionably constitutes postmodern strategy (“The Postmodern Landscapes”).  
What is suggested in this chapter, thus, is that there is no sharp distinction between 
the modern and the postmodern, particularly in Joyce’s novels, which appear the strongest 
influence on A Naked Needle. What distinguishes the “postmodern” novel is perhaps only a 
“banalization” or “routinization” of the transformation instantiated by the modernist novel. 
The materiality of the signifier embodied in Finnegans Wake, the novel which takes the 
techniques explored in Ulysses to their conclusion, is only gestured towards by subsequent 
“postmodern” novels like John Barth’s Chimera or Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a 
traveler…, with their multiple beginnings, multiple endings, characters who reveal 
themselves to be writing themselves into existence and so on.   
One must recapitulate again the compromise necessitated by From a Crooked Rib’s 
experiment with realism in order to appreciate the release permitted by modernism in A 
Naked Needle. The protagonist, Ebla, as fully explored in an earlier chapter, comes to accept 
all of the individual constraints of marriage, the escape from which has been the substance of 
the entire novel. One of the men she marries is as old and fat and rich as the husband chosen 











at closure different from the marriage at narrative opening is the fact that these marriages are 
all unions of Ebla’s own “free” will. She submits to the social contract, not through 
obligation, but through her own self-constituting freedom. The realist novel formally 
compensates for this compromise with sociality through irony. Critical difficulty in 
determining whether From a Crooked Rib has a “happy” or “sad” ending is balanced on a 
knife edge by irony in the tone and structure of the conclusion. Irony operates to critique the 
compromise in closure, but it constitutes a critique which suggests no alternative higher 
order as Hayden White suggests in Metahistory: 
… the trope of Irony … provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode of 
thought which is radically self-critical with respect not only to a given 
characterization of the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture 
adequately the truth of things in language. It is, in short, a model of the linguistic 
protocol in which skepticism in thought and relativism in ethics are conventionally 
expressed. (37-8) 
Farah’s first novel exemplifies Lukács’s observation in The Theory of the Novel that 
irony is “the normative mentality of the [realist] novel” (84). Since the person can only be 
constituted in orientation to a moral order and since the moral order, like language, can only 
be social, the project of the realist novel, to constitute the ethical out of the autonomous self, 
necessarily must encounter contradiction. Irony is the realist novel’s necessary response to 
this contradiction. Lukács suggests furthermore that irony is “the objectivity of the novel” 
(90). Since “objective” virtue no longer exists in an external horizon but is constituted 
independently within, irony comes to embody the ontic or transcendental component: 
For the novel, irony consists in this freedom of the writer in his relationship to 
God, the transcendental condition of the objectivity of form-giving. Irony, with 











God; irony sees the lost, utopian home of the idea that has become an ideal, and yet 
at the same time it understands that the ideal is subjectively and psychologically 
conditioned, because that is its only form of existence; irony, itself demonic, 
apprehends the demon that is within the subject as a metasubjective essentiality, 
and therefore, when it speaks of the adventures of errant souls in an inessential, 
empty reality, it intuitively speaks of past gods and gods that are yet to come; irony 
has to seek the only world that is adequate to it along the via dolorosa of 
interiority, but is doomed never to find it there; … (Lukács 93). 
Lukács suggests in this highly lyrical passage the compensation irony makes for the loss of a 
higher order which is in some way still present. Irony thus is a constitutive element of the 
novel form.  
When modernism liberates the novel to reflect on its own form, irony becomes 
infinite. In Ihab Hassan’s terms, irony severs the bond with the metaphysical (592). Alan 
Wilde distinguishes modernist “disjunctive” with postmodern “suspensive” irony, but this 
distinction is hard to maintain in Joyce and in A Naked Needle. Thus the transition from 
realist to modernist novel is the transition from irony to infinite irony. Infinite irony is epic 
totality uncontradictorily reconstituted in an endlessly self-reflexive aesthetic.  
A Naked Needle gestures towards this release in various ways one of which is the 
predominance of the musical motif in the novel. Walter Pater in The Renaissance suggests 
that “all art constantly aspires to the condition of music” (135). In a gloss on this 
observation, Perry Meisel notes that art’s inherent desire to the state of music is the desire for 
pure form, absolutely perfect since it exists without semantic content (54). This ideal is 
reflected also in Schopenhauer. Since music (without words) represents “the will itself” 
(emphasis in original),  and not the will’s “objectification” in ideas, music appears to 











embodies the disembodiment of music, it achieves an ideal unity, making it both whole and 
transparent. In other words, the aspiration to the condition of music is an aspiration for a 
totality which is so complete that totality effaces itself. The incarnation of art as music 
renders the ideology of the aesthetic “unideological”.  
The drift towards the condition of music is evident in both Ulysses and through 
Ulysses  is apparent in A Naked Needle. References to music abound in Ulysses and “Sirens” 
is commonly regarded as the section which, in its structure and use of language, seeks to 
imitate music. In its division into “Prelude” and six “Movements”, A Naked Needle appears 
to be conceived as a musical score. The attempt of language in onomatopoeia to embody 
sound noted in the parody of the sound of water sloshing in a pail, is highlighted by 
Koschin’s reference to feeling better: “… in spite of the pain in the out-of-tune  chord of his 
unmusical age” (10). When finally he meets Nancy, Koschin significantly offers the walking 
tour of Mogadiscio as a gesture of appreciation for her gift to him of music: 
- And did you know that I’ve brought you Beethoven tapes? 
- What? 
- Beethoven and Bach tapes … and the difficulty that I had to     
go through to get them taped, from BBC and other sources! 
- You are … 
- No I am not. It’s true. Just open that case. 
- How marvelous! A miracle! Beethoven! (86). 
While other forms of music are referred to in the text, including the Somali performer, 
Mariam Mursal, who eclectically mixes various traditions, and contemporary popular music 
like James Brown and Simon and Garfunkel, it is only wordless orchestral music, itself 
possessed of a very specific history, which appears to hold the symbolic potential in this 











 A Naked Needle similarly aestheticizes both time and space. The epic constructs time 
through space as an endless cycle symbolized by Odysseus’s exile from home and return to 
home. Epic time and space are transcendentally shaped by the gods who observe the drama 
of life from on high. The realist novel constructs time through space as teleology, where the 
novel hero constitutes both world and identity in self-validating progressive development. 
Perhaps the spirit of the Ulysses of this moment of modernity is best captured in a poem. 
Alfred Tennyson’s persona “Ulysses” no longer is Homer’s Ulysses. Tennyson’s hero 
embodies the fascination with the energy and dynamism of youth commented on by Moretti 
in an earlier chapter. Tennyson’s hero returns home; but the meaning of life is not complete. 
The circle is not completed since meaning is contained within the hero himself. He must 
journey on, moved by the restless instability of the obsessional pursuit of individual ideal, 
despite the faithful wife, Penelope, the son, Telemachus, and the subjects who would have 
him home. The contradiction of Tennyson’s Ulysses between individual freedom and 
socialization is dissolved in Joyce’s Ulysses. Modernism transforms and flattens time and 
space through the aestheticizing experience of the alienated hero. For Stephen Dedalus and 
Leopold Bloom, the meaning of life is no longer divinely guaranteed; nor are they possessed 
of the singular drive of the hero as individual. Meaning for the modernist hero is contained in 
infinite ironic reflection of meaning itself. Dedalus and Bloom are ironic incarnations of 
Odysseus in a text which casts a self-reflexive ironic glance at its own heroes.  
 In A Naked Needle, the break with epic time and space, and the apparent break with 
teleological time and space is formalized through a symbolic event at narrative opening. 
Koschin’s clock stops: 
Koschin now gets out of bed, and barefooted he walks over to the door, turns 











holds it near his ear: it has stopped. He winds the clock and sets it down without 
altering the position of the arms. He snickers at the idea of being either on time or 
late because of a timepiece, man-made, a convenience. What a farce! The 
continuum, the continuity of one’s efficacy, if you like, he thinks. And he looks the 
clock in the face. She responds to him: the tongue ticks, the tongue talks, in terms 
of identifying time in space. But what does McLuhan call clocks? An extension of 
the mind? Or the eye? The latter certainly sound more logical (3). 
Despite the clock’s expiring ticks in this sequence, it, in fact, has stopped as we are informed  
three pages later in an exchange of insults between Koschin and his landlady when he asks 
her the time. The clock has stopped. The cycles inscribed by the hand of time in space are 
terminated. The circle of life which inspires with meaning the existence of the hero, 
Odysseus, in A Naked Needle, which reflects Ulysses’s reflection of Homer’s epic, no longer 
revolves. The ring of life ceases to define the bounds of human existence. There is something 
in Farah’s conjunction of time, space and individuality suggestive of what Charles Taylor 
refers to as D.H. Lawrence’s “ ‘Dionysiac’ conception of life” conveyed in the idea that: 
“Our ready-made individuality, our identity is no more than an accidental cohesion in the 
flux of time” (Sources of the Self 463). 
 Time and space, of course, are experienced through the human being, as the quote 
from Lawrence suggests. How does modernism represent the person? Koschin in A Naked 
Needle, quite clearly is an ironic reflection of himself as textual creation. The novel opens 
with the disclaimer which alludes to Beckett’s “No symbols where none intended”: “No real 
characters where none is intended. / No true incidents where none is mentioned.” (emphasis 
in original). One reads the character of Koschin, not as one did the character of Ebla as a 
textual representation of a real person. One reads Koschin mimetically, but a mimesis of 











Koschin also imitates Soyinka’s Sekoni. Through the allusions in Ulysses to the Divine 
Comedy Koschin also imitates Dante’s pilgrim who journeys through the circles of hell to 
reach heaven on the other side. Parodically, the woman who cooks for Koschin, in a kind of 
hell agony sweating over her fire, reminds him of the “Angel in the Fourth Circle of the 
Heavens” (8). There are numerous references in the text to Dante’s Inferno which will 
provide the central intertextual allusion in the later novel, Links, including a misquotation of 
the first stanza of the Divine Comedy, when Koschin’s female friend, Meyran, invites him 
into her apartment (48). Similarly, when invited to the apartment of the American woman 
married to a Somali, Koschin browses through the books on a shelf in the living room, which 
include the African Writers Series of which A Naked Needle, featuring protagonist Koschin, 
is a part (56). Mimesis here is not the attempt to represent world or subject, but the attempt 
to expose world and subject as reflections of other reflections.  
 Despite the apparent liberation of the “metaphysical” truth of textuality, that world 
and subject are only ever constructs, A Naked Needle, like its precursor text Ulysses, bases 
its transformation of identity on the Enlightenment model of the disengaged subject. In other 
words, it is the “distortion” of a “distortion”. Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses is the resolution of 
the problematic Bildung of Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. If epiphany in the most 
well-known Kunstlerroman is an uneasy compromise with the Catholic traditionalism Joyce 
seeks to escape, then in the pure aestheticism of Ulysses, in particular, the stream of 
consciousness which replaces epiphany, Joyce finds the escape from the bind. The 
developmental Bildung’s  process of Portrait is retrospectively parodied through Stephen 
Dedalus in Ulysses. Stephen’s life history can only be known through the earlier book and 











Koschin Qowdhan, by contrast, carries his autobiography, the story of his Bildung in 
his pocket, along with two letters (41) and his cigarettes (27). Unlike Stephen Dedalus’s 
biography to which we have access, A Naked Needle does not give any clues to the contents 
of Koschin’s autobiography. Koschin’s reference to Goethe (5) suggests a familiarity with 
the Humanitatsideal encompassed by German Romanticism. We know also that Koschin’s 
“autobiographical sketch” (41) is the “longest piece he has ever written” (24), so presumably 
it is longer than his thesis on Joyce. We also know that it is addressed “TO WHOSOEVER 
HAPPENS TO BE THE READER [sic]” (emphasis in original) (24). In a significantly self-
reflexive move, it is Koschin himself who repeatedly in the novel reflects on his own 
development. It is Koschin, the character constructed out of fragments of other literary 
characters, who repeatedly reads his own Bildungsroman. In the course of the novel, we 
know that he reads his autobiography three times. The reading seems never to be completed.  
If the narrative of A Naked Needle represents the self-realization of the Bildung 
begun in the autobiography, then it is a self-fulfillment which gets rid of the contradiction of 
the idealist Bildungsroman through allowing form to carry the burden of morality which 
constitutively cannot be constructed out of an individualist philosophy. Koschin, in the 
modernist novel, solves the recalcitrant problem of individual development which must 
accede to social morality in the realist novel, by projecting morality itself onto form. Since 
Koschin never really lives life, only reads it indefinitely in an infinitely spinning circle, 
closure, resolution, the contradiction of the encounter with a social morality need never 
occur. 
 The protagonist of A Naked Needle is closer in age, gender and social status to the 











higher education, cosmopolitan experience and a member of the Mogadiscio elite, close to 
political power. The protagonist of this novel thus appears fundamentally different from the 
protagonist of Farah’s first published novel, the non-literate nomadic girl, Ebla. But in other 
ways, the two characters are similar. Koschin and Ebla are both radical individualists, 
finding meaning within, in a society which, in general, locates value in social and 
transcendental higher orders. They both share in the paradoxical social disadvantage and 
freedom of being orphans. As Stephen Kellman suggests, in the modernist “self-begetting” 
novel, the hero is either a “bastard or an orphan” who “inherits nothing, not even a father and 
must alone create his identity” (1251). The modernist hero quite literally conceives himself, 
another motif which will recur in Farah’s later novels. No mention is made of Koschin’s 
father and his mother we discover died while he was still young (45). He is located neither in 
space nor time. He suggests in an imagined dialogue with Nancy that: “…I know neither the 
date nor the day of my birth. A man of no ‘precise’ past, …” (2).  
If Koschin quite literally is a self-begetting hero who avidly shares the fantasy of 
many other modernist heroes of creating or giving birth to himself, he also symbolically 
disengages  from transcendental and social horizons. In one of the opening tableaux which, 
juxtaposed, construct the collage of the narrative, Koschin in an ineffective flutter attempts 
to quell his fear and anxiety at Nancy’s imminent arrival. He searches for an old leather 
bound amulet given to him by his mother before he died which “had been tied round his arm 
to protect him from the molestations of the bad eye” (5). His mother wanted him to keep it 
on his person always. He finds the amulet in the drawer of a table littered with “half-read” 
books. He tears the amulet open with his teeth, believing the scripture within to contain a 











Koschin tries “to read, to decipher the handwriting of the Sheikh, mysterious, quite 
unyielding […]” (6). While Koschin is a reader, while he is able to read all of the texts which 
construct both himself and his solipsistic world, the  transcendental signifier for him holds no 
revelation. He cannot read the sacred signs – except for the first letter, “Aleph!”, which in 
form imitates the number “one” , the symbol of the transcendental unity. Upon “reading” this 
letter, Koschin “throws the ‘mini-scripture’ aside, and walks away”, believing it to be one of 
the “Leftovers from superstition” (6). (In relinquishing this amulet, Koschin also, of course, 
frees himself from his ties to the mother. He dissociates himself from his biological origin. 
Now, he has no mother and no father. He can be seen to give birth to himself. He is more 
than just a self-fashioner, he is a self-engenderer.)   
Koschin similarly symbolically disengages from social origin. Again in a highly 
symbolic set-piece, Koschin turns away a clan elder who approaches him for a contribution 
towards blood compensation on behalf of a member of the diya paying group of which 
Koschin forms a part: 
- Do you want me to leave empty- handed?   
- I want you to go as you came … 
- Empty-handed? 
- … with your walking stick in your hand. Just as you came … 
- Not a cent? 
- And to tell the other members of your tribe that I owe no loyalty to any tribe, 
and never have (14-15).  
Thus, in both Ebla and Koschin, Farah constructs characters who are fundamentally free to 
narrate their own existences.  
But structurally also there are similarities in the two novels which are hard to miss. 











early hours of morning in their respective homes. Their life journey takes them out of their 
homes. Ebla’s self-realization is apparently teleological. Her trajectory, along which she is 
propelled by the individual drive to find meaning in life through experience, catapults her 
from tradition to modernity. In order for the novel to end, she has to find another home. Her 
home at the end is seemingly different from her home at the beginning of the narrative, since 
at the end she makes her own home. But the “home” which she finds for herself in the social 
contract of marriage is uncannily similar to the traditional marriage arranged in the home she 
has escaped. The return of the social order at closure is formally registered as irony in the 
novel. In A Naked Needle, the teleology of realist Bildung is replaced by the circle, the 
serpent with its tail in its own mouth. The novel self-consciously ends where it begins – with 
the social contract of marriage.  
With the resolution of A Naked Needle, Koschin, at the end of his odyssey, returns 
home. Koschin’s return home is a parody read through Ulysses of the return of Odysseus to 
Ithaca. Odysseus’s return is the closing of the circle of life. He returns home to the faithful 
Penelope after his perilous twenty year exile and the defeat of the greedy suitors. The sealing 
of the ring of life is exalted in the triumph of the closing bedroom scene. The rootedness of 
Odysseus in a set of relations out of which he finds his orientation is symbolized by the 
marital bed which is not a bed – it is the base of a huge tree which Odysseus himself had 
carved, a fact known only to Penelope, proving to her that the “stranger” is her husband. By 
contrast, Koschin drags his Penelope (Nancy) around with him on his odyssey all over 
Mogadiscio and makes her pay for the taxi fare to boot. The return home is a farcical 
reenactment of the hero’s return from exile. Nancy and Koschin return home to Koschin’s 











is sent up through the ridiculous as Koschin and Nancy exchange inane conversation about 
shifting the mess off the bed and finding pyjamas in the dark. The circle of life for Koschin 
quite literally begins and ends, much like it does for  Goncharov’s character Oblomov, in the 
bed of sloth. There is no consummation in the sense both of achieving satisfying resolution 
or in the legal marital sense since Nancy is “not much of a woman tonight” (180). The pair 
drop off to sleep with the saccharine closing exchange, “Sleep well, Nancy, he says. Sleep 
well, Koschin dear, she says” (181). But closure circles one back to Koschin’s protestations 
in the “Prelude”: 
My marital status. I mean, am I married? The frank honest-to-God answer to this 
is: I don’t know. There has been a promise, yes, a promise I made to some woman, 
yes. A word I committed myself to, yes, there is. But whether such a promise, a 
word uttered on the spur of an emotional moment, when one is skyriding, whether 
such a word is legally binding, I have no idea.  
Thus, while Ebla is obliged to limit individual freedom through entering the social contract 
of marriage, Koschin’s individual freedom remains unfettered since the ring of life just keeps 
on spinning. He is “married” but he is also not married, the end of the story returns to the 
beginning and the beginning presupposes the end. The irony with which closure in the realist 
novel is charged, in the modernist text, is transformed into an ironic reflection on irony itself. 
What comes to matter in the modernist permutation of the contradiction presented to the 
realist novel, is not so much making social morality appear to emanate from the autonomous 
individual. What matters is literariness itself. The aesthetic comes to bear the burden of 
morality. But in bearing the burden of morality, morality is a burden no longer. When 











 This is the source of the unease with modernism in both Georg Lukács and Raymond 
Williams. Modernism, through deflecting the higher order onto the aesthetic, effectively cuts 
the anchor on a sociality to which realism was tied, even though the bond was occluded by 
contradiction. Lukács suggests vis a vis  modernist fragmentation: “Attenuation of reality 
and dissolution of personality are thus interdependent: the stronger the one, the stronger the 
other. Underlying both is the consistent lack of a consistent view of human nature. Man is 
reduced to a sequence of unrelated experiential fragments; he is as inexplicable to others as 
to himself” (Realism in Our Time 26). Raymond Williams’s criticism of modernism which 
emerges most strongly in The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists, similarly 
rests upon the necessary social horizon of realism. Williams suggests that “… there is a kind 
of moral analysis in which society is a background” for the development of the hero or 
where society “is the creator of virtues and vices” (The English Novel 44). The moral 
analysis Williams refers to is the negotiation of ethical horizons in the realist novel. In 
“finding a place and making a settlement” (The Long Revolution 313), the realist hero 
inhabits, but also crucially denies, in affirmation of the inward ethics of individual identity, a 
social moral horizon.  
This is a point which both Lukács and Williams fail to perceive. Individualism 
occupies the paradoxical position in the thought of both analysts of being the triumphal 
product of middle class hegemony, but which can only fully be  realized in a classless 
society. In other words individualism is the culmination of human development which 
emerges under capitalism but which may only uncontradictorily be realized in a socialist 
order. This is the impact of the statement by Lenin quoted by Lukács: “Lenin once remarked 











Time 105). Lenin, of course, draws on the ambiguity in Marx clearly observed by Marshall 
Berman: “… the humanistic ideal of self-development grows out of the emerging reality of 
bourgeois economic development. Thus, for all Marx’s invective against the bourgeois 
economy, he embraces enthusiastically the personality structure that this economy has 
produced” (96). What is not recognized by either Lukács or Williams but which emerges 
from Charles Taylor’s analysis is that the social value prized by both authors is the product 
not of capitalist individualism, but of pre-individualist social orders in which the person was 
oriented against a socio-transcendental horizon. Social value is the product of engaged, 
embedded beings in an enchanted world. 
 
II The Existential Question in Sweet and Sour Milk   
A Naked Needle represents Farah at his most experimental. In his subsequent novel, Sweet 
and Sour Milk, Farah integrates the central transformations enabled by modernist technique 
to structure a modernist take on the detective novel. A Naked Needle responds to the central 
question posed by individualism – Who am I? – with the suggestion that the person is the 
refracted reflection of other textual representations. Sweet and Sour Milk indirectly asks the 
question in the context of a mystery. Soyaan has died. He has died in mysterious 
circumstances which lead his twin brother, Loyaan, to suspect foul play. The central question 
which drives the novel concerns who has killed Soyaan. Attempting to solve the mystery 
posed by this question, leads the twin brother to ask another question – Who was Soyaan? 
Loyaan discovers that despite the congruence of their birth, he does not know his twin at all. 
Soyaan, an economist in the service of the dictatorial regime, appears to have been involved 











“Memorandum” and a short essay which begins “Clowns. Cowards. And (tribal) upstarts” 
(33), provide the clues. In the unfolding of the narrative, the Memorandum is never located 
and the question, “Who killed Soyaan?”, is never satisfactorily answered.  
In his investigation of all the circumstances of his brother’s life and death, Loyaan 
comes face to face with another question. This time the question is “Who am I?” Like 
Koschin before him, who is socially alienated, Loyaan is disengaged from all social origins, 
in this case symbolized by the authoritarian patriarch, Keynaan. As a consequence, the 
question is not easily answered. The question, “Who am I?”, appears to open a vortex into 
which closure is absorbed. The novel ends with a mysterious knock at the door, presumably 
the knock of agents of the security services who will lead the brother away to death, the 
repetition of the murder of his twin. Loyaan’s death also will be shrouded in mystery. The 
cycle will begin again – “Who killed Loyaan?” 
If the central modernist influence in A Naked Needle was Joyce, the central influence 
in Sweet and Sour Milk is Samuel Beckett, although it would be dangerously dogmatic to 
insist on exclusive influence. The main influence in the earlier novel appears to be Joyce, 
however, the epigram “No real characters where none is intended. / No true incidents where 
none is mentioned” appears to be inspired by the final line from Beckett’s Watt, “no symbols 
where none intended” (255). Similarly, the music motif discussed earlier may well come 
from Beckett. Music is so central an element in Beckett’s work that musical scores have 
been written based on his plays. As Kellman suggests, while the modernist hero may stake a 
claim for spontaneous generation,  the modernist text forms part of a tradition, a literary 
tradition, for the most part  patrilinear. Joyce, whose forebears include all representatives of 











Joyce are key influences on Farah. The detective novel element in Sweet and Sour Milk may 
be inspired by Jacques Moran in Beckett’s Molloy. So too the extended and highly poetic 
bicycle allegory which forms the epigraph to the first part of the novel might allude to the 
recurring bicycle motif in Molloy. In Farah, the wheels of the bicycle seem to be allegories 
of the self which has no independence but for the “system”, the “code of behaviour” 
represented by the bicycle frame which enables it. But more significant in Sweet and Sour 
Milk is a Beckett inspired focus on language, which is, in a sense, a progression on Joyce’s 
literary construction of the self. If in Joyce, the self is nothing but other characters recycled, 
then in Beckett the self is the construct, at the bare minimum, of language. This might be the 
motivation in a drama like “Play”, Beckett’s play in one act, which seems to do away with 
character altogether. What is presented are only disembodied voices in urns. In Beckett, 
Woolf’s “room of one’s own” is parodied. Each “character” in its disengaged interiority 
enjoys the privilege of an urn or trash can of his own.  
What distinguishes Sweet and Sour Milk from the other novels, is the Beckett-like 
insistence on the materiality of language. This is forcefully impressed on the reader in one of 
the earliest sequences where Loyaan engages in conversation with the mortally ill Soyaan. 
Their lengthy exchange is interrupted by Soyaan’s unstoppable hiccupping, the obtrusiveness 
of which is suggested by this fragment: “The demystifica-hic-tion of in-hic- formation. Tell 
the hic masses in the simplest hic of terms what is happening. Demystify hic politics. […] 
Uncover whether hiding behind letters such as KGB, CIA, or other hic wicked alphabet of 
mysteries hic. Do you hic understand now hic?” (15).  Through the hiccupping, we, as 
readers, are forced to confront the materiality of the signifier. The signifier, figuratively, 











to allude to and expand on the use made of the hiccup by the “voice” called only “m” in 
Beckett’s one-act play, titled “Play”. The letter “m” furthermore seems to be the secret code 
inscribed in Soyaan’s diary to crack the mystery of his death: “ ‘M to the power of 2.’ What 
does this mean?” (21).  
Farah similarly in Sweet and Sour Milk draws on the trope of silence in Beckett. In 
Beckett, language in its materiality constructs mundane reality. Its opposite, silence, may 
thus embody transcendent nothingness; or silence may encompass a range of possibilities as 
Ihab Hassan suggests in his reading of the dismemberment of Orpheus in the book of the 
same title. In Sweet and Sour Milk, the trope of silence appears to be a form of resistance 
against power construed as a textual construct. As John Williams observes, in Sweet and 
Sour Milk the regime is presented as having the monopoly on the power exerted by the word. 
Thus those who resist must resist with silence. A key scene is one where Loyaan is 
summoned before a government minister to determine how much Loyaan has, in fact, 
figured out about his brother’s death . He strategically uses his own silence, as Williams 
shows, first to agitate the minister, then to foreground silence as a mode of resistance. When 
the minister cannot break Loyaan, the minister frustratedly falls into a silence which 
wrinkles “the Minister’s face into inhuman and voiceless forms” (Williams 170). 
Most significant, however, in Farah’s experiment with modernism in both A Naked 
Needle and Sweet and Sour Milk, is the revelation, in and through the procedures of 
modernism, that the subject is an unstable, literary or linguistic construct. In explorations of 
modernism, Virginia Woolf’s much-endorsed statement that “on or about December, 1910 
human character changed” (Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown 4) needs to be evaluated. It is 











simultaneously liberated the fragmented self from both the autonomous, rational, 
Enlightenment subject, and the sentimentalism of Romantic subjectivity, itself proceeds 
upon the basis of a disengaged identity. Charles Taylor suggests: 
And so a turn inward [referring to modernist interiority], to experience or 
subjectivity, didn’t mean a turn to a self to be articulated, where this is understood 
as an alignment of nature and reason, or instinct and creative power. On the 
contrary, the turn inward may take us beyond the self as usually understood, to a 
fragmentation of experience which calls our ordinary notions of identity into 
question, […] or beyond that to a new kind of unity, a new way of inhabiting time, 
… Indeed, we can see how the notion could arise that an escape from the 
traditional idea of the unitary self was a condition of a true retrieval of lived 
experience (Sources  462). 
What Taylor thus stresses is that modernist fragmentation is not the alternative to autonomy, 
“it is its complement” (Sources 465). 
The fragmented self constructed out of a collage of other fragments purports to 
represent a more authentic identity since it renders contradiction uncontradictory. The 
disengaged self no longer has uneasily to acquiesce to a social morality which it must 
pretend emerges from autonomy. The self recognized by modernism is an identity 
constructed in orientation to a higher order. But now the higher order is art itself. The 
fragmented self is oriented by and constructed out of other representations and itself will in 
turn become the axis and fragment for the autotelic generation of other identities. If the 
realist text seeks to escape the ligature of epic totality through presenting totality as freely 
produced in each individual soul, then the modernist text claims to efface totality in and 
through the aesthetic. The claim is made through modernism in Farah’s novels that in the 











to drive many of the later novels. What this conception occludes, is the origin of this 
resolution in the disengaged identity it purports to challenge. Art, in coming to represent the 
higher order, becomes the ultimate invisible totality.  
 
The following chapter which considers Close Sesame, the final novel of the “Dictatorship” 
trilogy, is tangential to the argument which is left off here and is developed further in 
Chapter 6. The next chapter explores the difficulty encountered when the novel attempts to 
represent a heteronomous subject, rather than autonomous identity and the consequent 


























Close Sesame and the Representation of  Heteronomy 
 
Close Sesame, the final book of the “Dictatorship” trilogy, is unique in Farah’s corpus. To 
capture what makes this novel exceptional it is necessary to be reminded of the constitutive 
presupposition of the classic realist novel, which modernism and postmodernism, through 
the specific terms of abrogation, ironically reaffirm. The realist novel may better be 
distinguished against the genre of the epic which it replaced. The epic is the story of how the 
hero is lost but finally returns “home” to a transcendent truth. The realist novel, by contrast, 
tells the story of how the hero apparently returns “home” to the “transcendent truth” within a 
disengaged self. Character and plot merge to become indistinguishable. The novel, in its 
defining articulation as Bildungsroman, is the modern cultural form which naturalizes and 
normalizes the subject as individual (Slaughter “Enabling Fictions” 1409-1411). To be an 
individual, is to possess the constitutively defined potential to generate an autonomous 
ethics. As Thomas Pavel, referred to in an earlier chapter, suggests, the novel charts the 
“interiorization of the ideal” or the “enchantment of interiority” (14-15). The structure of the 
novel itself tends to preclude representation of subjectivities where this normative 
assumption is not prevalent. Any conception of selfhood which does not proceed out of the 
internalization of moral sources can only be represented with difficulty in the novel. 
Individualism is so fundamental to the novel that attempts to represent personhood, that is, 












This problem first emerges clearly with the dissemination of the realist novel to 
Russia. Aleksandr Veselovskii neatly summarizes the Russian perception of the 
Enlightenment novel. He suggests that the novel is the “endpoint of a lengthy process of 
narrative individualization. A fixed shared “we” was gradually replaced […] with an 
uncertain, self-orienting “I”, a process that represented in miniature the victory of the ‘unity 
of content’ (the ego of the storyteller) over the ancient unity of performance” (Emerson 271). 
Enlightenment rationalism embodied in the novel comes up against the strongly anti-
procedurally rational tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church in which the effects of the 
Protestant Revolution had no impact. This translates into the paradox of the Russian realism 
of Tolstoy who re-introduces epic elements into the novel by the back door, as it were, and 
Dostoevsky’s oeuvre in which the awkward hero finds his path in life through a profoundly 
spiritual orientation. 
 Similarly, the “revolutionary” novel which finds in collective action the motor for 
social change, comes up against the individualist premise of the novel which ultimately 
dictates compromise. The paradox of the proletarian novel is the contradiction Hayden White 
observes of Marxism as a theory. Marxism shares in the immanentism of the Enlightenment 
but transcendentally holds out the possibility of a utopian future (Content of the Form 142-
143). This translates in the discourse of the novel into the struggle between realism and 
romanticism. In other words, the challenge for the novel is how to present a social truth 
through the autonomous, morally self-generating hero. Denning  encapsulates the 
contradiction of the revolutionary novel in the following way: 
Several challenges immediately presented themselves: the attempt to 
represent working class life in a genre that had developed as the 











and social circles; the attempt to represent a collective subject in a form 
built around the interior life of the individual; the attempt to create a public 
agitational work in a form that, unlike drama, depended upon private, often 
domestic consumption; and the attempt to create a vision of revolutionary 
social change in a form almost inherently committed to the solidity of 
society and history. The early [proletarian] novels are often awkward and 
unnovelistic.(70) 
To reinforce the point, David Trotter observes that working class novels of the period 1895 – 
1920 are almost always Bildungsromane about writers who benefit from educational 
opportunities and move out of the working class: “Work creates the allegiance of these 
writers, and of their protagonists; books create identity. Identity emerges through the 
rejection of allegiance …” (34). 
In the Asian colonial context, where the understanding of self as individual has no 
autochthonous base, Meenakshi Mukerjee finds that the negotiation with modernity of the 
early Indian novels, produces a similar compromise to that identified in the early Russian 
novel, namely, realism, but with a strong “epic overlay.” 
In African literature, Eileen Julien observes that the image of the continent is 
determined by the pessimistic tones of what she terms the “extroverted African novel”. This 
type of novel engages in a European or global discourse. In other words, these novels are 
written for the metropolitan centre rather than for an audience on the periphery. A 
consequence of this orientation is that these novels almost always represent African life, 
language, culture and ethos as “ornament” within an essentially Eurocentric frame. The 
African elements are simply decorative features in a form that is fundamentally European. 
The form itself cannot represent alternative worldviews. When alternative worldviews are 











refers to as “exuberant” novels, microcosmically popular, but insufficiently “literary” to be 
included in the category of world literature.   
The problems outlined above are all specific expressions of a fundamental 
consequence of the form of the novel. The Russian, revolutionary, African or Asian novel is 
not novelistic enough. This is an outcome, however, not of the writers’ failed artistry, but a 
consequence of the ideology of a genre inhospitable to the alternative worldviews of these 
authors. In order to be “literary”, long prose narratives are formally obliged to enter into the 
“individual freedom – socialization” dichotomy which is constitutive both of modernity and 
the novel. This dichotomy generates contradiction out of the imperative that the disengaged, 
free individual submit to the social code. These novels often unsuccessfully negotiate the 
demand of the form that morality appear immanent in the autonomous individual, within a 
social context where the moral sources remain indisputably exterior. Modernism and 
postmodernism deflect morality onto form (the aesthetic), suggesting a “post-moral” world, 
or a world which races on in Alasdair MacIntyre’s formulation, referred to in an earlier 
chapter - “After Virtue.” Novels which do not conform to these pre-requisites are seen as 
artistic failures.  
Close Sesame  has to be read in relief against the various examples of “failed” novels 
mentioned above. But, it is very important to stress that while Close Sesame purports to 
represent heteronomous subjectivity, ultimately, the ethos which dominates Farah’s other 
novels prevails. Thus, crucially, this chapter is an attempt to understand why Close Sesame, 













I Transcendental Moral Sources and the Novelistic Hero 
Without exception, critical accounts of Close Sesame read the novel as singular in Farah’s 
oeuvre. The novel’s egregiousness rests squarely on the uniqueness of the protagonist, 
Deeriye, through whom the entire novel is focalized. Reed Way Dasenbrock, for example, 
suggests that while the other “protagonists of the first trilogy are all young, oriented toward 
European culture and languages, and generally European-educated”(747), Deeriye, by 
contrast, represents tradition and religion. Derek Wright similarly reinforces the 
exceptionality of the hero of Close Sesame through the observation that Deeriye is “a unique 
specimen in [Farah’s] writing” since he is a “patriarch who is not a tyrant.” This is achieved 
despite his being a “devout Muslim and traditional Somali.” For which reason, Deeriye is 
Farah’s “most endearing hero” (Nuruddin Farah 85).  Alden and Tremaine see in Deeriye 
the artistic challenge for Farah of once again, following the female centred novels, creating 
“a character quite unlike himself: elderly, asthmatic, devoutly Muslim, centrally involved in 
an organized movement of resistance, and deeply embroiled in clan politics” (57). What is 
highly significant also, but a fact unnoted by the critics, is the observation that of all Farah’s 
protagonists, Deeriye is the only hero who dies at the end of the novel.      
To recapitulate, Deeriye is the exception among Farah’s protagonists since Deeriye 
represents tradition and religion. In other words, Close Sesame, constructs a central character 
who apparently draws his moral sources from the external social and transcendental 
frameworks of Somali tradition and Islamic religion, but within a genre which privileges the 
internal, individual moral source. The real challenge of Close Sesame, like the challenge of 
the Russian, proletarian or Indian novel, is to represent heteronomy employing a form which 











The themes of religion and tradition are embodied in Deeriye through the suggestion 
in the novel of a patterned history. Through the character of Deeriye, history in the novel is 
shown to be caught in inescapable cycles. Deeriye is “not so much a physical person so 
much as an abstraction … He was an idea; he was a national notion … an image … a 
kaleidoscope” (Close Sesame 12). Through the “kaleidoscope” which is Deeriye, Prophetic, 
caliphate, anti-colonial and postcolonial dictatorship histories are superimposed in order to 
be hermeneutically interrogated to reveal underlying patterns.  
The novel variously dramatizes Prophetic biography in its portrayal of the central 
character, Deeriye. As a very elderly asthmatic, Deeriye seems to exist at different levels of 
consciousness at once. The narrative presents him passing seamlessly from waking to sleep, 
from reality to dreamworld which prophetically foreshadows future events. Outside of the 
procedurally rational order, Deeriye also accesses other zones of existence in which he 
communes with his late wife, Nadiifa. He also realizes the goal of the mystical quest for     
“fana’ ” or annihilation in God. In these ways, Deeriye imitates, but more than imitates, 
embodies the Prophetic experience of the founder of Islam. In Islamic tradition, there is a 
strong connection between dreams and revelation, supported by Hadith or the recorded 
utterances of the Prophet (Graham 37). Other characters in the novel, like Deeriye’s brother-
in-law, Elmi-Tiir, recognize his stature achieved both through piety and through principled 
opposition to injustice. Elmi-Tiir refers to the experience of being in Deeriye’s presence as 
“standing in Deeriye’s revealed light” (Close Sesame 12). The group of young men involved 
in shadowy resistance to the Dictator, including Deeriye’s law professor son, Mursal, all 
have names symbolically suggestive of the sacred time of Prophecy and revelation: They are 











The last is the Arabic version of Gabriel, the angel of revelation. This resistance group 
regard Deeriye as their symbolic centre. Furthermore, when Deeriye dies at the end, on his 
body is found a copy of “Ya-Sin”, the thirty sixth chapter, regarded as the “heart” of the 
Qur’an. In this surah, the central fact of the prophecy of Muhammad and the key elements of 
the revelation he brought are expressed. The mystical letters, “Ya-Sin”, are also “assumed to 
be the title of the Prophet” (A. Yusuf Ali 1168).     
Twisting also in the gyres of history suggested by Deeriye’s representation are the 
succession battles which raged upon the death of the Prophet in 632. Direct reference is 
made on a number of occasions to Mucaawiya and Yaziid (Close Sesame 9, 44). Both 
Mucaawiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, and especially his son, Yaziid, are 
symbols of tyranny violently challenged. The father, Mucaawiya was challenged by the 
Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali. And the authority of the son, Yaziid, was challenged by the 
Prophet’s grandson, Hussain, who was killed by Yaziid at the Battle of Karbala. The lex 
talionis apparently inscribed in this history is what may have justified Deeriye’s possible 
assassination attempt on  the Dictator.  
The figure of Deeriye also strongly alludes to the Somali historical figure Mohamed 
Abdulle Hassan, dubbed the “Mad Mullah” by the British, leader of the sufi inspired 
resistance whose members were called “Dervishes”. In popular tradition, however, 
Mohamed Abdulle Hassan is regarded as “Sayyid”, an honorific title used for descendants in 
the line of the Prophet, and sharing in the “barakah”  or blessing of the Prophet’s household. 
In revisionist histories, the anti-colonialist Sayyid is also hailed as the father of Somali 
nationalism and through his poetic prowess is regarded as the Somali “Shakespeare.” For 











Deeriye was “reared to revere” and whose poems he recalls by heart. Deeriye’s  personal 
history coincides with key historical events in the life of the Sayyid. 1912 is the year 
Deeriye’s gives for his birth and the year that the Dervishes  kill the British military 
commander, Richard Corfield, in battle. (Corfield was actually killed in 1913, but 1912 is 
privileged by the text since it is also the year of the formation of the African National 
Congress with which Deeriye identifies among other persons, events and institutions in an 
expression of pan-African allegiance. Deeriye is also associated with other global political 
and anti-colonial figures like Ataturk and Gandhi.)  
Like the Sayyid before him who resisted British colonialism, Deeriye challenges Italian  
colonialism and then later the postcolonial dictatorship. In the same way that the Sayyid was 
betrayed by a fellow Somali, being accused to the British of the theft of a rifle, Deeriye is 
betrayed in a circumstance which leads to his incarceration in an Italian jail for twelve years. 
For his resistance to the dictator, he is later imprisoned for four years. History repeats itself 
when, just as the Sayyid was summoned to a meeting of the leaders of the Qadiriy 
Brotherhood in the coastal town of Berbera to discuss the religious validation of the 
resistance methods used by the Dervishes, so too, Deeriye is called to a meeting of clan 
elders convened by the Dictator.  
Somalis frequently point to similarities in the life history of the Sayyid with the 
Prophetic life. Like the Prophet, the Sayyid was also “given to dreams and midnight 
revelations” (Samatar, S.S. Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism 196).   
History is thus seen to repeat itself with Deeriye embodying the Sayyid and the 











aspect of the characterization of Deeriye. Indeed, the character is a construct of religion and 
tradition – as the text itself suggests, Deeriye is an “idea”, a “notion.” 
 
II Close Sesame and the Representation of Socially Constituted Selfhood 
The challenge for Farah in the final book of the “Dictatorship” trilogy is to construct a hero 
who, like the epic hero, locates moral sources outside of the self. But, paradoxically, the 
heteronomous hero must be constructed out of the building blocks of the genre which, in 
dynamic mutual interaction with philosophical and material contexts, constitutes the 
disengaged, autonomous self. Tradition locates virtue in a social code whose origins are 
located in time immemorial. Religion locates the higher order in a transcendental code, 
which, in the case of Islam, is also inescapably social.  
One might argue that both tradition and religion have already achieved representation 
in the earlier novel, Sardines, through the characters of the Somali traditional, Idil, and the 
Yemeni religious, Fatima bint Thabit. The counter to this suggestion is the fact that both 
these characters in the earlier novel are represented as “types”, or in Forster’s definition, as 
“flat characters.” The challenge in Close Sesame is to represent tradition and religion in and 
through the character of Deeriye. Deeriye must show development in the novel. Deeriye must 
be a “round” character in order for novelistic representation to be successful. Tradition and 
religion must not be simply aspects of the character portrayed in the novel, they must inform 
the structure of the narrative.   
 The irony of the attempted representation of heteronomy in this novel is that, right 
from the outset, the form appears to preclude the possibility of a social self. Ironically, the 










very elderly man. What are the implications of the expression of religion and tradition 
through the old man, Deeriye, rather than, for example, through the young man, Koschin, 
from A Naked Needle or through Medina, a mature woman in the prime of life? One 
implication is that consequent upon his age, Deeriye must live a radically circumscribed life. 
In the novel we are informed that the aged father is moved from a room in his daughter’s 
house which is being renovated, to the home of his son where he has “a room of [his] own”. 
Deeriye’s door, unlike the door of Virginia Woolf’s feminist individualist heroine, referred 
to in an earlier chapter, is not under lock and key. Deeriye’s door is kept ajar to allow the 
family’s benevolent vigilance over the old man. Deeriye, of course, also has a room of his 
own in his twelve years of incarceration in colonial jails and four years in independence jails. 
Almost without exception the “action” of the novel occurs in this one room in his son’s 
home, “and is very static,” as Bardolph suggests (400). But the room is one with a view. 
Through his window, Deeriye may gaze upon but not participate in the activities of the 
street, which frequently involve the mad revelations of the mysterious character, Khaliif. 
Consistent with the other novels, “action” in Close Sesame consists largely in the 
deliberation of ideas. Deeriye’s interior monologues are the dominant speech form of the 
novel. 
 The sense that Deeriye is radically cut off from the society around himself is 
exaggerated by the fact also that when in his room, he listens with headphones to “isolated 
Koranic litanies” (Close Sesame 20) and to recordings of the Sayyid’s poetry. So often, when 
other people enter his room, he is not even aware of their presence. The poetry,  of course, is 
also supposed to entrench the conviction that Deeriye embodies tradition. But the novel’s 











radically different. Somali oral poetry, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, is highly 
“individual” in composition, but highly social in performance. Deeriye’s enfeebled physical 
condition makes the fact of his possible performance, or his participation in a living tradition 
impossible. In the nomadic pastoral setting, the oral poet was central to social deliberation. 
While that tradition continued in altered ways in urban public fora, the oral poet similarly 
remained central to social life. Deeriye’s mode of appreciation of the poetry of the Sayyid 
wholly transforms it into one dimension of individual self-realization.  
What is interesting also, is that the text reproduces eleven lines of “The Death of 
Corfield”, Deeriye’s favourite poem composed by the Sayyid, in untranslated Somali. 
Refusal to translate creates a number of effects. It may enhance a sense of estrangement, that 
the culture represented cannot or should not be assimilated into the dominant language of 
discourse, in which case it creates a sense of exoticism. Or it may, rather more 
disingenuously, be used to suggest a profound “otherness” which, paradoxically, is entirely 
domesticated by the ideology of the form. While in this instance both of these considerations 
may hold, more to the point, is the fact that the Sayyid’s poem may compromise the novel’s 
sleight of hand in presenting the Sayyid’s subjectivity and Deeriye’s subjectivity as being 
essentially the same.  
The poem “The Death of Richard Corfield” was composed by the Sayyid after the 
leader of the camel constabulary was killed in a battle with the Dervishes, which he was on 
order to avoid (Andrzejewski and Lewis 70). The poem is particularly fierce in tone, perhaps 
since the Sayyid saw in Corfield the image of his own crazy recklessness. The poem is 
addressed to Corfield in the next world and is very strategically composed to exalt and 











side. The poem is a call to action which would expose the fundamentally opposed invocation 
of the novel to potentially endless interpretation.  
Close Sesame, despite the title which suggests finality and despite the expectation 
that it might share in the relative certainties of tradition and religion which it is supposed to 
represent, is one of Farah’s most radically indeterminate novels. Derek Wright suggests: “… 
the ambiguous and paradoxical, the unexplained and indeterminate, occupy so much space in  
[the] narrative that it is uncertain whether the final effect is a polyvalency of meaning or a 
massive aporia at the core of the book” (Novels of Nuruddin Farah  88). Deeriye’s death at 
the end is shrouded in uncertainty. His action – the final self-realization of his development 
in the novel – may have been suicide or a failed assassination attempt. If an assassination 
attempt, it fails since his revolver gets caught in his prayer beads. Whether this suggests the 
inadequacy of religion in the face of political oppression or the triumph of religion which 
resists becoming the mirror image of evil is a moot point. Closure is structured to suggest the 
higher order in the act of literary interpretation itself.  
 In its mode of construction of parallels between the Sayyid and its central character, 
Deeriye, the text masks another fundamental difference between the two figures. While the 
Sayyid reflects an identity oriented against the Somali social code in significant ways 
structured around kinship relations, Deeriye, reflecting the sensibility of virtually all Farah’s 
positively represented characters, completely rejects the idea of clan. While kinship relations 
to a certain extent may be a construct, often disastrously manipulated (Kapteijns, Besteman), 
they also are a significant aspect of Somali identity, so fundamental that they are noticed 
only by default, when there are tensions in the system. For example, the economy of the 











on kinship obligations. In other words, in this case, kinship obligations, “clan”, is not only 
what keeps the Somaliland economy afloat, but traditional conflict resolution techniques are 
precisely what allowed the fragile and regionally threatened stability of the Somaliland 
Republic to emerge (Bradbury 77-108).  
The Sayyid only retrospectively comes to be constituted as the father of Somali 
nationalism. The Sayyid’s primary orientation was religious, a religious understanding which 
did not outright reject kinship structures. The effect of the Sayyid’s religiously inspired anti-
colonial activities was to a certain extent to disembed the subject from narrowly defined clan 
associations and re-embed the subject in a wider religious identity. This did not prevent him, 
however, from on occasion  opportunistically manipulating clan identities (Samatar, A.I. 32-
33). In Deeriye, by contrast, one witnesses an entirely transmuted conception of the self. 
Deeriye regards his time in prison as the closed space which opens up his eyes to the 
fictionality of clan (Closed Sesame 103). Clan exists only as “trivial […] politicking” (Close 
Sesame 7). Deeriye’s reality is constituted around the “autonomy” of his subjectivity whose 
precondition is “a losing-control of the clan ideology or the narrow-minded ‘family first’ 
ideology” (Close Sesame 123).         
In the time frame depicted in the novel, Deeriye ventures out of his room on only 
three occasions; the first when he is struck by a stone thrown through the window and is 
taken to the hospital, the second when he is dropped off by his daughter-in-law at a 
neighbourhood tea shop and the third when he attends the meeting of clan elders organized 
by the Dictator. Curiously, on each of these occasions, when Deeriye does venture out into 
the world, he is not fully in the world. He is taken to the hospital unconscious. His visit to 











confused bewilderment. And Deeriye’s participation in the clan assembly is punctuated by 
unavoidable catnaps. Strictures of form appear to compel Farah to conceive of what should 
be a fully social and integrated self in terms of the alienation attendant upon the debilities of 
advanced age and ill health. In other words, since the novelistic novel struggles to represent 
community, privileging association instead, a protagonist profoundly out of keeping with 
what is purportedly represented in the novels is “pre-selected” in terms of the exigencies of 
the form.  
Deeriye is taken in criticism of the novel to represent the very pious Muslim. And 
indeed superficially, that is what he is. He is extremely conscientious about the five daily 
prayers, reads the Qur’an in the colonial prison, has the professions of faith constantly on his 
lips and has a profoundly spiritual consciousness. But, what once again is curious about this 
selection of central character is that he is physically unable to participate in the collective 
dimension of the expression of the Islamic faith. In the course of the entire novel, Deeriye is 
only on one occasion able to perform prayers in a mosque, even though Islam highly 
encourages congregational prayers five times a day every day. Deeriye visits the mosque as 
an incidental detour on his walk from the Baar Novecento to the house of his friend, Rooble. 
What is interesting is that the mosque, as forum of prayer, education and socialization, in a 
sense constitutes the religious equivalent of the eighteenth century coffee shops of the 
bourgeois public sphere. Despite this potential, the mosque does not come into the focus of 
the novel in any specific way.  
There are also powerful allusions to the sufi tradition in Somali Islam expressed 
through the portrayal of the character of Deeriye. Until recently, since Somalia has come 











part of a broader response to modernity, virtually all Somalis were associated with one of the 
sufi orders, which trace their origins to the Qadiriy brotherhood, founded by the twelfth 
century holy man, Abdul-Qader Jilani. The Sayyid was the founder of the northern splinter 
group called the Saalihiy order, while the Uwaysiyya order dominated in the south. What is 
common to all sufi movements, however, are the concepts of interiority and development. 
These come together in the sufi concept of “tariqa” or path. Like the self-development traced 
in the 18th century European Bildungsroman, the path negotiates various stages of 
development or, in the discourse of Islam, “stations” or “maqamat” (Schimmel Mystical 
Dimensions of Islam 100). A fundamental difference between the two models of self-
development, however, is that Islamic development is always a spiritual development as 
opposed to a secular development which witnesses the isolated individual inwardly at odds 
with society, finally reaching some associational compromise. The spiritual journey is in 
some ways similarly a lonely, individual, hermetic journey, but also, paradoxically, a journey 
of confraternity in which the “murid” or initiate is induced into a brotherhood and where the 
most significant social bond is the allegiance to “sheikh” or spiritual guide. The sufi 
brotherhood, unlike modern forms of association is not the coming together for mutual 
benefit of equal, independent actors. It is a spiritual hierarchy that comes into existence for a 
spiritual purpose whose social codes are both external and transcendental.  
The sufi represented in Farah’s novel, dictated by the form, necessarily must be a sufi 
minus his “sheikh” or “pir” and without his brotherhood. The fact that Deeriye is an elderly, 
incapacitated man naturalizes what otherwise would be a very peculiar identity formation, 
especially in the context of Somali religious expression through the brotherhoods. The 











expression in the brotherhoods is suggested by a cursory glance at Ahmed Samatar’s analysis 
of the “basic characteristics” of the Somali sufi orders. These include belief “in the living 
spirit of the great Prophet”, “the degree of control and power given to the leader of the 
order”, “a collective and organized spirit”, frequent “ ‘congregational’ activities” called 
“Dhikris”, vertical and horizontal integration of “inchoate groups”, the revival of the broadly 
social concepts of hegira (emigration) and jihad to resist British colonial penetration (A.I. 
Samatar 25-6).   
Deeriye as “the pious Muslim” masks another contradiction. Through the superficial 
elements of clothing, ritual and otherworldly spirituality, criticism interprets Deeriye as 
representative of Islamic consciousness. But this reading is flawed since Deeriye in essential 
ways orients himself against the self-generating morality of an individualist ethics rather 
than against an Islamic conception of revelation. For the pious Muslim, the Qur’an is the 
Word of God and the Prophet is the Perfect Man. The fundamentals of the faith thus 
established prescribe a wholly social practice. While various grades of obligation exist from 
mandatory to recommended, what are termed the “five pillars”, are the sine qua non of faith. 
Each of these fundamentals is constitutively social: The shahada, or statement of belief , 
namely, that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His final messenger, is not an 
interior belief but a declaration, a “performative”; the call to the five daily prayers is a call 
(ideally) to congregational worship; the injunction to give zakah, or almsgiving, is a call to 
social responsibility, the requirement that one perform the hadj, or pilgrimage at least once 
in one’s lifetime is an invocation to participation in a social ritual and the injunction to fast in 











only with a collective sighting of the moon. Close Sesame represents religious devotion 
through the hero, Deeriye, as the private pastime of the private individual.  
A further consequence of this representation is to undermine the force of external 
ethical orientation, the axis of the heteronomous self. For the pious Muslim, the Qur’an is the 
Word of God and the Hadith or Tradition of the Prophet represents a living interpretation of 
the revealed text. These sources, it is believed, embody the perfect blueprint for self and 
social realization for all people at all times. Prophetic time thus constitutes what Graham, 
quoting Mircea Eliade, refers to as “sacred” time, “a time out of time”: 
While Muhammad still lived and prophecy and revelation in Islam 
continued, an order of existence prevailed that was unattainable in subsequent 
times. Human affairs stood under the special “judgment” of the prophetic 
revelatory event, which illumined not just appearances, but realities in human life 
(9).  
While Deeriye listens to the Qur’an on cassette with headphones and dies with a copy of 
Surah Ya-Sin in his pocket, the Qur’an and its revelatory message are not really what orient 
the subjectivity of this character. The insignificance of the Qur’an as moral code in the novel 
is suggested by the fact that its teachings are never contemplated. Like the Sayyid’s poem, 
verses of the Qur’an  are neither translated nor engaged. The pivotal surah Ya-Sin, if 
examined, suggests that “Both Revelation and Nature are eloquent / in instructing man for 
his own good” (A. Yusuf Ali 1181). Even , more forcefully, verse 69 declares: “This is no 
less than / A Message and a Qur-an [in the dual suggestion of the word as both “recitation” 
and “reading”] / Making things clear.” For the devout Muslim, thus, the meaning of life is 











Deeriye, in sharp contrast, is a doubter: “It is the prerogative of God alone to be sure 
of anything. […] I am only human. And therefore I am in doubt” (Close Sesame 231). What 
Deeriye expresses is not the occasional uncertainty to which one is from time to time prone, 
but rather doubt as ethical source. This is, however, a philosophy which cannot easily be 
construed as Islamic as the Prophetic tradition, more than likely known to a character like 
Deeriye, emphasises: “Leave that which makes you doubt for that which does not make you 
doubt” (An-Nawawi 52).   
 For Deeriye, as sufi, furthermore, what often is referred to as the “imitatio 
Muhammadi” ought to become even more persuasive than in the practice of the average 
Muslim. Numerous verses in the Qur’an refer to the obligation to follow the example of the 
Prophet sent as a “mercy” to all human beings. For example a verse in the surah, “The House 
of Imran”, invokes the Muslim: “If ye do love God, / Follow me: God will love you / And 
forgive you your sins” (3: 31)  In the sufi brotherhoods, this injunction is even greater. The 
sheikh is the gateway to the Prophet and the Prophet is the gateway to God. The imitation of 
the “beautiful model” represented by the Prophet is expressed in the sufi orders with 
manifestly greater enthusiasm. Annemarie Schimmel suggests: 
But it was through this imitation of Muhammad’s actions as transmitted through 
the hadith that Islamic life assumed a unique uniformity in social behaviour, a fact 
that has always impressed visitors to all parts of the Muslim world. It is also 
visible, for instance, in the hagiography of Muslim saints. For, as Frithjof Schuon 
says: “This ‘Muhammadan’ character of the virtues … explains the relatively 
impersonal style of the saints; there are no other virtues than those of Muhammad, 
so they can only be repeated in those who follow his example; it is through them 











What is perplexing about the character of Deeriye, is the virtually complete absence of this 
dimension of Muslim practice. While for the Muslim, the code is external, both 
transcendental and social, embodied in the Prophet, exegete incarnate of the Qur’an, Deeriye 
appears to draw his moral source, like the protagonists in Farah’s other novels, from within 
himself. While in private Deeriye listens to and reads the Qur’an and the Traditions of the 
Prophet, the ethical code thereby constituted does not inform his moral orientation which 
draws its source from elsewhere.  
In a highly charged symbolic moment, Deeriye’s grandson, Samawade, stands at 
Deeriye’s bedroom window, ready to hurl his grandfather’s volume of a selection of 
Prophetic traditions and the Corfield cassette at the mysterious madman, Khaliif, who in the 
street publicly denounces their family as traitors. The irony envisioned by the novel through 
this incident and reinforced by other such symbolic events is the contradiction that through 
resisting evil, one often paradoxically becomes the mirror image of evil. Samawade is the 
mirror image of Yassin, the grandson of the “unneighbourly” neighbours, who had hurled a 
stone at Deeriye. But an irony not envisioned by the novel when Samawade attempts to 
discard the recording of the Sayyid’s poem and the Prophet’s traditions, is that such 
repudiation reveals the novel’s central contradiction, namely, the paradoxical attempt to 
represent heteronomy through a genre which constitutively denies heteronomy.  
The text’s representation of the meeting of the clan elders called by the Dictator 
creates the illusion of the representation of community constituted by a social-transcendental 
code. But this representation is self-negating: 
No major upsets were to come out of the inquisition. This became obvious as a 
number of the elders took the floor in turn and each painted it with slogans and 











rambled on and quoted proverbs and the Prophet’s tradition. […] Deeriye was so 
bored with these protracted speeches that he fell asleep twice, […] (Close Sesame 
167).      
Thus, while ritual often does become formulaic, what is revealing to note is that in the public 
sphere, through Deeriye as focalizer, the novel cannot portray a vibrant, living religious 
tradition. A religion which informs actual social codes can only be shown as a desiccated 
husk.  
For a devout Muslim, which is how the character of Deeriye is read, God, and His 
Prophet are the spiritual, social and psychological axis. Life is negotiated through the 
external ethical code which thus comes into being. Deeriye’s Bildung in the novel revolves 
around the question of retaliation. Self-realization in a Somalia under dictatorship involves 
resisting tyranny. Self-realization consists in resisting the tyrant without in turn becoming a 
tyrant. For Deeriye as “tragic hero”, the choice is whether to adopt violence in opposing the 
Dictator. But Deeriye is no tragic hero in the sense that the novel has no external moral code 
against which one can judge his action. Hamartia as a concept is negated if the ethical code 
is self-validating. Deeriye and his law professor son, Mursal, engage in extended debates on 
the lex talionis in Islamic law and history. In terms of this law, the family of a murder victim 
has the right of retaliation against a murderer. This provision provides the putative rationale 
for Deeriye’s attempted assassination of the Dictator. Since Deeriye’s son, Mursal, has been 
murdered by the regime, in terms of the novel’s version of Islamic law, Deeriye has the right 
of retaliation against the person of the Dictator.  
In coming to his decision, Deeriye does not engage in the “imitatio Muhammadi”  as 
one might expect a devout Muslim to do. A devout Muslim might interrogate his action 











oppression for Myself and have made it forbidden amongst you, so do not oppress one 
another” (An-Nawawi 80). Or a pious Muslim might consider the tradition: “Whosoever of 
you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then 
with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart – and that is the weakest of 
faith” (An-Nawawi 110). But Deeriye does not draw his source from a religious code, in 
which case, some form of action against oppression is highly recommended.  
 Even in the form of “action” eventually “taken” by Deeriye, his course is not 
informed by religion or the even the history of Islamdom. The Prophetic example prescribes 
action against oppression but not the action almost automatically assumed by Deeriye and 
the Somali “priviligentzia” represented in the novel. The Prophetic example is not that of the 
lone “kamikaze” (Close Sesame 155) assassin. The Prophetic example enjoins the resistance 
first passive and, when persuasion fails, active of the group against injustice. If the resistance 
envisaged by the novel is that of a shadowy, rootless organization of middle class 
individuals, it is not the resistance of the Prophetic “time out of time”, which encompassed 
the Meccan marginalized - the poor, women and slaves. Similarly, the lex talionis upon 
which Deeriye justifies his “assassination attempt” is not the right of revenge of the lone 
gunman. It is a public process where the first recourse is for the perpetrator to pay 
compensation to the family of the murdered man, failing which the family has the right of 
retaliation. But the noblest act enjoined by the Qur’an is in the face of sincere penitence of 
the perpetrator is for the family to grant mercy. This dimension of Shari’a is frequently 
misrecognized as the basis of individual human rights in Islam (Osanloo).     
Deeriye’s self-realization thus, is not the self-realization of the man of faith whose 











within himself. Deeriye, like Farah’s other protagonists, constitutes his own moral source. 
His time in the enclosed space of prison affords him the opportunity to construct a personal 
history and life philosophy which appear to owe nothing to any social frameworks and 
everything to his own self-inventiveness. Like Ataturk, he invents the date of his own birth 
(Close Sesame 163). He allows the proliferation of the myth that he was born in 1912, a key 
year in the histories of Somali nationalism and Pan-Africanism. The time spent in prison 
makes him, in the consciousness of both his family and the Somali nation, an “absent 
presence.” In this way Deeriye is a symbol also of post-representational accounts of 
language itself where meaning is absent from itself. Personal and national history on this 
account exist only as “illuminated prints – not truths” (Close Sesame 95). Deeriye 
rhetorically asks his daughter: “Did I ever tell you why I conjure up interlocutors, why I have 
visions, why it is that I invent histories, why I try to create symbolic links between unrelated 
historical events, why it is that I speak to your mother in my sleep … did I ever bother to 
explain myself?” (Close Sesame 229). Deeriye implies that it is precisely the private, 
isolated, space of prison which allows him the imaginativeness to create new forms of 
allegiance, forms of allegiance which on the face of it owe nothing either to filiation or the 
social bonds created by religion. Deeriye rates the affiliational bonds of friendship more 
highly than traditional or religious bonds. He is suspicious of the clan members he meets at 
the Baar Novecento since “Their principles and his seemed at variance with one another” 
(Close Sesame 102). The bonds Deeriye privileges are the bonds of friendship. What allows 
family to be rejected for friendship, is that for Deeriye, friendship appears to be constructed 
out of the free, rational choice of the individual, rather than through biological determinism: 
Friendship is an organizational concept of self-definition; family an 











one’s friends than one’s family. You define your activities by the associations and 
relationships you make of your own accord, whereas you never choose your family 
(Close Sesame 121).  
What this view denies is any sense of an external natural order and the complete 
naturalization of the internal “natural order” of procedural reason, which on investigation of 
the positive characters across the range of novels, proves not to be so natural after all. 
Friendships, as especially Knots makes clear, appear not to extend beyond the bounds of the 
middle class, western educated, cosmopolitan elite. Alden and Tremaine are thus accurate in 
their understanding of the character of Deeriye as “a model for how individuals can select 
from the materials of their social world those elements that they require for autonomous acts 
of self-definition” (89). In other words, one constructs oneself and enters into associational 
bonds with similarly self-constructed others. What this view promotes is the idea that “an 
absolutely empty unencumbered and improvisational self” (Bellah et al 80), can construct an 
ideal identity which enters into relationships of perfect mutuality with other ideal identities. 
In other words, there is a prior self which somehow stands apart from material, social and 
ideological contexts with the Promethean power eclectically to select from a range of 
identity options. As Charles Taylor reminds us, to conceive of a self without an orientation is 
also to conceive of a subject who is not human. These views in various ways reflect the 
Aristotelean dictum that outside of the polis, only a beast or angel may live.  
What this view is blind to in the context of the novel, is that as “pious Muslim” 
Deeriye cannot reject family. Firm obligations are placed on the Muslim to care for and 
show respect to both nuclear and extended family. The hierarchical order of love proceeds 
from God to the Prophet to one’s mother and then father and other relations. These 











not Muslim. Proceeding out of care of the family is care of one’s neighbours, whom one is 
required to respect as if they were family. As “devout Muslim”, Deeriye ought not to 
privilege friends over family, but ought to extend the recognition owed to family to friends. 
In other words, kinship obligations constitute the model for relations with non-kin.  
In keeping with Deeriye’s portrayal as sufi, he apparently achieves the ultimate self-
realization through fana’ or annihilation in God: “Then he dropped on his knees, held his 
open palms out and fell into a solemn prayer: peace! And it was! He saw, as would a sufi, 
the retreating mysterious formlessness of the divine and he contemplated this image of 
exceptional handsomeness, an image peace-producing as the soul’s reunion with God” 
(Close Sesame 179). But curiously, this is not the experience which constitutes his real 
epiphany. It is not what allows his development in the novel. Ultimate revelation for Deeriye 
lies not in divine revelation; it lies in self-revelation. Deeriye’s true epiphany comes just 
before his final act of radical hermeneutic indeterminacy:  
“The a sudden thought came to him as he walked […] ‘All our lives, 
mortals that we are, we misname things and objects, we misdefine, we misdescribe 
illnesses and misuse metaphors. Why, it is not my lungs: my face! Why this 
suggests the loss of face, the loss of reputation and nothing more than that! Why, 
this doesn’t suggest the loss of faith, the spiritual loss, the spiritual famine that 
envelopes one – right from the moment hundreds of heads of cattle rolled. I didn’t 
lose face: I lost faith, yes, faith in my own capability, faith in my people” (Close 
Sesame 235). 
Deeriye’s epiphany is not a religious revelation but the realization that he has misread the 
signs, it is a linguistic revelation. He has misread himself. He has lost faith in his own ability 
to act, to take a positive step. In his life to this point, he has suffered the consequences of not 











refused to name the Somali who killed an Italian soldier in self-defence. As a consequence 
he was personally punished with imprisonment and his clan was collectively punished by the 
slaughter of their herds. For the first time in his life, he is going to take a positive action. To 
concur with Alden and Tremaine, this “final and triumphant piece of self-narration”  
represents “the true narrative climax of the novel” (171). The irony in the context of closure, 
however, is that Deeriye’s ultimate “action” is shrouded in the radical indeterminacy of 
hermeneutic instability. 
 The novel equivocates to the extent that it purports to represent heteronomy, but a 
heteronomy which masks autonomy. Despite his representation as man of tradition and faith, 
Deeriye’s moral source remains his disengaged self. In his religious practice thus, Deeriye 
more closely resembles a type of New Age spiritualist who, with a fundamental prior and 
unexplained faith in brotherhood and harmony, eclectically chooses from a range of spiritual 
options. As Bellah et al suggest, for “radically individualistic religion … God is simply the 
self magnified” (235).  
 In the genres which embody heteronomy, the “lost” hero returns “home”. The 
meaning of life is apparent. It is apparent in a higher order external to the hero himself. In 
Close Sesame, despite the finality suggested in the title, closure opens a cave of infinite 
possibility. Deeriye’s Bildung allows him to “act” but the significance of his action 
polysemically proliferates. Is his “act” a suicide which allows him to join his wife, Nadiifa, 
his “houri”  in an exoticized heaven? Is his “act” a failed assassination attempt? If it is, what 
makes it fail? The answers, like the questions which may be asked are endless. The moral 
source revealed by closure in Close Sesame is the virtue represented by the act of 











itself from the ranks of failed novels. It cannot, however, resurrect its hero. To reiterate, 
Deeriye is the only Farah protagonist who dies. Even this compromised attempt to represent 
heteronomous identity, cannot but fail in the context of the form of the novel, the most 
significant cultural expression of the autonomous subject. 
 
This chapter thus is an interlude to the main argument which suggests that the novel is the 
most significant cultural form which embodies individualism or the internalization of the 
moral sources. The autonomous subject is the subject who, through procedural rationalism 
locates the higher order within the disengaged self. This chapter explores some of the 
resistances encountered when the novel attempts to represent heteronomous identity. The 
heteronomous subject is the subject who orients himself against an external higher order, 
usually constituted by tradition and/or religion. In most cases, as the history of the novel in 
various cultural contexts shows, the representation of heteronomy results in novels which are 
considered slightly “unnovelistic.” Close Sesame is not, however, a “failed” novel. It is not a 
“failed” novel since the ethical axis against which the central character constitutes and 



















From Dissolution to Reconstruction: Maps and Secrets, Links and Knots 
 
This chapter picks up the thread from Chapter 4 where modernist resolution of the 
contradiction of individualism was explored. The previous chapter, Chapter 5, was tangential 
to the argument. It considered the one exception in Farah’s oeuvre, namely, Close Sesame, 
which attempts to represent a heteronomous subject through the narrative mode of the novel 
which privileges autonomy. Earlier the central compromise of realism was explored. Realism 
compromises with the contradiction that individual autonomy finally submits to socialization 
through irony. What was suggested in Chapter 4, is that the techniques of modernism allow 
irony to reflect on itself. Self-reflexive irony takes the form of textuality. The contradiction 
encountered by realism disappears in the idea that both the self and society are literary 
constructs. Postmodernism, this chapter argues, assumes what modernism shows through 
various formal techniques. Modernism shows that the subject is a collage of literary 
fragments. Postmodernism proceeds from the idea of the divided subject. This chapter 
proposes, through a reading primarily of Maps, that postmodern “schizophrenic” identity  is 
not a radical critique of the autonomous subject. Instead, through an analysis of 
schizophrenia, which draws on the discourses of psychology and psychoanalysis, it will be 
shown that dominant interpretations of schizoid identity efface the disengaged, autonomous 
subjectivity upon which celebration of the schizophrenic is premised.    
 The second half of the chapter, which considers the most recent novels, Links and 
Knots, suggests that radically fragmented identity is at odds with Farah’s commitment to 











which they negotiate through the idea of “performativity”. The subject no longer is 
schizophrenically split. Now the relatively coherent subject, in a model drawn from theatre, 
assumes different personae (masks) responding to the exigencies of various contexts. 
     
I Dissolving Boundaries: Maps and Secrets 
The “Blood in the Sun” trilogy is framed by the coming of age narratives of two young men, 
namely, Askar of Maps and Kalaman of Secrets. The middle novel, Gifts, is the development 
story, in some ways dissensual, of a mature, previously married mother of three, discussed at 
some length in an earlier chapter. What links these novels thematically is the figure of the 
orphan at the heart of each of the texts, who symbolically represents the subject free of what 
Edward Said refers to as “filiation.” These novels are also connected by the contrasting way 
in which they use allegory, in particular, national allegory encountered in the earlier novels. 
From a Crooked Rib and Gifts, in particular, may be read as national allegories. In other 
words, the fate of the protagonist is fundamentally linked to the fate of the nation. What one 
witnesses in Maps and Secrets, is that the hero’s story no longer is an index of the narrative 
of the nation. Instead, the two developmental stories are conflated and  both stories come to 
be somatically represented. Obstructions to the development of subject and nation are read as 
pathological symptoms which manifest themselves in and on the body of the protagonist.  
From a Crooked Rib, guided by the principles of realist representation, constructs the 
formation story of its heroine, Ebla, as an allegory of the formation of the nation. The second 
trilogy ironically reflects on allegory itself through collapsing surface and deep narratives. In 
other words, while in some of the earlier novels, deeper, fuller meaning in the subtext was 











and depth itself is critiqued. The surface story no longer suggests hidden depths. 
Henceforward, there is only the surface narrative. The heroine in the earlier representational 
mode was a “signifier” whose development signified the development of the nation. In the 
second trilogy signifier and signified collapse on each other. Maps does not lead one to read 
national development through the story of Askar’s personal development. Neither does 
Secrets lead the reader to deduce the story of clan strife from the story of its hero, Kalaman. 
Instead, nation and clan “inscribe” themselves on the bodies of the protagonists. National 
and clan crises are experienced as the illness of the protagonists. This trend is observed more 
starkly in the framing novels to be considered here than in the middle novel, Gifts. In the 
narrative mode of these novels, metaphor is understood literally. The “body politic” is not 
simply an organicist metaphor for civil society. It is the literal inscription of politics on the 
body of the subject. In this operation, the sign is revealed as fully material in itself. Metaphor 
does not gesture to meaning beyond itself. Tenor and vehicle collapse. The metaphor, in its 
materiality, is the meaning. 
 The self-conscious postmodern textuality of both Maps and Secrets is not so much a 
development on the modernism of A Naked Needle and Sweet and Sour Milk, as it is a 
making explicit of what was implicit in the effects of modernist technique on the 
representation of both self and world. Modernism shows the truth of fragmented, textually 
refracted subjectivity. Postmodernism tells the truth of the fractured subject. The narrative of 
A Naked Needle was structured to reveal that Koschin’s subjectivity is a collage, generated 
out of the juxtaposition of literary fragments. In Askar and Kalaman, the heroes of Maps and 
Secrets respectively, the textually destabilized self is simply assumed on the basis of the 











 The question of identity, which often is only partially exposed in the other novels, is 
made explicit in Maps. “Who am I?” is a question Askar (a possible homophone for 
“Asker”) asks himself and others obsessively from the time that he is able to speak. But the 
question of personal identity in this novel, set in the period of the 1977 Ogaden war, cannot 
be disentangled from national identity. In terms of the rhetoric of Somali nationalism, the 
question “Who am I?” cannot be disengaged from the question “Where am I?” According to 
the assumptions of nationalism, defined in a particular way, Askar cannot  know himself 
until he knows whether he is Somali or Ethiopian. Askar’s interrogation leads his foster 
mother, Misra, to question whether he wouldn’t “in the end go mad questioning things” (44).  
Askar’s dilemma is Belacqua’s. Belacqua is the contemplative character Dante encounters in 
purgatory, and the subject of frequent allusion in Beckett, a strong influence in almost all 
Farah’s novels. The way in which Askar’s existential doubt alludes to Belacqua’s is made 
clear in the following fragment: “Alone, melancholic, he sat on a boulder, his head between 
his hands, his expression mournful. He was saddest that there was no one else to whom he 
could put questions about his own identity; there was no one to answer his nagging, ‘Who 
am I?’ or ‘Where am I?’ ” (45). The pain inflicted on his body by the social rite of passage to 
adulthood marked by circumcision, provokes the interrogation of identity with a renewed 
intensity: “I don’t know what curses I shouted or uttered. All I can tell you is that I woke up, 
my body wet with sweat, my throat aching from crying and saying again and again and 
again, ‘Who am I? Where am I? Where am I? Who am I?’ ” (97). This is a question Askar 
apparently is unable to answer right until the end of the narrative when he is arrested on 
suspicion of involvement in the murder of his foster mother and ritual mutilation of the 











betrayed the Somali community among whom she was raised for the Ethiopian man with 
whom she is ethnically linked. Misra is the product of the union of an Amhara nobleman and 
an Oromo woman, but who, from a young age, was brought up in a Somali household. 
Closure does not yield any answers to the mysteries of the novel. Askar till the end cannot 
answer the existential question, neither do we as readers solve the mystery of the crime 
committed. There are no solutions since at the end, the narrative circles back to the 
beginning. This effect is created since at the end it appears that the novel, in fact, is just the 
story Askar tells to himself or is a dramatization of the trial where he, Askar, is the accused, 
judge and jury (Cobham 88-90). The questions, “Who am I?”, “Where am I?”, are ultimately 
sucked into a self-destructive vortex. As Lukács suggests of the identity constituted by 
modernism, when “Man is reduced to a sequence of unrelated experiential fragments he is as 
inexplicable to others as to himself” (Realism in Our Time 26).   
  The existential-cum-national question posed in Maps remains a secret as does the 
identity of Misra’s murderer. But, the concept of the “secret” itself is destabilized in the 
closing novel of the trilogy, Secrets. The secret at the heart of Secrets, as a number of critics 
note, is that there are no secrets, since every secret seems to be available to those from whom 
the secret must remain most hidden. The novel, Secrets, is set in the period just prior to 
Siyad Barre’s flight from Mogadiscio in 1991. Thereafter, Somalia was plunged into a 
bloody civil war, which, in the context, assumed the form of clan warfare. Thus, while Maps 
interprets the dissolution of personal identity in conjunction with the dissolution of national 
identity, Secrets aligns fragmented personal identity with a critique of clan identity. Like 
Askar, Kalaman is plagued by existential uncertainty: “I was a self-questioner, my head 











question of identity in this novel is linked with the notion of the secret. Nonno, Kalaman’s 
putative grandfather, suggests: “Secrets define us, they mark us, they set us apart from all the 
others. The secrets which we preserve provide a key to who we are, deep down” (144). But, 
as has been noted, in Secrets there are no secrets. So identity loses its ontological foundation. 
The question implicitly asked by Kalaman, “Who am I?”, interrogates the idea of patrilinear 
descent. Traditionally, every Somali child carries the name of his father and grandfather. But 
Kalaman is neither his father nor his grandfather’s descendant. He is the product of a gang-
rape whose leader is known only by the initials Y.M.I. (“Why am I?”). Kalaman thus 
constitutes a conundrum to clan identity but his subjectivity is not quite as radically fractured 
as Askar’s, already pointing to the direction taken in the two novels which probably will 
form part of the third trilogy. 
 While realism marks the historical moment of the production of the individual, the 
disengaged, morally autonomous Enlightenment subject, postmodern dissolution marks the 
historical moment of a seemingly liberatory postindividualism. In both Maps and Secrets, 
fragmentation occurs in the constitution of self, nation and clan, reflected in narrative form 
itself. What is fascinating about these two novels, is that dissolution is presented, perhaps as 
the postmodern symptom of the contradiction identified earlier in the realist Bildungsroman, 
as both pathological and emancipatory.  
 The consequence of excessive cerebration on questions of identity for Askar is the 
progression to insanity, but as the madman Khaliif in Close Sesame reminded us, the 
discourse of the mad is the discourse of truth. Lukács, identifies psychopathology as the 
“problem” which is “central to all modernist literature”, but which is also “the goal, the 











self, the schizophrenic identity in Farah’s Maps embodies the ambiguity pointed out by 
Lukács. Schizophrenia figures both as Askar’s debility, but also as “an emblem of creative 
insurrection” (Sass 2) against authoritarian power.  
But on what basis can the claim be made that Askar is schizophrenic? One can assess 
Askar’s characterization against some of the symptoms of schizophrenia identified by Louis 
A. Sass in an analysis of the interpretations of schizophrenia in psychology, psychiatry and 
art. According to Sass, the schizophrenic frequently is identified as “the patient whose very 
essence is ‘incomprehensibility itself’ ” (4). Schizophrenics evoke in others the “praecox 
feeling” – they have an “aura of strangeness and otherworldliness” (4). The schizophrenic 
fears a loss of mastery of his own thoughts (4), therefore he is constantly vigilant, self-
monitoring (9). The schizophrenic experiences the sensation that his body is inhabited by 
others: “Gradually I am no longer able to distinguish how much of myself is in me and how 
much is already in others. I am a conglomeration, a monstrosity, modeled anew each day. … 
It talks out of me.” (quoted in Sass 3). The schizophrenic has the sense that his body is 
inhabited by others. “A distinction between self and world is lacking” (5)  in the schizoid 
identity. The schizophrenic enjoys a feeling of “primitive grandiosity”, an “egocentricity” 
which leads him to believe himself the “centre of the universe” (21).  
Askar’s psychology appears to be sketched, point for point, on the clinical symptoms 
of schizophrenia. As has been noted above, Askar remains incomprehensible to himself and 
to others throughout the novel. Askar elicits the “praecox feeling” in those who encounter 
him. He has a disconcerting “stare” which his uncle interprets as “wicked and satanic” (11). 
As a newborn, Askar is described as “self-conscious.” This self consciousness, develops into 











attempted mastery of self: “You began debating with the egos of which you were 
compounded, and, detaching itself from the other selves, there stood before you , substantial 
as a shadow, the self (in you) which did not at all approve of your talking with or touching 
Misra, lest you were lost in the intensity of her embrace” (60). Hyper-vigilance is manifested 
even more clearly in an episode where Askar is ill: “Indeed, you were too shocked to allow 
one of your selves to stand out from the others, with a view to studying the activities, 
thoughts of your primary self” (70). The consequence of self-reflexivity is splitting of the 
subject. The infant Askar is perceived in his recollection of other’s views to be adult – the 
adult in the child. He is able to access different zones of reality in both the natural and 
supernatural worlds: “Perhaps his stars have conferred upon him the fortune of holding 
simultaneously multiple citizenships of different kingdoms: that of the living and that of the 
dead; not to mention that of being an infant and an adult at the same time” (11-2). The result 
of potentially infinite splitting is that the boundary of the self becomes unclear. The subject 
loses the ability to distinguish between self and other, self and world. Askar, for example, 
perceives himself to be an extension of his foster mother, Misra. He imagines himself either 
as her third breast, thus feminizing his own sex; or as her third leg, in this way identifying 
himself with the phallus.  
More significantly, however, Askar regards himself as the objective correlative of the 
nation. When the Somali forces are vanquished by the Ethiopians, Askar falls gravely ill. 
Like the case discussed by Sass of a woman who experiences her own sensations as mere 
“epiphenomena” of actions performed upon an imagined machine, Askar’s pain is the pain 
suffered by the nation. Frequently the schizophrenic entertains  notions of megalomania. 











Askar is the self-made man residing in the autotelic or self-made text – the text is the 
retrospective narration of the individual who has developed to the point where he could 
construct his own story. Askar believes himself to have been present at his own birth (14), he 
believes that he “made himself”, he was “his own creation” (23 and 33), and he dreams a 
dream where he is inside a woman trying to give birth to himself (191). These delusions are 
encouraged by the circumstances of his birth. Paternity, remains a mystery to the end. Is 
Askar the son of Cali Xamari, the warrior who died for the Somali cause, or the rather less 
heroic Aw-Adan? Did Askar’s mother die just before or just after giving birth? Did she or 
did she not suckle him? Since both paternity and maternity are in some ways uncertain, 
Askar is confirmed in the conviction that he is autogamous. The unejected egg which Misra 
finds in a hen she slaughters also holds great symbolic value for the young self-generating 
man, Askar. If Askar believes he can create himself, Askar also imagines he has the power to 
“re-create” himself. Askar’s delusions are to a certain extent encouraged by his Uncle Hilaal, 
who is a psychology lecturer. In a letter to his nephew, Hilaal suggests that Askar may be 
like the epic heroes Sunjata and Mwendo, Sunjata, “an adult when he was three,” and 
Mwendo, “born through a middle finger” (22).  “Primitive grandiosity” also manifests in his 
suggestion that Misra may not be real. She may just be a figment of his over-fertile 
imagination.  
 All these aspects of the characterization of Askar are present also in the 
characterization of Kalaman in Secrets. Paternity is uncertain since Damac falls pregnant 
after a gang-rape. (The brutal image of the gang-rape is foreshadowed earlier in Maps when 
Misra is violated by a group of Somali men who claim she was raped by baboons.) The 











friend Sholoongo’s menstrual blood from a thimble. Similar to the constitution of 
community through the Eucharist, the drinking of Sholoongo’s blood symbolically 
establishes descent from her in the female line as opposed to the privileging of the male line 
in Somali kinship structures. With many fathers and mothers, Kalaman may entertain the 
idea that he creates himself and so may rationally choose parents. Similarly, parents may 
choose Kalaman as a child, as his felicitous “adoption” by Yaqut and Nonno attest.  
The child one assumes will be born to Sholoongo after the reverse rape of the old 
man, Nonno, takes the idea of uncertain parentage into an abyss. The child born to 
Sholoongo would be autonomous of all conceivable notions of kinship. Sholoongo is 
impregnated by Nonno in Kalaman’s bed. Thus, biologically the father is Nonno. But since 
Sholoongo is impregnated in a “reverse-rape”, paternity seems doubtful. In terms of Islamic 
law, in cases of doubtful paternity, “the child belongs to the bed”. So Kalaman would be the 
father. But Kalaman, being of one blood with Sholoongo, would also be the child’s sibling. 
Since parentage is so hard to fathom, it might be more appropriate to consider the child self-
generating. The novels go to extreme lengths to create the wholly autonomous man, who has 
the power to create and narrate himself. Kalaman, like Askar, is compared with epic heroes 
and prophets. Since he can create himself, he also has the power to re-create and re-invent 
himself. The boundaries of identity thus defined are fluid and unstable. Since the boundaries 
of the subject are pregnable, the object world impinges on the self. Similar to Askar, clan 
strife is experienced in the body of the hero as Kalaman’s fevers and deliriums.  
The decentred or fragmented identities suggested by the schizophrenic in various 
ways come to be celebrated in the novels. The narratives suggest that both Askar and 











identity. Until Askar realizes the entirely arbitrary nature of the grounding of national 
identity on Somali ethnicity and Somali language, his development is stymied. Until 
Kalaman understands that the obsession with biological origins is an obsession with self-
destructive, authoritarian clan rhetoric, his development is hampered. Self-realization entails 
recognition of the apparently more authentic divided nature of the self. While the anti-hero, 
Oskar, in Gunter Grass’s  Tin Drum (one of the intertextual points of reference of Maps) is a 
parodic allegory of German nationalism, Askar’s take on the intersection of personal and 
national identity is a little more anguished. In order to heal himself, Askar needs to view his 
fractured self differently. He needs to be happy in his schizophrenia. Kalaman’s quest will be 
fulfilled upon the realization that biological fatherhood, the basis of clan identity, is not as 
meaningful as the relationships one “freely chooses.” Kalaman must internalize Nonno’s 
maxim: “I am a person, a clan is a mob. […] I am reasonable. Clans are not” (297). Identity 
is not given by birth or by any other ontological fundament. Identity is protean, shape-
shifting. The subject may construct himself however he desires. Development is not 
contained. Development is infinite. This is the wisdom in the name Nonno gives to the 
newborn child, suggested to him by the pre-Islamic Somali totem, the crow. The child is 
named “Kalaman”, a “cul-de-sac of a name”, since it is a pure signifier. It refers to nothing 
beyond itself. It has no meaning. As Derek Wright suggests apropos of the name, 
“Kalaman”: “It … encourages him [Kalaman] to achieve, existentially, the autonomy 
exemplified by his name; to stand independently as a self-determining, self-invented being 
(like Nonno himself), supplying his own identity instead of relying on prior connections of 











Farah’s novels point to the discourse of exclusivist identity of nation and clan as the 
basis of the complete rejection of both these forms of community. What this approach 
overlooks, is the fact that the rhetoric of nationhood often is the symbolic form which 
articulates more complex issues which impact materially on ways of life. The dispute over 
the Ogaden, for example, was only superficially about the national integrity of an essentialist 
idea of Somaliness. More significantly, it was a dispute about colonially imposed borders 
which strongly impacted upon Somali forms of life: “… the international borders between 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia cut through the pastoralists’ rangelands, leaving 
Somali clans living in more than one state.” (Bradbury 24). Furthermore, the self-destruction 
of the Somali nation is often attributed simplistically in the media, and ironically in Farah’s 
novels which challenge this view, to the destructive propensities of “clannism”, ignoring the 
fact that what one was witnessing was not the dynamic of traditional kinship, but the 
dynamic of traditional kinship in articulation with a modern state-formation and modern 
economy. Farah’s novels, superficially at least, attempt to present worldviews in conflict 
with the ideology of the novels. Most critics concur, however, that  traditional Somali 
kinship is the one worldview to which the novels are closed. The often observed “democratic 
openness” of Farah’s novels is closed only to the idea of clan. (Ironically, the fragile stability 
which holds in the Somaliland Republic was established precisely on the basis of indigenous 
clan conflict resolution procedures.)  
 The fluid nature of identity endorsed by the novels is attested in many ways. One 
way of showing that identity is shifting is to construct characters who defy conventional 
gender stereotypes. Farah’s novels frequently are inhabited by  “masculine” women and 











uncommon in Farah’s world. The reversal of traditional gender roles encountered in Sardines 
continues in the later novels with men who are comfortable in conventional female roles and 
financially independent, car-driving, gun-wielding women. Yaqut in Secrets goes so far as 
“breastfeeding” Kalaman. The borders between zones of reality are also not firmly fixed. 
Nonno in Secrets, for example, appears able to access other dimensions of existence. Species 
borders also are fluid, with the shape-shifting Sholoongo embodied sometimes as a human 
being and at other times as an animal. Sex and sexuality as markers of identity are also 
imploded. Sex becomes a marker of identity in the context of the laws of incest. There is an 
intimate link between one’s own identity and the identity of others since carnal knowledge of 
these others might be prohibited. Who one is determines with whom one might have sexual 
relations. Similarly, homo- or hetero-sexuality, which as Foucault points out is defined only 
in the context of the nineteenth-century European science of sexuality, also is an index of 
identity. All of these markers of identity are imploded in Secrets  with the transgression of all 
conventional taboos, certainly taboos which are operative in Somali society (Samatar, S “Are 
there Secrets in Secrets”). Both Maps and Secrets  take a prurient interest in bestiality, 
paedophilia, homo- and bi-sexuality, onanism and incest, proving beyond any reasonable 
doubt the conviction of Askar’s Uncle Hilaal – “sooner or later, sex” (234). What Hilaal 
suggests by this maxim is that the sex drive, rather than rationality or spirituality, appears to 
lie at the core of all social relations. The inescapability of sex restores the body to a position 
of centrality in debate. What is interesting about the restoration of the body in both Maps and 
Secrets is that the significance of the body is recovered almost completely through the mind, 











 But to return to the question of schizophrenia, Sass observes that frequently in 
psychology schizophrenia is interpreted as a more vital mode of being associated with 
infantile regression. This is taken up in the celebration of schizoid identity in the arts where 
the hybrid self is identified with more “primitive”, but more authentic pre-Enlightenment 
modes of being (6-7). A similar evolutionary identification is made in the novels under 
consideration. The fluid identities constructed in the novels are shown implicitly to connect 
with and reinvent non-modern enchanted states of being. The ritual exorcism of the “cuudis” 
and “mingis” ceremonies, where “jinn” inhabit the bodies of the afflicted, and people speak 
in the voices of others, is symbolically crucial in Maps. But the social frame within which 
spirit possession occurs is profoundly different from fluid identity which is the paradoxical 
product of self-possession. 
But perhaps the most significant association in this regard is the link between Askar’s 
schizophrenic identity and Misra’s identity. In a lucid glimmering, Askar recognizes that 
Misra is the true heroine of the story. She is the heroine since she appears not to be 
incapacitated by issues of identity as Askar is. She is the product of a “damoz” union 
between an Amhara nobleman and an Oromo slave woman, brought up as a Somali, 
speaking an accented Somali and who unknowingly enters an incestuous relationship with 
her younger Ethiopian brother. Misra quite literally is the “bastard”, “mongrel”, “hybrid” 
identity frequently presented as a utopian ideal in postmodern art. But the text elides a very 
significant difference between Askar’s identity and Misra’s identity which superficially 
appear similar. These subjectivities are the product of two very different worldviews. While  
Askar’s subjectivity is the ultimate construct of a self disengaged from the social and 











It might be useful to adopt the terminology used by Charles Taylor to demonstrate 
the difference between the identities of Askar and Misra. Taylor uses the term “porous” 
(Taylor Sources of the Self 187-193, Secular Age 37-41) to describe the pre-individualist self 
who orients herself in relation  to an external ethical horizon. Since this self is constituted in 
relation to a code outside of itself, it necessarily views itself as fundamentally connected 
with both other subjects and with the world of objects. Subject-object is not a dichotomy or a 
divide. Reason exists, but it is substantive, not procedural. Misra may, like Askar, ask the 
question, “Who am I?”. But for Misra, this would not be a question of identity as an 
existential category. It may be an enquiry as to whose daughter or whose sister she is. But it 
certainly is not a question about how Misra should create or construct herself out of her own 
resources. In fact, Askar suggests in his meditations that Misra “knew who she was”(26). If 
it were the case that Misra asked the ontological question, “Who am I?”, the story would be 
Misra’s. But it is not Misra’s story and in the novel cannot be. It is Askar’s story. Misra’s 
acceptance of the diversity of her background is not the acceptance of “hybrid”, “fluid”, 
“schizophrenic” identity as a permanent condition. It’s the acceptance instead of alternate 
embedding. The narrative never presents Misra in the first person, neither is it ever focalized 
through Misra. Misra’s representation is filtered through Askar’s consciousness. Misra’s 
history is presented in about a page and a half. Like the grandfather in From a Crooked Rib, 
Misra’s story it appears is not a story the novel can tell. Misra, like the grandfather, must die 
at the end.      
    Askar’s self, by contrast, constitutes what Taylor refers to as a “buffered” self 
(Sources of the Self 187-193, A Secular Age 37-41). This is the self which is ontologically 











ethical horizons, each man is a world unto himself. This is the model of subjectivity 
constructed by the Cartesian revolution. The postmodern, decentred self is not so much a 
challenge to autonomous identity as it is the product of too intense a focus on the disengaged 
self. In other words, to quote a psychiatrist quoted by Christopher Lasch in The Culture of 
Narcissism, “schizophrenia is above all a narcissistic disorder” (172), an observation verified 
by the symbolic importance of mirrors in virtually all Farah’s novels. Indeed, Lasch claims 
an even broader significance for narcissism, holding the self-centred, self-adoring subject as 
the model citizen of the post-industrial world: 
Economic man himself has given way to the psychological man of our times – the 
final product of bourgeois individualism. The new narcissist is not haunted by guilt 
but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a 
meaning in life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the 
reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use 
for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of 
group loyalties … (xvi). 
Lasch’s observations find a correlative in any of Farah’s heroes. 
Louis Sass expands on the narcissistic element in schizophrenia. Sass suggests that 
the schizophrenic is the product not so much of the symbolic rejection of rationalist 
repression, as the product of too intense a focus on the autonomous Enlightenment self: “ the 
fragmented self [is] no less a product of what one might call illusions of the cogito, than its 
opposite” (3). Sass identifies the schizophrenic world of “intense introspection” as “a 
depersonalized, divided world pervaded by what, following Michel Foucault, we might call 
an inner ‘panopticism’ ” (22). As if to confirm symbolically the centrality of cogitation to the 
schizoid identity, Askar experiences the inability to think as an illness: “I cannot think,” he 











the effect of the “hypertrophy of attentive self-reflexive awareness” (10). In other words, the 
disengaged self, trying to pin down its own essence, paradoxically yields the fragmentation 
of that prior self. Thus, as Sass stresses, the subject effaces itself “while simultaneously 
obscuring its own role in this effacement” (8). Sass employs the analogy of the man trying to 
see the dark by very quickly turning on the light to explain the paradoxical effect of intense, 
self-reflexive introspection. The analogue of this effect in literature is the mise-en-abyme, 
the stock in trade of modernist and postmodernist art. Since the disengaged subject occludes 
its own totalizing role in this procedure, totality stealthily and transparently re-enters Eden. 
The absolute interiority and solipsism of this procedure is captured in Askar’s dream of a 
golden age where Askar’s angst is replaced by existential certainty. His question which 
echoes through the novel, “Who am I?”, is answered in the dream – “I am I” (96). The “I-
am-Thou” motif of the spiritual quester, the heteronomous self who defines himself in 
relation to the transcendental other, for example, is replaced by the infinite mirror image 
reflexivity of the self-defining subject.  
One might describe this effect identified by Sass on the model proposed by Taylor. 
The subject, unmoored from an external ethics, relies upon procedural reason to construct an 
internal moral horizon. But the figurative cord which bound the subject to a 
social/transcendental higher order is also the cord which keeps the subject himself bounded. 
Internal moral horizons result in infinite self-reflexivity. Untethered from a stable external 
order, the subject is first loosened from the world, then loosened from other subjects. 
Ultimately the subject himself falls apart. Schizophrenic fragmentation is the ultimate 
consequence of the initial delinking, the moment when the subject disengages from an 











That dissolution is encoded in the moment of the installation of the subject as 
individual, is eloquently captured by Marshall Berman’s analysis of a central tension in 
Marxism. Berman makes clear what is implied in Marx. Where Taylor uses the metaphors of 
“embedding” and “disembedding” drawn from Giddens, Berman expands on the “clothed” 
and “naked” metaphors for the subject in Marx. The subject in pre-capitalist societies, born 
into “status,” where “status” also suggests for Marx a kind of “stasis,” is the “clothed” self. 
The subject released by capitalism, by contrast, is “naked”, suggesting both the radical 
possibility and vulnerability of bourgeois individualism: 
Marx believes that the shocks and upheavals and catastrophes of life in 
bourgeois society enable moderns, by going through them, as Lear does, to 
discover who they “really are”. But if bourgeois society is as volatile as Marx 
thinks it is, how can its people ever settle on any real selves? With all the 
possibilities and necessities that bombard the self and all the desperate drives that 
propel it, how can anyone define definitively which ones are essential and which 
ones merely incidental? The nature of the newly naked modern man may turn out 
to be as elusive and mysterious as that of the old, clothed one, maybe even more 
elusive, because there will no longer be any illusion of a real self underneath the 
masks. Thus, along with community and society, individuality itself may be 
melting into the modern air (110).   
But, of course, the individual has not melted “into the modern air.” The individual, 
wearing the many masks of the divided, hybrid self is with us yet. Ironically, as Barry Adam 
notes, “… the postmodern romance with locality, hybridity, and mobility is entirely 
consistent with global trends in capital” (105). Adams refers to Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri to suggest further that “… Empire too is bent on doing away with modern forms of 











both the self and the nation, while utopian in their ambition, leave untouched the more 
significant inequalities. This occurs since the fluid self embodies no agency and therefore 
represents no real threat to the system. And the provisional map is in practice no map at all, 
leaving the terrain to its prior distorted charting.  The schizophrenic identity represented by 
Askar is only ever, as Lukács suggests, “… a gesture … that is destined to lead nowhere, it is 
an escape into nothingness” (Realism in Our Time 29).  Adam draws on Zygmunt Bauman 
and Nancy Fraser to propose that postmodernism is “a site clearing operation, but the risk 
run by deconstruction is that its intellectual efforts fall back into a world which marches on 
and once the ‘site’ has been ‘cleared’ of Western, Enlightenment modernist narratives, what 
curiously still remains by default is the neoliberal individual” (104). 
 
II Links: Towards Reconstruction 
Some form of centred subjectivity is both that which is most hidden and an absolute 
requirement of the system. Above all else, Farah remains a highly political, socially 
concerned writer, and it is virtually impossible to construct a politics based on pathologically 
fragmented identity. This realization stops Farah from allowing Kalaman to slide into 
Askar’s existential abyss. Kalaman is an altogether more banal character compared to Askar. 
Kalaman, as a character, reminds one finally of Ebla, the heroine of Farah’s first published 
proto-realist novel. Like Ebla, Kalaman is radically disembedded. His formation shares with 
Ebla’s development trajectory the potential boundlessness of youth, ultimately contained by 
the social contract of marriage. Kalaman will marry the rather more constrained and 
contained Talaado in preference over the shape-shifting Sholoongo. This marriage again is a 











outcome of the “free choice” of the rational subject, liberated from tradition, but now, 
crucially, masking a “unity” in fragmentation.  The image of the mask and subjectivity 
theatrically adopted as a “persona” (the Latin word for “mask”) is significant in Maps and 
Secrets and crucial in the later novel, Knots.  
 Since it is impossible to base a politics on pathologically fragmented identity, the 
tentative coherence of the subject suggested in Secrets is more fully realized in the next 
novel, Links. Clearly in Links, “innovative self-destruction”, to quote Marshall Berman, 
quoting a 1978 Mobil oil advertisement, no longer is an option. As Christopher Lasch 
suggests, “Escape through irony and critical self-awareness is … itself an illusion”, 
providing  “only momentary relief.” “Distancing soon becomes a routine in its own right,” 
and ultimately “inhibits spontaneity” becoming “as constraining as the social roles from 
which they are meant to provide ironic detachment” (96).  
Links tells the story of the exile, Jeebleh, who returns to Mogadiscio after almost 
twenty years in New York where he has established a family and a career. Jeebleh returns to 
Mogadiscio ostensibly to locate his mother’s grave. His mother has died nine years prior. As 
in many Farah novels where motives are never uncomplicated, it would appear that Jeebleh 
returns also to Mogadiscio, the city of death, in the hope of disorienting death. He has had a 
close brush with mortality in an accident involving a taxi driven by a Somali immigrant to 
New York. But these may just be rational justifications for Jeebleh’s “true” motive. He may 
have been drawn to Mogadiscio to settle scores with his “step-brother” and lifetime enemy, 
Caloosha, the perpetrator of numerous criminal and cruel deeds and responsible for the 
detention of both Jeebleh and his best friend, Bile, who is also Caloosha’s brother. Jeebleh 











of two young girls, Raasta and Makka, who may have been kidnapped by Caloosha and 
whom Jeebleh hopes heroically to rescue in the process of exacting revenge upon his enemy.  
In Jeebleh’s return, a number of motifs come together symbolized by the title of the 
novel, Links. In coming to Mogadiscio, Jeebleh re-establishes a “link” with the homeland, 
which simultaneously is a voyage of self-discovery, allowing him to connect with himself 
and with other like-minded characters, who attempt to reconstitute the body politic. Here, 
dissolution is read only pathologically, a symptom of the collective insanity of the nation. 
Schizophrenia and madness are read as psychological responses to a society self-destructing, 
no longer as a liberatory release from a repressive autonomous self. On witnessing social 
fragmentation in the city, Jeebleh repeatedly refers to the “borderline schizophrenia” (125, 
137) of its inhabitants. The father of one of the missing girls appears to be a schizoid 
personality (226-7), identified with the guilty conscience of a Lady Macbeth, at being a 
passive witness of the slide into anarchy. In an Islamic take on Lady Macbeth’s obsessional 
hand washing, Faahiye compulsively performs the ritual ablution in an attempt to purify 
himself of guilt. Jeebleh’s best friend, Bile, appears to suffer from a “mental imbalance” 
(282) for which he requires “chloral anti-depressants” (296). In the next novel, Knots, it is 
clear that medication is insufficient to compose Bile’s dissociating self.  
 If allusion served in earlier novels to suggest the literary “constructedness” of a self 
which had no stabilizing core, in Links allusion serves to give depth and authenticity to a 
centred protagonist. The texts alluded to are Dante’s Inferno, the Faust myth, Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Interestingly, Ian Watt in Myths of Modern 
Individualism, identifies Faust and Crusoe as two of four “grand” mythical figures of 











Don Quixote and Don Juan.) Dante, whose Thomistic conception of man’s relationship to 
God, is shot through by a hitherto unknown focus on the self, makes him the subject of the 
claims of both Medievalists and Renaissance scholars. Dante locates the source of his 
subjectivity in a pre-Renaissance conception of the centrality of God but Dante, unlike any 
other author of the Middle Ages, makes the self the focus of sustained attention. For Jacob 
Burckhardt in The Civilization of the Renaissance Dante is “the most national herald of the 
time” as a result of “the wealth of individuality which he set forth” (82). Or as another Dante 
scholar asserts: “At the same time, Dante is the supreme example in literary history of the 
writer who, at every important turn, is seeking himself (humanly, morally, psychologically, 
imaginatively), finding himself, defining himself – in effect, telling his life story” (Lewis, 
R.W.B. 100 ) Similarly, Heart of Darkness is frequently read as the paradigmatic text of 
modernist subjectivity.  
Dante Alighieri’s Inferno, the first canticle of The Divine Comedy, is a strong literary 
antecedent in Links. In an interesting, ironic twist, Dante the Pilgrim descends into Hell and 
discovers that it looks remarkably much like his native Florence. Jeebleh, by contrast, returns 
to his native Mogadiscio and discovers that it looks remarkably much like Hell. Even if it 
were not for this superficial similarity, there are a number of other reasons why Farah might 
identify with Dante. Dante like Farah was an exile whose writing obliges him to revisit again 
and again the soil of his birth. Dante, through his political activities and his association with 
a Florentine faction called the White Guelphs, was forced into exile from his beloved 
Florence for over 19 years until his death. The clan politics of Dante’s Florence, strike one as 
remarkably similar to the politics of Mogadiscio. Allusions to Dante’s The Divine Comedy 











is alluded to in a network of intertextuality encompassing Joyce, Beckett and also Soyinka.  
The Divine Comedy appears to inform Links at numerous levels. It appears to be part of the 
mental universe of a number of the characters. When he arrives in Mogadiscio, Jeebleh is 
met at the airport by a character variously called Af-Laawe or Marabou. Interestingly, 
Jeebleh assumes that Af-Laawe has given himself this nickname, which means “No-Mouth” 
in Somali, as a conscious reference to the character “No-Mouth” in The Divine Comedy. 
Jeebleh himself, we are informed in the text, while studying in Italy, did a Somali translation 
of the Inferno as a dissertation. Jeebleh’s Irish friend, Seamus, who also studied with him in 
Italy, is quite unproblematically able to quote a Dantean verse apropos to the Somali civil 
war.    
But the Inferno is more deeply constitutive of Links also. In the structure of its plot, 
Links parallels the movement of Dante the Pilgrim on his spiritual journey from being lost in 
the forests of despair, through the gates and all the circles of Hell to Lucifer’s inner sanctum 
and out on the other side. Where Dante the Pilgrim is guided in his descent through the 
Inferno by the reliable, trustworthy pagan poet, Virgil, who represents Wisdom, Jeebleh is 
guided through the hell that is Mogadiscio by the deceptive, corrupt, thieving Af-Laawe. In 
The Divine Comedy when Dante first sees Virgil, he is described as a “shade”. The first thing 
Jeebleh sees of Af-Laawe, is his shadow: “Turning, he saw the stranger’s late afternoon 
shadow” (11). Part of the inscription above Hell’s gate in The Divine Comedy forms the 
epigraph to the first part of the novel in the later Duckworth edition. It reads: “Through me 
the way into the suffering city / Through me the way to the eternal pain, / Through me the 











Hell’s gate itself is represented in Links by the gates of the hotel where Jeebleh stays 
on first arriving in the city. Like Dante the Pilgrim, who is so overcome by what he 
witnesses in the vestibule of hell, that he swoons on the banks of the river Acheron while 
waiting for the ferryman to take them to the other side, Jeebleh also, once inside the 
Mogadiscio hotel “[takes] leave of his senses for a few exhausted seconds, during which he 
may or may not have known who he was, where he was or what on earth he was doing 
there.” (L 41) The epilepsy or “falling sickness” which was supposed to have afflicted Dante 
the Poet and certainly repeatedly affects Dante the Pilgrim in his journey through the 
netherworld, is reflected in Jeebleh’s occasional passing out and is made to resonate very 
strongly in an episode at the end of the novel involving an epileptic who has a seizure on a 
Mogadiscio street. With an economy and simplicity strikingly similar to the exit of Dante the 
Pilgrim from the Inferno, Jeebleh emerges from the hell that is Mogadiscio. Where Dante 
emerges from the crepuscular gloom to see the stars, Jeebleh emerges from the mist to see 
the sun. Dante’s Hell “is shaped in concentric circles that spiral downward ever tighter, until 
you reach Betrayal” (Menocal xiv). Traitors are the sinners who keep the devil company. 
And, for a number of reasons, Jeebleh regards himself as a traitor and betrayal similarly 
seems to occupy the very heart of the architecture of Mogadiscio as Hell. Links suggests that 
the civil war in Somalia needs to be understood as the betrayal of one Somali by another. Af-
Laawe, Jeebleh’s treacherous guide, observes: “In a civil war, death is an intimate … You’re 
killed by a person with whom you’ve shared intimacies, and who may benefit from your 
death” ( 128). Af-Laawe undercores his point by referring to the Somali expression for civil 
war, “dagaalka sokeeye”, which translates as “killing an intimate”. Of all the explanations 











it all, lies the betrayal of one individual by another. At a personal level, Jeebleh suspects, 
agonizingly, that through his “brother” Caloosha’s offices, his mother may have died 
thinking her son was a traitor: “ Jeeble[h] [sic] imagined Caloosha calling on his mother, 
sitting by her bedside day in and day out, and describing him as the epitome of betrayal. 
Could she, in truth, have seen him as a traitor, someone who belonged outside of the 
precincts of human community?” ( 219). If Lucifer is the arch-traitor in the inner circle of 
Dante’s Hell, Caloosha is the Devil in Farah’s Links. The text quite explicitly identifies 
Caloosha as the source of whatever disharmony, violence, corruption, cruelty and brutality 
exist in the novel. Caloosha, the brother of Bile, who, it appears, murdered his own father 
and had a hand in his incarceration under the Dictator, is represented as pure, unadulterated 
evil, a supporter of inter-clan strife, an oppressor of women and the head of a cartel dealing 
in body parts.  
 There is, however, a highly significant difference between the Divine Comedy and its 
use in Links. Political analysis in Farah’s novel, distills down to the inherent evil in certain 
individuals, challenged, as we shall see, by the good in others, symbolized by the miracle 
child, Raasta. Evil and good exist as metaphysical categories, however, in an individualist 
philosophy which structurally cannot produce such ontologies. The “architectural” structure 
of the Divine Comedy sustains a focus on the unique person, but each person is offset against 
a transcendental moral horizon. In the afterlife, each sinner is punished according to the 
nature and degree of his sin which is judged against an ontologically fixed moral code. The 
culture of individualism, the crucible which forms Farah’s novels, exists, in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s terms, “After Virtue”, since the autonomous disengaged self cannot construct a 











outside of the individualist worldview of the novels. But in the process of the individualist 
“reinvention” of sacred eschatology, the social practices in which good and evil were 
constituted is lost. Good and evil exist in the novel simply as sensational elements in a  
world without complexity.  
The way in which the myth of Faust is used in the novel suggests another inherent 
problem in the manner in which the novel resurrects and elides the origins of ethics. If 
Jeebleh’s unacknowledged motive for returning to Mogadiscio is to kill the cruel and 
villanous Caloosha, then, like Faust, he has entered into a pact with the Devil. The novel 
progressively exposes how Jeebleh’s story is drawn into the corrupt and corrupting influence 
of the civil war story. This is represented in a number of ways, one of which is Jeebleh’s 
fascination with guns, culminating in his finally carrying one and not being incapacitated by 
conscience in using it to settle a minor dispute between a food vendor and a petty thief. 
Jeebleh’s unholy desire to kill Caloosha draws him into spheres of influence and activity, the 
unacceptable nature of which dictate that he for the first time tells half-truths and bleached 
versions of the truth to his wife and two daughters back home in New York. The text 
suggests that, “he wouldn’t hesitate to lie if he believed that by doing so he might serve a 
higher purpose: that of justice.” Paradoxically for Jeebleh the quest for justice draws him 
closer and closer to the Devil, much like Caloosha’s quest for power makes him Evil 
incarnate. The Irishman, Seamus, friend to Jeebleh and Bile, who has made Mogadiscio his 
second home, remarks that: “Hell is a warlord who has ransomed his soul to Satan in 
exchange for elusive power” (57). Caloosha himself is cynically aware of the price he has 











that he “reactivate his conscience”, he states: “I’m afraid I cannot as I sold it [my 
conscience] to the Devil to pay for a mortgage on the house of my self-promotion” (133). 
What makes problematic the text’s analysis of the character of Caloosha, who 
presumably is the type for many of the warlords operating in Mogadiscio, is that his 
psychopathic behaviour appears not to be the consequence of a self-interest unchecked by 
societal control since Somali society is non-functional. It appears rather to be the 
consequence of the fact that he is innately evil. In a sense, he is presented as a detestable 
Devil whose inauspicious beginnings – he was born in the breech position – very nearly kills 
his mother and fatefully determines his character. The Evil that is Caloosha is epitomized by 
the anxiety of his own mother, who before her death, had remarked: “It’s very difficult to rid 
yourself of the monster whom you’ve given birth to yourself, fed raised and looked after, and 
then let loose on the world” (156).  She is brought to this point since he had been a “difficult 
child to raise.” He is cruel, throws knives at living targets, and displays a penchant for setting 
things alight. Caloosha, the warlord, who represents other warlords, is marked by the text as 
a congenitally evil monster: “Caloosha’s distended belly was filled with the sentiments of 
war and wickedness, which was why he looked so ugly and so unhealthy. Attrition retarded 
his brain, evil dulled his imagination, not sharpened it” (97). Since Links, dedicated as it is to 
autonomous individuality, cannot construct a moral horizon since morality is necessarily 
social, it resorts in sensationalistic terms to the moral vocabulary of other social codes, but 
without the complex social network of obligations out of which this moral vocabulary arises.    
Numerous explanations for the Somali collapse have been proposed sometimes as 
single factors and sometimes as a combination of factors. Many of these analyses are 











Ahmed Samatar. Among these explanations are included: the destabilizing effect of colonial 
manipulation of tradition and the imposition of colonial national boundaries, the breakdown 
of civil society as a consequence of more than three decades of dictatorship, Cold War proxy 
rivalries and tensions, the sometimes deliberate and sometimes unforeseen effects of 
international aid; urbanization and unequal distribution of resources between the middle 
class and the unemployed and a host of other factors. Yet in Links, all this complexity is 
distilled down to the individual and issues forth in statements like: “… in civil wars, both 
those violated and the violators suffer from a huge lack – the inability to remain in touch 
with their inner selves” (69). “… when a society has lost its general sense of direction and 
along with it, its self-respect, then every individual is on his or her own, miserably alone” ( 
104). “Neither the city nor the nation had a unifying theme. We were headless as 
individuals…” (108). “Let’s blame it on the civil war, … Let’s blame it on our sick minds, 
on the tantrums that belong in our heads. Let’s blame it on the endemic violence, the cruelty 
that’s been let loose on the weak. Let’s blame it on our damaged sense of self” ( 153). “I 
believe that it is time that we squared up to our demons as individuals, time that we owned 
up, time we let go and had a good, clean grief” (154). “He wished … [that] instead of 
insisting that the self is not to blame, [everyone] would admit their part in the collapse, to the 
culpability of every individual in the failure” (163). While not denying the factor of the 
agency of each person, it is misleading to locate all Somalia’s ills only in the autonomous 
individual disengaged from its social circumstance.  
It is precisely this limited and limiting view of the crisis which leads Jeebleh to his 
simplistic “individual” and, to a certain extent, megalomaniac solution. His singular 











Hamlet-like indecision which hangs over Maps, to an exaggerated sense of the significance 
of the individual intervention. To serve the greater cause of justice which consists in the 
liberation of the child of peace, Raasta, he feels justified in killing her captors, which in the 
actual outcome of the story proves unnecessary: 
So which would I rather be, someone who kills for justice, or someone 
helplessly unable to do a thing? I would rather I killed instead of twiddling my 
thumbs, waiting for others to do the job. To hell with the opinion of others, 
especially my clansmen, who haven’t the right to sit in judgement on my actions! I 
am all for justice by any means possible (300). 
  Links shares a number of structural similarities also with Joseph Conrad’s modernist 
Bildungsroman, Heart of Darkness. Early on in the narrative, reference is made to self-
recuperation as forging “a link to the darkness at the centre of [one’s] life” (55). This 
summary of Heart of Darkness (in part indebted to Michael Levenson) makes clear its 
similarity with the plot structure of Links: A man leaves his home to travel to another 
country where he hopes to conclude unsettled matters. The country itself and the people he 
meets there disturb his moral certainties. As a consequence of his experiences, he finds 
himself adopting the distorted morality of the alien country. Despite his transformation, he is 
unable to remain in the alien country. He returns to the normality of his home, but will feel 
forever estranged among his acquaintances. 
However, while the subjectivity Marlow discovers is “hollow” to the core, 
subjectivity in Links is centred, but within a moral horizon structurally outside of its own 
possibility. The character, Jeebleh, marks a return once again to the relatively coherent self 
of literary realism. Jeebleh’s development involves finding ways to connect with others 











the individualist truth of the disengaged, independent self; whereafter forms of association 
which leave the individual fundamentally free may be negotiated. Affirming autonomy takes 
the form of a parable, based upon Defoe’s tale of Robinson Crusoe, one of Watt’s “grand” 
myths of modern individualist subject formation. This allusion reverberates in the text, not 
through the central character, Jeebleh, but through his best friend, Bile, whose importance is 
suggested by the fact that, apart from Jeebleh, Bile is the only other narrative focalizer.      
 Significantly, Bile’s general factotum who “rescues” Jeebleh from the suspicious Af-
Laawe is referred to as Bile’s “Man Friday”. This reference to Crusoe’s colonial subject, 
Man Friday, alerts us to the ways in which Bile’s story is modeled on that of Robinson 
Crusoe. Bile has been incarcerated under the Dictatorship. When the Dictator flees 
Mogadiscio in January 1991, the gates of all the prisons, zoos and madhouses are flung open, 
delivering their inmates into the streets. Bile experiences his release from captivity not as an 
exhilarating freedom, but as an experience as terrifying as Crusoe’s shipwreck. Much like 
Crusoe who shuns social ties to pursue his agenda as homo economicus, Bile prefers 
remaining in his cell alone. Bile claims he cannot leave this “room of his own” since he has 
trouble walking as a consequence of muscle atrophy through lack of exercise in prison. Later 
he is forced to leave his cell. Like Crusoe, shipwrecked on the island, who fears attack from 
wild beasts and cannibalistic natives, Bile fears the people on the outside. He encounters, 
what he describes as a gang of marauding youths whom, surprisingly, contradicting his 
earlier claim about his incapacitated condition, he manages to outrun. He fortuitously comes 
upon a house evacuated as he is fleeing from the youths by its obviously well-to-do owners. 
Bile finds that he is alone in the house except for a dog, the analogue of Crusoe’s parrot, 











Crusoe. If Crusoe needs the deserted island in order to stage himself as the hero in a 
narrative about the virtues of economic individualism, Bile needs the empty house to 
compose himself as a hero of a slightly different sort. Bile composes himself, both in the 
sense of recovering after his frightening ordeal, but also in the sense of constituting himself 
as a kind of benevolent, philanthropic actor in the cause of goodness on the model of 
Plotinus, the third century Greek philosopher, whom Bile mentions by name. In the house, 
Bile discovers a duffel bag filled with almost a million US Dollars. Having figuratively 
“pulled himself together”, he ventures forth to construct the world anew. He uses the money 
to fund his experiment in imaginative social construction, called “The Refuge”, for those 
dispossessed by war. He also constructs a hospital and a home for himself and his like-
minded friends. These, to continue the insular motif, are islands of hope in a war-torn land. 
What often goes unnoticed in the myths of self-made men is the occluded extent to 
which they rely on the products of social endeavour. Crusoe, of course, is not wholly 
independent in the construction of his sovereign domain. As Christopher Hill observes, he 
relies on the products of a more social world, brought from the shipwreck: “It is thanks to the 
tools and commodities which Crusoe salvages from the wreck that he is able not only to 
survive but to prosper, drawing on the heritage of centuries of civilisation” (12). What Hill 
refers to as Crusoe’s “mental furniture”, comes from a world in which the subject is 
embedded in social relations, not isolated on an island. Similarly, to construct his “islands of 
hope”, Bile uses the money which is not the product of his independent labour. More 
importantly, however, he fosters in The Refuge positive social practices which have their 
source in precisely the traditional worldview Farah’s novels critique. For example, Bile 











belief that people who eat together will not kill each other. Garuba notes that Bile’s 
experiment “in creating a new kind of public” is anchored “on a traditional practice from the 
past” (193). What is also interesting in Bile’s experiment in a new form of sociality which 
borrows from but tends to elide the past, is Bile’s position as “benevolent sovereign” – he 
constructs a society which, curiously, he is not a part of. What is striking in descriptions of 
Bile’s participation in the social and sociable world he constructs is that he seems to be 
alienated within it. That Bile’s projects will fail is suggested by the decomposition of his self 
which we observe at the end of the novel and which is corroborated in the subsequent novel. 
Social engineering which proceeds on the basis of the autonomous self comes to be 
embodied in the miracle child, Raasta, whose given name, “Rajo”, means “hope.” Raasta has 
a preternatural facility for languages and draws people around herself in peace. Garuba 
suggests that Raasta’s body “becomes the site around which the conventional heterogeneity 
of city life can be performed” ( “No-man’s Land” 193) and her polyglossia is symbolic as 
“the abode of linguistic diversity” (“No-man’s Land 194). Raasta is the wonder child 
conceived and delivered as opposed to the stillborn miracle children  of the earlier novels. 
Unlike these other children who usher in a golden age, Raasta has “ ‘secular’ beginnings, and 
had nothing to do with the religious fevers that were part of the millennial hysteria presaging 
the disastrous end of the corrupt world” (276).  
Raasta’s Down’s syndrome companion, Makka, by contrast for Garuba “represent[s] 
the arrested development of the country and the city and the potential locked away in its 
inarticulacy” (194). At a more primary level, at the level of the subject who constitutes the 
public sphere, Makka may be read as an example of failed Bildung, analogous to Askar of 











the solipsistic ideal of perfect existential certainty, “I am I”, in the later text, the hermetically 
contained self becomes a problem. When Bile finds the orphaned Makka, she utters over and 
over to herself the Somali phrase, “aniga, aniga ah!” translated in the text as “Me, myself I!” 
(149), or in alternate translation, “I am it!”. Towards the end of the novel, furthermore, when 
Jeebleh is having his hair cut in a Mogdiscio barber shop, he catches sight of Makka, who in 
a moment of circular specularity like Narcissus, is enamoured of her own reflection in the 
barber’s mirror: “Yes, Makka was there in the mirror, all right; and she was grinning with 
self-recognition. He watched her watching herself with fascination” ( 259). Thus, while in 
the earlier novels, the self-generating, perfectly self-sufficient subject is presented as a 
utopian ideal, in Links, through the contrast between the prodigy Raasta and the abnormal 
Makka, a shift in the nature of subjectivity is signaled. Complete independence and self-
reliance now are projected as pathological. The individual now needs to connect. 
The transformed subject is the individual who can connect with other individuals, 
who breaks the bonds of isolation, who can make “links” without losing the freedom 
essential to the autonomous self. Links is a novel about entering sociality, but a sociality 
quite unlike earlier forms of community, since sociality must not create obligation. Raasta 
again is a symbol of the new public envisioned by the novel. Towards the end of the novel, 
after the girls have been found, Raasta’s mother, Shanta, is distraught at the impending 
psychological collapse of her brother, Bile. The mother is in tears in Bile’s clinic. Expanding 
on the allegory of individual and collective contained in the use of pronouns which has been 
a sustained concern of the novel, Raasta overcomes her fear “of plurals”, to draw those 











Raasta talked to her mother , then to Makka, then to the little sick girl in an inclusive way, 
making them all think that there was fun in plurals” (284). 
Raasta, in miniature, thus represents the protagonist, Jeebleh’s development. 
Jeebleh’s self-realization involves much more than just the renewed link with the 
motherland. It involves, more fundamentally, finding ways to link with others which do not 
compromise the independent self. Jeebleh, seeing his reflection in the mirrored sunglasses of 
Qasiir, the type of the new Somali urban youth, concludes “that he had changed a lot in the 
short time he had spent in the city of his birth” (292). The nature of this change involves the 
capacity of the autonomous, self-narrating subject to form associational bonds with other 
autonomous, self-narrating subjects: “My friends and I are forever linked through the chains 
of the stories which we share” (302). If, in closure of the classic realist novel, individual 
freedom is contained by the social bond of marriage, at the end of  Links, a broader sociality 
is imagined which is lyrically and triumphantly articulated through the closing words: “And 
we!” (303), which may allude to Leopold Bloom’s musings on the relationship of the 
individual to the national in Joyce’s Ulysses.  
Curiously, what is absent in closure is the irony requisite of the novel as a genre. 
Irony was generated out of the “tautological-teleological” compromise of individual 
autonomy with traditional morality. Irony is absent in Links. The “neo-realism” of the 
relatively coherent, improvisational self seems to transform the novel more and more into 
romance, one of the sources out of which the novel emerged, as referred to in an earlier 
chapter. Jeebleh, on this interpretation represents a kind of knight who rescues both the 
maiden, Raasta, and the common weal. The romance dimension of Farah’s neo-realism, 













III Knots and the Postcolonial Romance of the Public Sphere 
An incipient focus on alternative forms of community in Links is continued and enlarged in 
the next novel, Knots. Knots tells the story of the diasporic Somali who returns from Canada 
to her native land. In this novel also, the personal developmental tale is inextricably 
connected with a broader story of development, but this time not of national development, 
but the development of a form of postnational community. Cambara, the protagonist, returns 
to Mogadiscio for a host of overlapping reasons; but chief among them is her secret and 
outrageous intention of taking possession of a property owned by her family, now occupied 
by a minor Mogadiscio warlord. Repossessing the mansion which her family let out to 
diplomats and dignitaries appears to be part of a greater ambition to construct a “counterlife” 
of peace to war-decimated Mogadiscio. The family property acts in the novel as the symbolic 
locale for the reconstruction of Somali civil society. She knows that “as a woman alone she 
stands no chance of survival” (71), so she aligns herself with a women’s mutual help 
network, which appears to operate throughout Mogadiscio. Cambara’s ambition as Farah 
presents it is nothing less than to construct, single-handedly and at an oblique angle to 
Somalia’s historical trajectory, a version of the Habermasian public sphere.  
In this vision of the reconstruction of Somali society, stateless since the flight of the 
dictator, Siyad Barre, in 1991, Knots may again be contrasted with the earlier novel, Links. 
While Links seems to locate the potential for regeneration of Somali society in benevolent 
men, Knots locates the potential for reconstruction specifically in women. We encounter 











traumatized, overdosing himself on Prozac equivalents to keep himself quite literally from 
coming undone. Jettisoned also in Knots is the idea of the transformation of Somali society 
by a miracle child of peace. In Knots the task of Somali reconstruction is left squarely to 
women and is given shape through the formation of  Somali civil society.  For this 
monumental mission, the almost superwoman status with which her author imbues Cambara 
is vital. Cambara jets in from Canada, a knife-wielding martial arts expert who is also a 
make-up artist, actress, feted journalist and soon to be playwright and theatre director. 
 While public spheres have existed wherever there have been communities, the public 
sphere envisioned by Knots is a variation of the public sphere which emerges at the end of 
the eighteenth century in Europe, analyzed most notably by Jürgen Habermas. For 
Habermas, this public sphere embodies a utopian ideal, which in the course of history has not 
been realized. The bourgeois public sphere is a sphere of “private people [who] come 
together as a public” and engages in rational-critical debate which challenges public 
authority (Habermas 27-28). By implication, the participants in the potentially utopian public 
sphere are the subjects of a “disenchanted” world, where the participants view the world in 
the light of reason procedurally rather than substantively defined. Charles Taylor makes clear 
the unprecedented nature of this public sphere in a qualification of Habermas’s definition. 
The eighteenth century public sphere is “an instance of a new kind: a metatopical common 
space and common agency without an action transcendent constitution, an agency grounded 
purely in its own common actions” (Taylor Modern Social Imaginaries 86). In other words, 
in the Somali context, while a public sphere has always existed for public debate, radically 
democratic in its (gendered) inclusiveness, symbolized by the tree beneath which 











code of virtue, embodied in Islam and tradition, the law of God and the law going back to 
time immemorial. The actors in the Enlightenment public sphere, by contrast, are 
autonomous, morally self-constituting individuals. The public sphere thus constituted is 
purely horizontal, constituting exclusively in its activity its own higher order or morality.    
What is the nature of the Somali public sphere envisioned by Knots? If, as critics 
suggest, the reference to “private people” in the formulation of the bourgeois public sphere is 
a euphemism for propertied men, then by contrast, the private individuals of the public 
sphere in Knots quite explicitly is a sphere of propertied women. Somali civil war atrocities 
are symbolized by dirt, filth, ordure, graphically represented in virtually all of the male 
characters. Cambara, for example, finds Bile, the Robinson Crusoe figure in Links, 
physically unable to raise himself from his own excrement since he has fallen apart 
psychically. In the same way that Cambara cleans up both Bile and his apartment, the text 
suggests that women need to “clean up” what is rotten in the “state” of Somalia. The task of 
Somali reconstruction in this novel is presented as the task of women since even men with 
the will to challenge the civil war lack the capacity to effect any change.  
Knots thus constructs ab initio a female public sphere. This female public sphere is 
not a counter-public sphere. In the civil war Somalia of the novel, there is no male public 
sphere. Neither is there any public authority since there is no state. The female public sphere 
is created as if in a vacuum. There is, furthermore, no sharp division as with the bourgeois 
public sphere, between public activity and private deliberation. The Somali female public 
sphere takes on what in Habermas’s formulation would constitute the function of public 











Women’s Network takes the initiative for the provision of healthcare and acts as police, 
judge and jury in cases of the abuse of women.  
Habermas’s conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere constructs the division 
between public and private so that traditional women’s work and women’s concerns fall into 
the realm of the private and thus are not open to political deliberation and transformation. 
The Somali female public sphere as presented in Knots, gestures towards opening up the 
sphere of women’s work to public deliberation. But it does so in a way which seems to limit 
concerns to middle class worlds. This novel indulges in studiedly “throwaway” references to 
female attire, day and night creams, make-up and shoes. Cambara also invests an inordinate 
amount of effort cooking. In a  variation of the adage that the way to a man’s heart is through 
his stomach, Cambara cooks for the various child soldiers and battlewagon security guards to 
win them over. All of the principle female characters are professionals, but also mothers. Yet 
the novel’s projection of a Somali female public sphere does not in any fundamental way 
challenge the division between female reproduction and male social subject production. The 
women of the Somali female public sphere bear and raise children, cook and keep house, but 
these are not the activities around which their public sphere is developed. Traditional 
women’s work remains excluded from real debate even though it is brought out from what 
Habermas describes as the “shadowy realms” of the intimate sphere of the bourgeois 
household. The Somali female public sphere maintains the masculine division between 
public and private activity through locating the real work of a public sphere elsewhere, as we 
shall see. As such, the female public sphere presented by Knots appears merely to be a 











It would appear that part of Cambara’s mission all along has been to stage a play in 
the family property, repossessed from the minor warlord. Like Habermas’s bourgeois public 
sphere, the Somali public sphere envisioned by Knots seems to consolidate itself through 
cultural expression. But there are also marked differences between the two public spheres. 
For Habermas, the private individuals of the bourgeois public sphere at the outset are a 
reading public. This appears not to be the case in the Mogadiscio constructed by Knots. A 
few of the male characters in the novel, through their dispositions and social conscience, act 
as token women. Bile is one such character. When she first meets him, Bile “is holding a 
book gingerly and using his index finger as a bookmark; …” (169). Unfortunately, “no 
matter how hard she tries, [Cambara] is unable to make out the title of the book he has on his 
lap.” (169) Thus, while the bourgeois public sphere developed organically out of economic 
and cultural transformations of which letter writing, an improved postal service, burgeoning 
newspaper and periodical circulation, the development of the scholarly journal, the activity 
of the literary critic and widespread reading of novels were hallmarks, the private individuals 
of the Somali public sphere are not conceived by the novel as a reading public. No matter 
how hard Cambara tries, the book on Bile’s lap cannot be identified and cannot come to 
occupy even a symbolic role. Similarly, when later in the novel Cambara tries to read 
Flannery o’ Connor’s short story, “Good Country People”, she finds she is “unable to 
concentrate, turning the pages without retaining any of what she has read” (351). Somalis, 
particularly Somalis who have remained in the Somali territories, constitute an oral rather 
than literate public. Paradoxically, although the public envisioned by Knots is not a reading 
public, the individuality displayed by its full members is an individuality derived originally 











Bildungsroman. Cambara intends “to construct a counterlife dependent on a few individuals, 
namely Kiin, maybe Bile and Dajaal, whom she has cast in the likeness of reliable allies” 
(201). The characters whom Cambara is able to enter into association with, rather than those 
whose purpose consists in being functionaries, are all products of the formation ideal which 
is the project of all Farah’s novels. But the focus in this novel falls on identity formation 
through theatre and the electronic media since Somalis remain predominantly oral.    
Ironically, although the public to be incorporated by Knots is largely not a reading 
public, nevertheless, full entry into this sphere depends upon “full” individuality. As has 
been suggested earlier, the construction of such individuality relies in no small part upon the 
technology of the Bildungsroman. What makes Knots slightly different from the earlier 
Bildungsromane in Farah’s oeuvre, is that, here, construction of “re-inventing” individuals 
for an imagined community is so deliberate. The centrality of the individual is foregrounded 
in ways characteristic of the novels of Farah. Farah’s protagonists without exception reflect a 
consuming preoccupation with the self. Cambara is no exception. Cambara’s mission in 
Mogadiscio depends only secondarily on securing the right allies and procuring the 
appropriate means of defence. More than anything else,  realizing her ambitions depends 
upon the realization of a particular sense of self. It is an abstracted sense of self, wholly 
disengaged from its context, which exists as a defined object manipulated and structured at 
will by the radically reflexive mind. In order to consolidate and develop this “audience-
oriented” self, Cambara displays the tendency to isolate herself.  Like the individuals of the 
bourgeois home Habermas describes, Cambara repeatedly needs to withdraw into the private 
spaces of her bedroom or bathroom either at her cousin’s house or at Kiin’s hotel. Her need 











of the return of the warlord is excluded. The public space of Kiin’s hotel must be replaced by 
the privacy of the family property. Privacy figures in the novel not as the occasional need to 
be by oneself. Privacy appears to constitute a fundamental feature of the individuality 
represented. The new individuality which comes to light is the performative identity which 
rehearses its roles before the mirror. 
The language used to describe Cambara’s private, inner world is revealing. When 
Cambara first meets Kiin, a leading personality in the Women’s Network, the text presents 
Cambara as feeling “invigorated” since “her awareness of selfhood [is] boosted”. (197) 
Before one of her meetings with Zaak, her repulsive, qaat-chewing cousin, the free indirect 
speech of the text suggests her possible response if Zaak should harangue her for wanting to 
improve his style of dress: “If he takes this line with her, then she will remind him that she 
has ceased to be the woman he used to know from the instant she unloaded him and that in 
her reinvented self, she cares less about what he wears, more about her own problems.” 
(208-9) Cambara believes also that Bile, the character with whom she most strongly 
identifies, will “supplement”, “complete” and “enrich” her “new self”. She considers 
“whether admitting SilkHair [the child she might adopt] into the parameters of her newly 
reconstructed self will have given it a firmer format.” (218-9) After one of her “sorties” into 
the city, Cambara almost invariably has to “regroup” her self. She needs to collect and 
compose her chosen vision of her self.  
For this task, mirrors play as significant a role in this text as they do in Farah’s other 
novels. The references are numerous, but consider this example: After a shopping expedition 
into Mogadiscio, Cambara removes her scarf and we are told, “The mirror reflects an old self 











which Cambara can measure her self, she very ingeniously sees a reflection of herself within 
herself. Cambara becomes her own mirror. She is in the back seat of a chauffeur driven car 
provided by Kiin: “Her veil removed, she is, in her mind’s eye, wearing a chemise, bought 
from a Pakistani outlet in Toronto, with a custom-made pair of baggy linen 
trousers”(emphasis added) (197). So great is the symbolic value of mirrors in the text, that 
the mirror gets internalized. This idea of the self dissociated from society with its 
concomitant potential for self-development,  a unique, internal “object” with unplumbed 
interior depths is taken in this novel a stage further. But it is a progression structurally 
contained in the autonomous self from which it proceeds. In Knots, the disengaged self 
appears free to be whomsoever it wants to be.   
Not everyone in the novel, it would appear, is equipped with the appropriate 
individuality for its version of the Somali public sphere. Cambara seeks in Mogadiscio to 
replace the son she lost in Canada with other children. Two possibilities present themselves. 
The first is a child soldier that her cousin, Zaak, employs to protect his home and himself. 
The second is an apparently orphaned child whom Cambara finds hanging about outside the 
hotel where she stays. Although the first child is a product of the patrilinear, pastoralist 
Somali clan system which values kinship to the extent that most Somali children are 
supposed to be able to give one not only their own names but also the names of their 
forefathers right up to the higher reaches of the family tree, the child who appears to fulfill 
Cambara’s maternal instincts is known only by a physical attribute. Because of his soft, 
wavy hair, this child is called SilkHair. Virtually without exception, those characters 
immersed in ways which could be described as traditional, appear to lack as individuals the 











characters who, through the nature of their subjectivity, must remain incidental, are 
identified only by external attributes. In the course of the novel, we come across characters 
like “SnubNose”, “TinyFeet”, “Red-Eyed Randy” and “Armed Companion”, to name just a 
few. Although some of these pastoralist “types” (both in loose definition and in Forster’s 
use) are essential to Cambara’s project of the construction of a public sphere, they are fated 
through their signal lack of the requisite individuality to the roles of mere functionaries.  
The orphan whom Cambara meets at the hotel, on the other hand, is not simply 
anointed according to some outstanding external feature. He is asked his name. It is Gacal. 
Gacal is a child born to expatriate Somalis who, though they have no Somali friends in the 
United States where they live, wish for their son to come to Mogadiscio to learn Somali 
culture. Gacal’s father is killed and his mother’s whereabouts are unknown. The cultivated 
Gacal, unlike SilkHair, displays a full individuality. Cambara studies Gacal: 
She finds the observation most becoming, out of the ordinary: a boy, not quite ten 
by her reckoning, who displays a developed-enough personality and qualifies as no 
one’s son … Gacal has the sort of flair you associate with the well-born. He carries 
himself with élan. It does not require much imagination to sense that he is of a 
different class, physically aware of where he is in relation to where others are. Not 
only does he surround himself with much space, but he is mindful not to encroach 
on yours. Does his behaviour point to a middle-class upbringing in his past? (229) 
 As if Gacal’s development were not complete, Cambara gives him a video version of Carlo 
Collodi’s Pinocchio to watch with Kiin’s daughters. The novel foregrounds an interpretation 
of the children’s story which highlights how, despite their circumstance, Good Bad Boys, as 
opposed to Bad Bad Boys can become well-adjusted. But Pinocchio is also a children’s tale 
which, as many children’s stories do, lays bare the mechanics often masked in adult fiction. 











boy made of wood, a mere puppet on a string, subject to dictates which are not his own, can 
become a real flesh and blood, thinking, feeling, reflecting, rational being determining his 
own course.The class specificity of the individuality required for the novel’s version of a 
Somali public sphere is apparent. 
 Through a noticeable attention to consumerism and life as “style”, evident in the 
focus on clothing, shoes, make-up, table settings, food and the common leisure activities of  
a select group, the public sphere envisioned in Knots bears a remarkable similarity to the 
lifestyle enclave which is: 
… linked most closely to leisure and consumption and is usually unrelated to the 
world of work. It brings together those who are socially, economically, or 
culturally similar, and one of its chief aims is the enjoyment of being with those 
who ‘share one’s lifestyle’. … Whereas a community attempts to be an inclusive 
whole, celebrating the interdependence of public and private life … lifestyle is 
fundamentally segmental and celebrates the narcissism of similarity… (Bellah et al 
72). 
The focus no longer is, as it was in Maps, on the illusion of an autonomous self revealed to 
be an aesthetic construct. Rather, at this moment in Farah’s career which reflects a global 
trend, the focus is on how a relatively coherent, constructively self-reflexive subject “styles” 
itself. The concept of self-styling draws upon, but also misreads gnothi seaton, the Greek 
invocation to “care of the self”, taken up by Michel Foucault in The History of Sexuality 
(Smart, B. Rajchman, J.). The life of the individual here is presented as an “aesthetic or 
cultural project”. In other words, where earlier the subject was projected as nothing but a 
literary construct, now the subject constructs itself as a work of art. Where earlier, morality 











An associated move is identified in the focus on performance - on theatre, masks and 
costumes. “Performativity” has been presented as a liberatory project particularly in the 
context of “gender construction” (Butler). “Performance” of hybrid identity in the context of 
“nomadism” on an international scale is interrogated by May Joseph. She suggests:  
… this new cosmopolitanism [is] often neither stable, easily penetrated, legal nor 
necessarily progressive in their internationalizing imperatives. On the contrary, the 
enticing logic of consumption as the great leveler of nations, national identities, 
and competing modes of citizenship conceals the exclusionary and nondemocratic 
tendencies embedded in this logic that contradict the hard-fought battles for 
alternative venues of public citizenship waged by various political identities (8).   
The focus on performance is not a wholly new concern in Farah’s novels. Acting, 
playing out a role, dramatizing the self is alluded to in the childhood games of the young 
Askar in Maps, and is the subject of more obvious attention in Secrets. The transnational, 
transsexual, “transspecies” characters, Sholoongo and her brother, Timir, represent the 
fantastic ideal of performative identity. Timir introduces himself to Kalaman in the following 
way: “I am an all-around theatre person , … I teach the theory of theatre, I act 
semiprofessionally in plays whenever I have the time or opportunity” (56). The sister 
Sholoongo “assumes the different personae an actor assumes” (200). By the end of Knots, it 
appears that staging a play in the ballroom of the repossessed family home is the true 
purpose of  Cambara’s return to Mogadiscio. In this context, she is able to construct an ideal 
non-authoritarian, liberatory community out of “like-minded” performative selves.  
What the focus on performativity elides, however, is the prior, ideologically fixed 
self which scripts its roles for itself. The self-inventing, self-narrating subject is always 











of the modern disengaged conception of identity. The paradox inherent in this idea of 
performativity is pointedly elicited in the “folk wit” cited by Kellman in an overview of the 
self-generating artwork, to the effect that “Abraham Lincoln was born in a log cabin which 
he helped his father to build” (1251). Attention to “styling” of the self, effaces the prior self 
which is always already “styled”.  
Knots glowingly constructs a liberatory postnational Somali community out of a 
diasporic cast. In this respect, the narrative moves closer to the genre of romance. Michael 
McKeon, referred to in an earlier chapter, identifies as “romance” those elements in 
eighteenth century novels which defy the formal realism attendant upon the individualism 
Ian Watt suggests is constitutive of the novel genre. Included under the rubric “romance”, 
McKeon includes spirituality, stock situations and conventions, and traditional plot, among 
other elements. What McKeon identifies as “romance” is a version of what Taylor might 
identify as the “external morality” constitutive of the individual. In other words, included 
under the rubric “romance” are those elements of sociality which novelistic individualism 
relies upon but must efface in order to come into existence as a genre. “Romance”, the 
external higher order of sociality is what Farah’s latter novels tend towards. But while the 
recognition of an external eudaimonia in realism generated irony, romance in Farah’s neo-
realism negotiates subject constitution in such a way that irony is dissipated. 
Fredric Jameson, in an essay on the importance of attention to the analysis of “the 
history of the forms” (Jameson “Romance as Genre” 136), suggests that the fullest account 
of “romance as a mode has been given by Northrop Frye” (Jameson “Romance as Genre” 
138) (emphasis in original). Frye defines the romance, the “mythos of summer”, thus: 
The romance is nearest of all literary forms to the wish-fulfilment dream, and for 











intellectual class tends to project its ideals in some form of romance, where the 
virtuous heroes and beautiful heroines represent the ideals and the villains the 
threats to their ascendancy. […] The perennially child-like quality of romance is 
marked by its extraordinarily persistent nostalgia, its search for some kind of 
golden age in time or space (186). 
The postcolonial romance imperative which drives Knots need not be rehearsed. 
What needs to be clarified, however, is the fact that romance, unlike fantasy, desires “a 
fulfillment that will deliver it from the anxieties of reality but will still contain that reality 
(Frye 193). In other words, the concern of romance is paradise, but the paradise it constructs 
is mundane. The hero of the romance according to Frye is a “mythical Messiah or deliverer”, 
but on a human scale. In the earlier “Blood in the Sun” trilogy and the possible trilogy in 
progress, strong gestures are made towards prophetic deliverance through a golden child, but 
in Knots, this tendency is restrained. The new world envisaged is a secular one, constructed 
by a woman in profane time. Absent in Knots also, is the irony constitutive of the novel as 
genre, confirming a circling back to the historical origins of the novel.   
The brave new world created by Knots is constructed by metropolitan Somali 
intellectuals. The diaspora the novel has its eye on is not the members of the Somali diaspora 
in Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States. It is the intellectual, 
professional and business class diaspora in Canada, Europe and the United States. So, while 
one can choose to be whatever one wants to be, the range of subjects to whom this choice is 
open is radically limited. Some sense of the closed boundaries of a text which in other ways 
is nomadic on an international scale, is apparent from the extensive, detailed and coldly 
efficient description of the security which surrounds Cambara’s theatrical debut: 
To ensure that there are no lapses in security, which Dajaal has planned 











several inner and outer circles and a minimum of three checkpoints, … All manner 
of communication gadgets are in use: walkie-talkies, a landline telephone at the 
property, and several handheld mobiles. At each checkpoint , there are men with 
machine guns hidden from view, the second security ring having only the 
“technical” as part of a show of force, if it comes to that (415).         
What is curious about the ending in Knots, is that concern with keeping others out does not 
register as ironic undercutting of closure. It is instead, merely a practical concern. The novel 
does not address the question of what to do with the barbarians at the gate. But the 
implication is that they must be permanently excluded. Or some intervention is required; 



























The novels of Nuruddin Farah engage a wide range of critical concerns. Thematic 
explorations of the novels include the focus on social and political issues like feminism, 
colonization, nationalism and postcolonial dictatorship, as well as civil war. The 
representation of Somali culture, orality and religion have also drawn critical attention. 
Generic engagements include analysis of the affinity the novels share with the genre of the 
detective story, for example.  Questions of form have been addressed, focusing on the use in 
the novels of the techniques of modernism and postmodernism. The common thread running 
through all these varied approaches, however, is Farah’s concern with the individual both as 
object of the operation of power and subject of transformation. 
 This thesis has argued that the conception of the subject as individual is not universal 
and not neutral in its political effect. While the novels expose traditional gender identities, 
kinship structures and nationalism as representing ideologically charged constructs, the 
novels assume the notion of the subject as individual as completely natural. 
 Relying on the work of philosopher, Charles Taylor, this thesis has shown that the 
dominant contemporary model of the subject is the product of the historical, social, religious 
and cultural development of modernity. The disengaged, autonomous subject is a product of 
societies of the North-Atlantic in the period of historical modernity. Based on philosophical 
argument, Charles Taylor shows that questions of the human person cannot be entertained 
without addressing moral questions. The higher order throughout human history in all parts 
of the world has been identified external to the self. For Taylor this includes Buddhism 











philosophy as the procedurally rational philosophy of modernity. According to Taylor, only 
modernity  is marked by the internalization of the moral sources.  
This thesis has shown that the novel is the most significant cultural form which, in 
part, constitutes modern identity. The novel responds to social, cultural, philosophical and 
economic changes, but also formally consolidates the internalization of moral sources which 
identifies the modern subject as individual. More than merely a representation of 
individualism, the novel, in part, constitutes the individual.  
In Farah’s novels, various articulations of individualism may be identified. In the 
early work, most significantly informed by formal realism, the moral sources are shown to 
inhabit the novel heroine, who thereby possesses limitless freedom. In order to achieve 
closure, however, individual freedom must submit to socialization. The individual here 
submits to a socially constituted morality, but that submission is presented as the outcome of 
individual desire – the “tautological-teleological” premise of the Bildungsroman, that sub-
genre of the novel which comes to define the novel itself. Social compromise in the novel 
registers formally as irony. The techniques of modernism in Farah’s later novels, through the 
reflection of irony on itself, allow the displacement of morality onto form or the aesthetic. As 
this move becomes routine in postmodernism, infinite self-reflexivity fragments the self. 
This fragmentation of the self is ambiguously represented as both pathological and 
liberatory.  
Since, however, some form of centred subject remains requisite to Farah’s political 
commitment, grounded as it is upon individual agency, the later works return to a model of a 
relatively coherent subject inhabiting a type of “neo-realism.” This is a version of realism 











moral orientation. In the later novels, this capacity of the individual for invention of both the 
self and the self’s moral horizon is framed in the discourse of performativity and styling. 
What the idea of the self-fashioning subject ignores is the effacement of the prior 
disengaged, autonomous subject upon which it is premised.   
Farah’s political commitment cannot, however, in terms of Taylor’s argument, 
originate from the individualist philosophy the novels support. Commitment to justice, 
equality and freedom can only originate socially and, Taylor argues further, transcendentally. 
Ignoring this dimension of the constitution of the higher order has the paradoxical effect in 
the novels of excluding precisely those subjects for whom Farah desires a utopian future.   
Farah’s achievement, as yet incomplete since the likely third trilogy awaits closure, 
represents a strategy which transforms the novel from Lukács’s genre of “transcendental 
homelessness” to a genre which finds a home. In terms of Farah’s project, the novel 
negotiates a mode whereby it can be, in Novalis’s formulation of the drive of philosophy to 
which Lukacs alludes, “at home everywhere.” Farah’s novels chart the journey of the novel 
as the genre of transcendental homelessness to a genre which is at home everywhere. In 
order to discover the meaning of life purely immanently, “everywhere”, the novel has to 
return to its origins in more social forms, in particular, romance. But the sociality represented 
by the genre of romance is masked by the  illusion of performative identity which effaces its 
coming into being out of the disengaged, autonomous self – the individual. In this way the 
novels ultimately occlude attachment to the form of totality embodied in the contradictory 
idea of the unlimited freedom of the disengaged, autonomous self. The novels 
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